Nov

11

From Russia with … Weapon Sights and a Diplomatic Row?


Posted by at 5:54 pm on November 11, 2013
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesDDTCUSML

By  Sgt. Scott M. Biscuiti [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ADefense.gov_photo_essay_090329-M-7747B-015.jpg

Last week, a federal judge in Wyoming set trial for February of next year for Russian Roman Kvinikadze, who was arrested this August on charges that he attempted to export thermal imaging weapon sights without a required license from the U.S. State Department.

The story of Kvinikadze’s arrest began last year when he contacted an undercover Department of Homeland Security agent on the Chinese e-commerce site, Alibaba.com.  It is unclear from court documents what the DHS agent posted on Alibaba.com to attract Kvinikadze, but it was enough for Kvinikadze to introduce himself as an aspiring hunting store owner that wanted a quote for weapon sights.  According to the criminal complaint, Kvinikadze eventually traveled to a Las Vegas gun show where the DHS agent told him that the sights required a U.S. export license but “there were other ways to ship the weapon sights without a license.”  Kvinikadze apparently expressed continued interest and later went to meet the agent in Wyoming, where he was arrested.

According to Russian media on Friday, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s human rights commissioner described Kvinikadze’s arrest as a “kind of American law enforcement agency approach to Russian citizens [that] is becoming increasingly disrespectful of international law and bilateral agreements, including the 1999 agreement on mutual legal assistance in investigating crimes.”  He also reportedly described Kvinikadze as “being knowingly provoked to violate the law as he was lured into the United States [to be arrested].”

The Russian government appears to be intimating Kvinikadze’s entrapment defense at trial.  Although a successful entrapment defense is difficult and complex, Kvinikadze appears to have a better chance than previous foreign nationals engaging with undercover U.S. agents online.  In September, we discussed the arrest of Patrick Campbell, the foreign national arrested at JFK airport for, among other things, having yellowcake uranium in his luggage.  In that case, again beginning on Alibaba.com, Campbell responded to a DHS agent’s solicitation for yellowcake and informed the agent that he could “handle” any U.S. export restrictions that concerned the agent in shipping uranium to Iran.

In Kvinikadze’s case, critical facts are the reverse: Kvinikadze found the DHS agent purporting to be a seller and the DHS agent was the one who informed Kvinikadze of  a required U.S. export license and “ways” to avoid getting one.  The criminal complaint is, however, peppered with suggestions that Kvinikadze was a sophisticated buyer and was not lured, but rather conspired, to export the sights illegally.

What may be Kvinikadze’s best defense is the Russian government’s support.  The Russian human rights commissioner has reportedly also said that “[Kvinikadze’s] situation is being closely followed by the Russian Foreign Ministry,” and that after Kvinikadze’s arrest, “our consular workers got in touch with him and with the prison authorities in Nebraska where he is being held … We will continue providing consular-legal assistance to our compatriot.”

There are, of course, a host of reasons why U.S. law enforcement looks for foreign threats on foreign websites where activity threatening U.S. security interests is taking place.  However, how such operations are conducted as well as their frequency and targets have, as this case shows, diplomatic ramifications.

Based on the Russian government’s response, one has to wonder how the United States would respond if the weapon sights were looking the other way.  How Russia’s response to Kvinikadze affects U.S. law enforcement strategy remains to be seen.  In the meantime, if sites like Alibaba.com are open for undercover U.S. law enforcement, any U.S. business should be keenly aware that other countries are likely doing the same.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Nov

7

Naming Names


Posted by at 10:09 pm on November 7, 2013
Category: BISDDTCDeemed ExportsExport Reform

By MediaPhoto.Org (mediaphoto.org Own work) [CC-BY-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ARussian_passports.jpgThe Bureau of Industry and Security has released new guidance on deemed re-exports which is intended to deal with issues arising when a U.S. company exports technology to a foreign company that then re-exports that technology to its own employees which are not of the same nationality as the foreign company receiving the technology export. The purpose of the guidance is to address certain issues raised by the current export control reform effort and, specifically, to deal with re-exports of technology relating to the newly created 600 series of items that have been transferred from the United States Munitions List (“USML”) to the Commerce Control List (“CCL”).

As the guidance notes, one of the overarching principles of the export control effort is that military items moved from the USML to the CCL should not thereby be subjected to more stringent controls than were applicable to the item when it was on the USML. Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (the “ITAR”) “technical data” is subject to certain license exemptions permitting technical data, in certain cases, to be transferred without license by foreign companies to their employees who are not of the same nationality as the foreign company. These employees include “third country nationals” who are nationals of countries other than the nationality of the foreign company involved and “dual nationals” which are nationals of two countries, one of which may, but does not necessarily include, the nationality of the foreign company.

The first of these exceptions, found in section 124.16 of the ITAR,  allows such retransfer from companies in NATO countries, the EU, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland to retransfer technologies to third country nationals who are also from such countries and subject to certain further conditions. And the other exception, found in section 126.18, permits intra-company transfers of technical data from the foreign company to employees without regard to the country restrictions of 124.16 but subject to certain other restrictions such as requiring the third country national employees to sign non-disclosure agreements and requiring the company to assure that the third country national doesn’t have “substantive contacts” with countries subject to arms embargoes under section 126.1 of the ITAR.

Nothing in the Export Administration Regulations (the “EAR”) provides equivalent license exceptions to permit the transfer of technology to nationals of NATO countries, the EU, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland without a license as permitted by section 124.16 of the ITAR. Accordingly, the new guidance indicates that it is the policy of BIS to permit transfers of technology relating to series 600 items without a license if the conditions of 124.16 are fulfilled. Also to the extent that section 126.18 of the ITAR permits transfers to third country nationals outside of the EU, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland if they sign an NDA and are screened for contacts with embargoed countries, BIS will permit similar transfers of series 600 technology.

The situation with section 126.18 is more complicated because section 126.18 addresses an issue under the ITAR that is not a problem under the EAR, namely the problem of dual nationals born in countries subject to arms embargoes. Section 126.18 was designed to deal with the thorny problem of dual nationals under DDTC which require that a dual national should be treated as a citizen of both countries. Accordingly a naturalized U.K. citizen born in China would still be treated as Chinese, and thus ineligible to receive ITAR-controlled technical data even if he had been awarded the OBE by the Queen because, in DDTC’s eyes, that dual national was irrevocably and permanently tainted with Chinese blood. Although such discrimination would be illegal if applied by DDTC in the United States, DDTC saw no problem with applying this rule in foreign countries even if it would, as it often did, violate the human rights laws of that foreign country to discriminate against someone solely based on place of birth. Under BIS rules, in contrast,
a person is treated as a citizen of the country of his or her most recent nationality. A naturalized UK citizen would be treated simply as a UK citizen without regard to the fact that he or she was born in China and was once Chinese. Thus, strictly speaking, the BIS guidance does not need to implement those parts of 126.18 as they relate to dual nationals.

There is, however, one problem relating to technology re-exports for series 600 items where the transfer from the USML to the EAR will subject the technology to more stringent requirements and which is not addressed by this guidance. Under DDTC’s application procedures, a U.S. exporter seeking authority for a foreign company to transfer technical data to its third country and dual nationals, the U.S. exporter need only list the nationalities of the employees. In other words, the U.S. exporter says, for example, that the technical data will be exported to French, German and Mexican nationals. Under BIS application guidelines, however, the U.S. exporter must give the names, passport numbers and addresses for each employee that will receive the technology re-export. In addition to that, a resume for each individual, showing education, employment history and military service, must be provided for each employee.

Over and above the obvious burden of compiling this information in the first place, the U.S. exporter will be required to obtain amendments or new authorizations each time the foreign transferee hires new employees in the affected program area. Under DDTC’s rules, an amendment is required only if an employee with a nationality not previously approved is hired. Granted this burden can be minimized to some extent through reliance on section 126.18, but this may not be possible where the foreign employer is either unable or unwilling to comply with all of the conditions required by section 126.18, including screening employees for contacts with embargoed countries, maintaining records of this screening, and fulfilling the other requirements of section 126.18.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)



Nov

5

Be Careful What You Say on LinkedIn


Posted by at 6:08 pm on November 5, 2013
Category: BISCriminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Nicholas Kaiga http://www.linkedin.com/in/nkaiga [Fair Use]
ABOVE: Nicholas Kaiga


According to a recently unsealed criminal complaint, a Belgian citizen, Nicholas Kaiga, has been charged with attempted unlicensed exports of export controlled aluminum tubing to Malaysia. The story recounted by the complaint begins with an order placed with a U.S. company for 7075 aluminum to be exported to a company in the UAE. Because 7075 aluminum is covered by ECCN 1C202, an export license application was filed with the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”). When BIS sent an employee to the company address in the UAE, it discovered that the address actually belonged to a different company. Worse, it belonged to a different Iranian company, so BIS denied the license.

Undeterred, the UAE company instructed that the aluminum be shipped to Belgium instead given that a license is not required to send 7075 aluminum to Belgium. Enter Mr. Kaiga and his company Industrial Metals and Commodities, which he apparently was running from his house in a residential area of Brussels. Mr. Kaiga went so far as to fill out a BIS Form 711 stating that the aluminum was destined to be resold in Belgium In cahoots with federal investigators, the U.S. company then shipped what purported to be 7075 aluminum (but was in fact a lower grade EAR99 aluminum)  to Kaiga, who then promptly shipped it to a company in Malaysia related to the Iranian company that ordered the 7075 aluminum in the first place. The shipment would have required a license both for export to Malaysia and, obviously, Iran, neither of which had been obtained.

Some time later, Mr. Kaiga made an improvident trip to New York and met with an undercover agent, whom he allegedly told that the aluminum was always intended to go to Malaysia. For good measure, Kaiga allegedly bragged to the agent about his ability to get around export controls. Then they arrested him.

An interesting footnote to all this is Mr. Kaiga’s expansive LinkedIn biography where he explains:

My overall experiences have taught me to become very flexible and adaptable to different manners of … working.

Maybe flexibility is not always such a good thing.  He also claims that one of his “specialties” is “managing high risk operations.” Not so much given the outcome of his trip to New York. He might want to change that when he gets access to a computer again in several years.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)



Oct

31

Lessons in Spycraft: Don’t Try This at Home


Posted by at 6:50 pm on October 31, 2013
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesDDTC

Source http://www.defenseimagery.mil/imagery.html#a=search&s=f-15&chk=6cff0&t=0&p=2&guid=76a6c050743c287abd63255e111c2a6e7a281d91 [Public Domaiin; work of federal employee]A New Jersey woman, Hannah Robert, was arraigned on Monday on charges that she exported ITAR-controlled technical drawings without a DDTC license in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. The drawings allegedly involved parts for the F-15, the Chinook helicopter and other military aircraft as well as nuclear submarines.

According to the DOJ press release, Ms. Robert used an unusual method of exporting the technical drawings to her overseas contact:

Starting in October 2010, Robert transmitted the military drawings for these parts to India by posting the technical data to the password-protected website of a Camden County, N.J., church where she was a volunteer web administrator. This was done without the knowledge of the church staff. Robert e-mailed R.P. the username and password to the church website so that R.P. could download the files from India. Through the course of the scheme, Robert uploaded thousands of technical drawings to the church website for R.P. to download in India.

A key element in any export prosecution is scienter, that is, proof that the defendant knew that his or her conduct was illegal. If these allegations are true, the prosecution is not going to have a hard time in establishing that Ms. Robert knew that she should not have sent these drawings out of the country without a license.

For espionage aficionados, this technique is known as a dead drop and in the Internet era dead drops have been done on such places as draft folders of shared Gmail accounts (viz., the love letters of General Petraeus and Paula Broadwell). It’s probably safe to say that churches, whether brick and mortar or their virtual locations, are not the best location for a dead drop. The DOJ press release doesn’t reveal how Ms. Robert got nabbed but I have a pretty clear picture of some shocked vicar stumbling on these drawings late one night and calling the feds.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)



Oct

30

Good Luck Collecting That Fine


Posted by at 7:01 pm on October 30, 2013
Category: General

Source http://www.dfsa.ae/Documents/Alerts%202012/004P_Alma%20Investment%20LLC_False%20Document_Reference%20to%20DIFC.pdf [Fair Use]The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) recently announced a whopping $1.5 million fine against “Alma Investment LLC, a UAE-based investment and advising company” for violations of U.S. sanctions on Iran. Since the case involved six electronic funds transfers for $103,283, the $1.5 million fine represents the maximum available fine.

One of the reasons for the mega-fine cited by OFAC was that “Alma did not cooperate with OFAC during the course of its investigation.” Reading between the lines, Alma didn’t cooperate because it never responded to or acknowledged OFAC’s requests for information, nor did it consent to the imposition of this fine. That is likely because Alma doesn’t really exist but was an entirely fictional company created as a scheme to defraud investors. The Dubai Financial Services Authority released a warning on Alma indicating Alma was fraudulently soliciting funds from investors and representing that it was registered in Dubai even though, according to DFSA, it was neither registered in Dubai nor present at the address it represented in Dubai. The website for Alma cited by the DFSA is no longer operational. So, I hope OFAC hasn’t spent the $1.5 million yet.

However, I do suggest that the agency take a look at fining Oceanic Airlines to make up the shortfall. It’s rumored that Oceanic just sold a Boeing 777 to Iran Air. And fining Oceanic “will have a compliance/deterrence effect” just as strong, if not stronger, as the one cited by OFAC in levying the $1.5 million fine against Alma.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)


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