Oct

7

An Iranian Skyscraper in NYC Shows a Juicy Side of Sanctions Enforcement


Posted by at 5:08 pm on October 7, 2013
Category: Criminal PenaltiesEconomic SanctionsIran SanctionsOFAC

Source http://650Fifth.com [Fair Use]

In an 82-page opinion issued last month, U.S. District Judge Katherine Forrest granted forfeiture of 650 Fifth Avenue, a 36-story building in midtown Manhattan which houses, among other posh tenants, the flagship store for Juicy Couture. The impending problems for 650 Fifth started when the former Iranian Shah Pahlavi formed a U.S. non-profit, which borrowed $42 million from Bank Melli in 1975 to retire a loan on the property at 650 Fifth and construct the building itself. (Bank Melli is wholly owned and controlled by the Iranian government.) What followed in 1979, of course, was the Iranian Revolution and, over the next decade, the Iranian government developed an ownership structure of the property and building at 650 Fifth, which resulted in, among other things, creation of U.S. entities controlled by the Iranian government to transfer rental income from 650 Fifth to Bank Melli.

The case is without question one-of-a-kind and, as such, grabbed news headlines when forfeiture was granted. It should be noted, however, that the issue of whether 650 Fifth was ever blocked property was not brought before the court even though Bank Melli’s property or interests in property in the United States were blocked beginning in 2007. Instead, the United States commenced a forfeiture action in 2008. 650 Fifth became, in effect, a blocked property via forfeiture on the grounds that, as Judge Forrest explained under U.S. forfeiture law, 650 Fifth Avenue is property that “bear[s] a substantial connection” to violations of IEEPA, namely violations of Iranian sanctions in which U.S. entities controlled by the Iranian government provided services to the Iranian government by way of the entities’ ownership and management of 650 Fifth, including collecting rental income from the building and remitting it to the Iranian government via Bank Melli.

In the case of 650 Fifth, forfeiture is quite a costly penalty with the building itself reportedly valued between $500 and $700 million, and the opinion stating that at least $75 million had been reinvested in the building by the Iranian government. Forfeiture of the building itself makes it one of the largest U.S. sanctions penalties ever.

The upshot of this decision for other circumstances that don’t include a Manhattan skyscraper owned and controlled by the Iranian government is a reminder that any violation of IEEPA-based sanctions carries with it a potentially hefty penalty in the form of forfeiture that won’t be found in OFAC’s regulations except their reference that sanctions violations “may also be subject to … other applicable law.” When considering what is at stake in a sanctions violation, property connected to the violation has to be part of the calculus, especially in circumstances where the government pursues a criminal violation and seeks a monetary penalty that requires forfeiture of such property to meet it. In an egregious case like 650 Fifth, the building itself fit the bill.

Clif adds: It is important to understand that the defendants in the case were found by the judge to have concealed the interest of Bank Melli and to have concealed the payment of the rent collected by the U.S. owners to Bank Melli.  This is why Juicy Couture, or the other tenants in the building, are unlikely to receive nastygrams from OFAC alleging that they violated the Iran sanctions through payment of their rent.   Also, because Bank Melli was not the owner of the building, but was simply receiving income from the building, the building itself would not be blocked.  Hence, forfeiture was the more viable option for the U.S. Government.  Plus, of course, the USG now owns the building and receives the rental income.  If it had been blocked, the current owners would still “own” the building while all rental income would sit in blocked accounts.

 

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Oct

3

Shutdown Blues


Posted by at 6:52 pm on October 3, 2013
Category: General

Based on photograph By Daderot (Own work) [CC0], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3APatent_quote_-_United_States_Department_of_Commerce_-_DSC05103.JPGMore on the 2013 shutdown and export issues:

Commerce: BIS yesterday updated its website to inform exporters that the SNAP-R licensing page was closed until the government shutdown is ended. Emergency license applications will be accepted but only if justified on grounds of national security. It is probably safe to say that your need to export cattle prods to Estonia won’t meet that standard.

Treasury: News reports (like this one) indicate that the offices of OFAC have been pretty much emptied out by the shutdown. The folks on the Hill are lamenting that these means that OFAC won’t be deterring Iran from its nuclear ambitions. No one seems to mention that it also means that means that medicines and medical devices not covered by the general licenses but eligible for specific licenses won’t be making it to Iran. No big surprise there, I suppose.

State: DDTC is still saying it has staff through Friday, October 4, and only emergency licenses after that.

With export licensing and classification decisions shut down for the duration, you have to wonder whether the result of the Shutdown of 2013 will be a bumper crop of voluntary disclosures in the same way that there was a bumper crop of babies after the Great Blackout of 1965*

*Yes, I know that’s an urban legend.

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Oct

2

Fun Furlough Facts


Posted by at 11:07 am on October 2, 2013
Category: BISCuba SanctionsDDTCOFAC

Based on photograph By Daderot (Own work) [CC0], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3APatent_quote_-_United_States_Department_of_Commerce_-_DSC05103.JPGSo, you may be wondering which export agencies are up and which are down now that the Federal Government is shutdown. The answer isn’t altogether clear at this point (still!) but here is what appears to be the current rundown of things.

Treasury. The license application page is down with a note saying that licenses won’t even be accepted during the shutdown. If you need to file a TSRA or other license, you’re just going to have to wait until the government is open even to file the license.

State. Normal operations at least through Friday, October 4. After that, licenses will be accepted and acted on only in emergency situations.

Commerce. Crickets, as they say. Nothing but the sound of crickets from that corner. The BIS website makes no mention of the shutdown which means either it’s business at usual over at BIS (not very likely) or that they are so shut down they can’t even post something on the front page of their website.

USITC. Looking for the correct HTUS code to put on an AES form? Too bad. The online version of the Harmonized Tariff is down for the duration. Now aren’t you sorry you didn’t print out all 3,456,732.12 pages of it?

Radio Marti. Well, you can’t get a license to send food to Cuba during the shutdown, but the federal government has decided that propaganda is an essential service, and Radio Marti broadcasts to Cuba will continue unabated, shutdown or not. Apparently, the Cubans need to hear about our shutdown which proves that we’re a free country or something like that. Of course, Cuba’s jamming operations are also unaffected by the shutdown, so mostly the broadcasts to Cuba will be about as effective as they always have been.

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Sep

27

Treasury’s Bore


Posted by at 1:23 am on September 27, 2013
Category: OFAC

Treasury's War Cover [Fair Use]Juan Zarate’s new book on OFAC, Treasury’s War, is a crashing bore and I have to admit that about half way into it I gave up. Zarate had taken my money to buy the book; I wasn’t going to let him take any more of my time as well.

I wanted to like Zarate’s book. Zarate was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes during the Bush Administration, and I hoped that his book would provide interesting details on OFAC’s enforcement activities during his tenure. Instead, the book is mostly a lengthy self-encomium where Zarate depicts himself as a modern-day Elliot Ness who risked life and limb as one of Treasury’s “guerillas in gray suits.” Yes, he actually used that phrase. He also breathlessly relates a corkscrew landing he made (or more accurately the pilot made) during a trip to Afghanistan.

Most of the problem with the book is its deadly repetitiveness. The book might be a useful drinking game if you had to drink a shot every time Zarate says that terrorists need money, mentions Elliot Ness or describes the conference room where a meeting took place (Civil war currency on the wall! Historical artifacts such as silverware!  Mahogany conference tables! Views of the South Lawn!). I really began to suspect that Zarate was being paid by the word. We hear that one of his colleagues “looked like he belonged on the cover of GQ magazine.”

Not surprisingly, the book is also a completely uncritical look at OFAC’s activities after September 11. Zarate defends the controversial “80/20” rule for blocking assets when the agency only had 80 percent of the evidence needed to decide whether assets should be blocked. He complains about the reorganization that created the DHS and how it took away Treasury’s “guns and badges.” (The ghost of Elliot Ness appears again.) He also paints Richard Newcomb as a chief player in the war against terror notwithstanding that the former director of OFAC resigned on heels of criticism after OFAC told Congress in 2003 that OFAC “had just four full-time employees dedicated to investigating Osama bin Laden’s and Saddam Hussein’s wealth while nearly two dozen were working on Cuban embargo violations.”

There is only one interesting tidbit that I found before I gave up on the book, and it doesn’t reflect well on Zarate. During his discussion of efforts of OFAC to slurp up SWIFT data, Zarate reveals that in order to protect the sensitivity of this effort, they used the code name TURTLE for SWIFT. Who would have imagined that a reference to some financial resource named Turtle might in fact be a reference to SWIFT? No one. Not in a million years.

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Sep

25

Coming to America? What a Trip to NYC Could Mean for U.S. Sanctions on Sudan


Posted by at 9:30 pm on September 25, 2013
Category: Economic SanctionsSanctionsSudan

By U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Jesse B. Awalt/Released (DefenseImagery.mil, VIRIN 090202-N-0506A-724) [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AOmar_al-Bashir%2C_12th_AU_Summit%2C_090202-N-0506A-724.jpg
ABOVE: Omar Al-Bashir

From news that appeared to break recently in the Sudanese press, Sudanese President Omar Hassan al-Bashir submitted a visa application to the U.S. State Department in order for him to attend UN General Assembly meetings that begin next week. When asked about the application at Monday’s State Department press briefing, Deputy Spokesperson Marie Harf said, “We condemn any potential effort by President Bashir to travel to New York, given that he stands accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity by the International Criminal Court. We would say that before presenting himself to UN headquarters, President Bashir should present himself to the ICC in The Hague to answer for the crimes of which he’s been accused.” Harf continued, “Clearly, we have a visa application right now and would condemn any potential travel by him, but I just don’t have anything further than that.” While it can be expected the State Department will have a concrete position by next week, this situation, and the U.S. response, could serve as an important juncture in U.S. sanctions against Sudan.

Although Syria, Iran and North Korea have attracted most of U.S. foreign policy’s attention in the past year, Sudan remains among the few countries under a comprehensive U.S. trade embargo. Sanctions against Sudan, however, continue to allow foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to do business there, and the sanctions themselves do not even apply in general to what the Sudanese Sanctions Regulations refer to as “Specified Areas of Sudan.” The Areas, most of which are along the Sudan-South Sudan border, are among the richest in oil and other natural resources in the entire country.

From a U.S. sanctions perspective, Sudan is more open for U.S. business than Iran. Yet since Bashir’s last trip to the United States in 2006, former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has attended UN meetings in New York on several occasions and even spoke at Columbia University. Although his trips were not without controversy, Ahmadinejad was still permitted to enter (and leave) the United States. Reactions from the State Department and Ambassador Samantha Power about Bashir’s visa request point out a difference that Bashir has a warrant issued for his arrest by the ICC, an organization incidentally to which neither Sudan nor the United States are parties. In short, Bashir is one of the most condemned sitting foreign leaders by the United States and most of the world. His visa request, therefore, invites comparison to those prior ones of Ahmadinejad and other leaders of sanctioned countries.

Whether Bashir, his regime and, by extension, Sudan should be subject to stronger sanctions like those against Iran is a debate for U.S. foreign policymakers that is not treated as a political priority at the moment. What is significant about Bashir’s visa request is that Bashir himself may be forcing the issue on the United States, notwithstanding the widespread violence that has continued in Sudan to the present. Issuing or denying a visa both carry significant foreign policy consequences and may lead to a closer examination as to what current U.S. sanctions and export control objectives are with respect to Sudan.

Clif adds: It should also be noted that a denial of the visa for Al-Bashir would be a violation of Article IV of the UN Headquarters Agreement, pursuant to which the United States committed not to impose any “impediments to travel” by “representatives of Members” to UN Headquarters “irrespective of the relations existing between” the United States and the country involved.

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