Jul

10

People Are from Earth; OFAC Is from Saturn


Posted by at 10:25 pm on July 10, 2013
Category: General

On Another PlanetThe latest technical amendments promulgated last Friday by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) make me wonder where the people who write these rules come from. Mars, perhaps? No, further out. I’m guessing they come from Saturn because even someone from Mars might have a better idea about how things actually work here on planet Earth.

These technical amendments add to the Terrorism Sanctions Regulations and the Global Terrorism Sanctions Regulations a rule reflecting OFAC’s infamous guidance dealing with ownership interests by blocked parties. First, let’s quote the regulation in question and then, in case you don’t speak Saturnian, translate it into English as spoken here on Earth.

A person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 594.201(a) has an interest in all property and interests in property of an entity in which it owns, directly or indirectly, a 50 percent or greater interest.

Translated from Saturnian into English this means, more or less:

Terrorists have an interest in things in which they have a 50 percent or greater interest.

Who says you can’t make a living printing tautologies in the Federal Register? People have an interest in things that they have an interest in. Who would have thought?

Next we have this:

The property and interests in property of such an entity, therefore, are blocked, and such an entity is a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to § 594.201(a), regardless of whether the entity itself is listed in the Annex to Executive Order 13224, as amended, or designated pursuant to § 594.201(a)

Again, for those of you who haven’t made it through the Rosetta Stone DVDs on Saturnian, this says in English:

You have to block the assets of companies who aren’t on the SDN list if they are owned 50 percent or more by someone who is on the list

Now this may make sense on Saturn, at least if you’re a business on Saturn and are deciding whether to sell a light phaser or flying saucer fuel to a three-legged, four-eyed alien who has just walked into your shop. But, here on Earth, not so much.

To begin with, how does anyone screen for blocked parties who aren’t on the list of blocked parties? Simple, you say, just ask every company you’re screening for the name of all its 50 percent or greater owners. Okay, so I do that and I find out that the majority owner isn’t on the list. Home free! Not so fast. Who owns the majority owner? Because if he is owned by a blocked party, then his property is blocked, meaning the company you are screening is blocked and its assets must also be blocked. Okay, so you ask for the names of owners greater than 50 percent and owners of owners with more than a 50 percent interest. But wait, even if the owner of the owner isn’t on the list, the owner of the owner of the owner might be and so forth.

And, of course, there’s another problem with this rule as some innocent investors in Illinois learned. These blocking rules apply not just to the interest of the blocked party but to the interest of the minority investors as well. And they apply even if the majority investor (or the majority investor in the majority investor) is designated after the investment. So, let’s say that Mr. A owns 51 percent of Company B which owns 51 percent of company C and that, several years after his investment, he’s designated by OFAC as an SDN. The 49 percent investors in both Company B and C now have their investments blocked. How can anyone protect themselves against that? What crystal ball are people supposed to use to predict whether a person they are doing business with won’t become an SDN in the future?

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Jul

2

Just What We Need: More Export Controls


Posted by at 6:42 pm on July 2, 2013
Category: Arms ExportCyber WeaponsExport Control Proposals

Hacking in Progress, image by Cristiano Betta (Flickr: Barcamp London 3 @ Google Offices UK) [CC-BY-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AHacking_in_progress_at_BarCampLondon_3.jpgThe Senate Armed Services Committee has favorably reported S. 1197, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014. And, you will be pleased to know (or maybe not), they have slipped into the bill a proposal for new export controls, this time on software that could be characterized as “cyber weapons.”

What got the immensely tech savvy aging Senators all whirled up on cyber weapons was, apparently, testimony they received in hearings on the bill about the Shamoon virus. Shamoon, in addition to being an excellent name for a dog, is also the name of a computer virus that struck Aramco in Saudi Arabia and rewrote or destroyed data on hard drives. No doubt the Senators were particularly vexed that one of the payloads carried by Shamoon was a picture of a burning U.S. flag which was used to overwrite some of the data.

So now section 946 of the proposed Defense Authorization Act requires the President to convene an “interagency process … to control the proliferation of cyber weapons through unilateral and cooperative export controls.” The Senate Report on the proposed legislation acknowledged that there might be some difficulty distinguishing between “cyber weapons” (bad) and “dual-use, lawful intercept, and penetration testing” technologies” (good). But, hey, that’s what an interagency process is for!

Now, the million dollar question, of course, is whether new export controls on cyber weapons would have had any impact on Shamoon. The answer, not surprisingly, is probably not. Kapersky Labs, which dissected the virus, concluded that the virus was riddled with a number of “silly errors” which limited its effectiveness and likely was the work not of sophisticated cyber criminals but was a “quick and dirty” job by “skillful amateurs.” Significantly, it was not something that the hackers acquired in the United States (or anywhere else) and exported but home-grown, error-ridden code. The only people who are going to be bothered by section 946 and its proposed export controls will be legitimate manufacturers of network intercept, analysis and testing software.

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Jun

27

What Do These Two People Have in Common?


Posted by at 9:42 pm on June 27, 2013
Category: OFAC

Dick Armey and Ringo Starr [fair use]

Indeed, what do former House Majority Leader Richard Armey and former Beatle Ringo Starr have in common? Other than, of course, immense artistic talent and devilish good looks. Well, they both are named Richard and they both were born on July 7, 1940. This means, surprisingly, at least as far as the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) is concerned that they are both not merely 73-year-old men named Richard but are, in fact, one and the same person.

If you don’t believe that, tell that to Wells Fargo Bank which just got whacked by OFAC to the tune of $23,937 for opening up bank accounts for people that had the same birthdates as narcotics kingpens on the SDN list and that had names that shared part of their names with those narcotics kingpens. Wells Fargo opened an account for Carlos A. Ruelas (who had a U.S. address and a U.S. social security number) who allegedly was Carlos Antonio Ruelas Topete who was on the SDN list with a Tijuana, Mexico address. (Ruelas Topete was deleted from the SDN list last January.) The bank also opened an account for Claudia Aguirre (who also had a U.S. address and a U.S. Social Security) who allegedly was Claudia Aguirre Sanchez who is on the SDN list with a Tijuana address.

The moral of the story here, whether or not the account holders were or were not SDNs, is that it’s probably a good idea to screen not just by names but by birthdates as well.  And the next time you see Dick Armey see if you can get him to play the drum part for “I Wanna Hold Your Hand.”

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Jun

25

OFAC v. ATP: Game, Set, Match to OFAC


Posted by at 9:27 pm on June 25, 2013
Category: Iran SanctionsOFAC

J. Edmond Barre http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:J._Edmond_Barre.jpg [Public Domain]In its quest to keep the world safe from an Iranian nuclear bomb, the Office of Foreign Assets Control has focused its laser-like scrutiny on an Iranian tennis referee. Obviously, the same skills required to call a ball out or to halt a match for rain are critical to the process of uranium enrichment.

In this regard, OFAC has just fined ATP Tour, Inc. $48,600 as part of a settlement of charges that ATP had made “salary payments to an individual who is ordinarily resident in Iran … for services rendered and expenses incurred in connection with ATP tournaments the individual officiated.” The settlement documents do not reveal the individual involved but it almost certainly has to be Ali Nili, a well-known Gold Badge tennis umpire who has frequently officiated ATP and other international tennis matches.

One of the things that probably, and somewhat justifiably, hacked off OFAC is that apparently ATP made 8 payments to the Iranian referee after it had received a warning letter from OFAC about the payments. That was probably a bad idea, since even OFAC admits in the settlement papers that paying Iranian refs “represent[s] relatively low harm to the sanctions program.” You think? OFAC also indicates that the payments were probably licensable.

Another interesting area of speculation, not directly revealed in the settlement documents, is what is currently being done with Ali Nili who is still officiating ATP matches, like this one at the Shanghai Rolex Masters in 2012. I’m assuming that ATP has now in fact applied for, and received,  an OFAC license.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jun

17

FCPA Totally Useful As a Secondary Sanctions Program


Posted by at 6:14 pm on June 17, 2013
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDoJEconomic SanctionsFCPAIran SanctionsOECDSEC

Total Gas Station in France http://www.total.com/MEDIAS/MEDIAS_INFOS/1564/FR/station-service-morinvilliers-France-media.jpg [Fair Use]

The U.S. Department of Justice recently announced that Total, S.A., the French oil and gas company, agreed to pay $245.2 million to resolve charges that it paid bribes to an Iranian government official by way of purported consulting agreements from 1995 to 2004 in order to secure, among other things, oil and gas rights in Iran. The Justice Department described the case against Total as “the first coordinated action by French and U.S. law enforcement in a major bribery case.” The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission also reached a settlement with Total pursuant to which Total agreed to pay $153 million to resolve related FCPA allegations.

There is a lot to be said about Total’s settlement. At almost $400 million combined, Total’s payments are in the pantheon of largest payments ever for FCPA matters, along with Siemens, KBR and BAE. Another interesting component to the Total case, however, is its potential effectiveness for economic sanctions enforcement vis-à-vis Iran.

In the past few weeks, Congress and the White House have been busy expanding U.S. economic sanctions against foreign persons for their dealings with Iran. We reported recently on the current House bill that would expand sanctions against foreign banks engaging in certain transactions with Iranian banks. The President last week issued an executive order expanding secondary sanctions against, for example, foreign banks’ rial-based transactions as well as certain dealings by anyone with most persons on the SDN List pursuant to sanctions against Iran.

These secondary sanctions, however, provide U.S. enforcement authorities with a great deal of discretion on if and when to designate foreign persons to the SDN List. Pushing the bounds of secondary sanctions beyond those against foreign persons with substantial ties to the Iranian government, of course, runs the risk of offending other countries who continue to permit their companies to do business with Iran.

Given these limitations, the FCPA would appear to be an effective tool the United States can use in applying pressure against foreign persons doing business with Iran. Although the FCPA carries its own extraterritorial criticisms, corruption is a global issue that many countries have committed itself to address whether by national law or membership to groups like the OECD.

While the United States differs with other countries on precisely what sanctions policies to adopt against Iran, Sudan, Syria or North Korea for current conflict or human rights concerns in those countries, there would seem to be a common allegiance to combat corruption there. It just so happens all four countries are among the most corrupt countries in the world as annually ranked by Transparency International. The Total case at least sends the message to foreign companies that business as usual in Iran can result in significant FCPA penalties and possible cooperation from authorities in the companies’ home countries in bringing them about.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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