Apr

15

Justin Timberlake Shows the U.S. Is Not NSYNC With Its Sanctions Songbook


Posted by at 6:30 pm on April 15, 2014
Category: Economic SanctionsOFACRussia SanctionsSDN List

By Mandy Coombes [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AJustin_Timberlake_-_Justified_World_Tour_-_Earls_Court_-_2.jpg

Armed with over 30 million Twitter followers and a shelf-full of Grammy and Emmy awards, Justin Timberlake may be staring down U.S. sanctions better than Putin himself.  Reuters reported last week that JT’s sold-out show next month at Helsinki’s Hartwall Arena will go on despite the fact that the largest indoor venue in the country is owned by Gennady Timchenko, Arkady Rotenberg and Boris Rotenberg.  All three Russians are on the SDN List because they are, in OFAC’s words, members of the Putin “Inner Circle.”  Perhaps equally as important to Finnish music fans, Miley Cyrus, Aerosmith and Nine Inch Nails are also scheduled to perform at the Hartwall Arena between now and June 1st.

Because U.S. company Live Nation is the concert promoter for these U.S. musicians, there is an understandable concern that dealings with Hartwall Arena may be impermissible under U.S. sanctions law because the 15,000-seat venue is entirely owned by a troika of billionaires on the SDN List.  But no one will have to stop the music as Live Nation announced that “U.S. officials had indicated at the weekend that the sanctions would not prevent the concerts going ahead.”

Some have speculated the shows would go on because Live Nation may have already paid in full Arena Events Oy, the entity owned by Timchenko and the Rotenbergs which owns the Hartwall Arena, prior to the three Russians being added to the SDN List.  But that logic doesn’t hold up because, if paying Arena Events Oy would be a violation, so would, according to the relevant executive order, providing services “for the benefit of” Arena Events Oy.  If Live Nation could not pay for the concert, Justin and Miley could not perform their services.

The most likely response that OFAC may have given Live Nation has been a recent focus of ours: the so-called 50 percent rule.  We reported a few weeks ago that Visa and Mastercard resumed transactions with banks owned by the Rotenbergs because, as we understand it, no one Rotenberg owns 50 percent or more of the banks.  Presumably, then, Timchenko and the Rotenberg Brothers do not individually hold more than 50 percent.  Of course, an entity owned entirely by three Russian SDNs is a good candidate for designation at any time.  You have to imagine that OFAC may have made some assurances to Live Nation else Live Nation would be ill-advised to fly its pricey talent in private jets to Finland only to have the Arena designated moments before the stars arrive.

These concerts are, however, a hallmark of how out of tune sanctions enforcement appears to be in relation to the zeal of the President’s executive orders authorizing the sanctions in the first place.  What better opportunity for OFAC to elucidate the 50 percent rule in order to explain how U.S. sanctions will permit four American musical acts, who are each listened to by millions around the world, to perform before tens of thousands of people about a two-hour drive from the Russian border in an arena owned solely by three Russian individuals on the SDN List.

Enforcing sanctions against entities owned or controlled by someone already targeted by sanctions is an important arrow in any country’s sanctions quiver.  How such an enforcement policy is defined and articulated publicly is critically important to its effectiveness.

As it stands now, U.S. sanctions would permit Miley Cyrus to sing her hit song “Party in the U.S.A.” to a concert with Putin in attendance.  For a whole host of reasons, we don’t want to see that.

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Apr

11

Russia/Ukraine Sanctions Designations for April 11, 2014


Posted by at 2:39 pm on April 11, 2014
Category: Russia DesignationsRussia Sanctions

More persons and companies were designated today by the Office of Foreign Assets Control under the Russia/Ukraine sanctions. Here is the list:

The following individuals have been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

CHALIY, Aleksei Mikhailovich (a.k.a. CHALIY, Aleksei; a.k.a. CHALIY, Aleksei Mikhailovich; a.k.a. CHALIY, Aleksey Mikhailovich; a.k.a. CHALIY, Aleksey Mykhaylovych; a.k.a. CHALIY, Alexei; a.k.a. CHALIY, Mikhailovich Oleksiy; a.k.a. CHALY, Aleksey Mikhailovich; a.k.a. CHALY, Alexei; a.k.a. CHALYI, Aleksei; a.k.a. CHALYI, Aleksiy); DOB 13 Jun 1961; POB Sevastopol, Ukraine; Mayor of Sevastopol; Chairman of the Coordination Council for the Establishment of the Sevastopol Municipal Administration (individual) [UKRAINE].

MALYSHEV, Mikhail Grigorevich, 15/9 Ulitsa Turgeneva, Apt. 9, Simferopol, Crimea, Ukraine; DOB 10 Oct 1955; POB Simferopol, Crimea; Chair of the Crimea Electoral Commission (individual) [UKRAINE].

MEDVEDEV, Valery Kirillovich, 22 Ulitsa Oktyarskoi Revolutsii, Building 9, Apt. 14, Sevastopol, Crimea, Ukraine; DOB 21 Aug 1946; POB Russia; Chair of the Sevastopol Electoral Commission (individual) [UKRAINE].

TEMIRGALIEV, Rustam Ilmirovich; DOB 15 Aug 1976; POB Ulan-Ude, Russia; Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Crimea; Crimean Deputy Prime Minister (individual) [UKRAINE].

TSEKOV, Sergey Pavlovich; DOB 28 Sep 1953; POB Simferopol, Crimea, Ukraine (individual) [UKRAINE].

ZHEREBTSOV, Yuriy Gennadievych (a.k.a. ZHEREBTSOV, Yuriy Gennadyevich; a.k.a. ZHEREBTSOV, Yury), 23 Ulitsa Koltsevaya, Yevpatoria, Crimea, Ukraine; DOB 19 Nov 1969; POB Odessa, Ukraine; Counselor to the Speaker of the Crimean Rada (individual) [UKRAINE].

ZIMA, Pyotr Anatoliyovych (a.k.a. ZIMA, Petr Anatolyevich; a.k.a. ZYMA, Petro), 18 Ulitsa D. Ulyanova, Apartment 110, Simferopol, Crimea, Ukraine; DOB 29 Mar 1965; POB Russia; Head of the Crimean SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) (individual) [UKRAINE].

The following entity has been added to OFAC’s SDN List:

CHERNOMORNEFTEGAZ (a.k.a. CHORNOMORNAFTOGAZ; a.k.a. NJSC CHORNOMORNAFTOGAZ), Kirova / per. Sovnarkomovskaya, 52/1, Simferopol, Crimea 95000, Ukraine; This designation refers to the entity in Crimea at the listed address only, and does not include its parent company. [UKRAINE].

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Apr

8

The Best Question on Burma Sanctions Is Still Unanswered


Posted by at 6:28 pm on April 8, 2014
Category: Burma SanctionsCompliance Programs and ProceduresEconomic SanctionsGeneralOFACSDN ListZimbabwe Sanctions

By Bild von Stefan Grünig, CH-3752 Wimmis (de:Benutzer:Sgruenig)Sgruenig at de.wikipedia [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/)], from Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ABurma06.jpg

OFAC announced last week that it issued additional Frequently Asked Questions and respective answers relating to what remain of U.S. sanctions against Burma.  None of the additional questions or answers is surprising or resolves an issue that is not otherwise answered by other OFAC guidance or applicable general licenses.

The questions and answers are, for the most part, a helpful recitation of the current landscape of sanctions involving Burma that summarize in one place the state of sanctions based on an assortment of scattered statutes, executive orders, regulations and licenses.  But one question stands out along with its non-responsive answer, in part, as follows:

What are the plans to update the SDN List for Burma?

Listings and any potential delistings under our Burma authorities will be pursued as appropriate to meet changing conditions in Burma.

The question itself has a colloquial quality to it as if the frequently asked question really put to OFAC has been along the lines of “What’s going on here?”

As other questions and answers describe, a number of banks remain on the SDN List but General License 19 authorizes U.S. persons to conduct most transactions with the banks.  In a similar situation about a year ago dealing with Zimbabwean banks, we posted about OFAC’s decision to keep those banks on the SDN List but, through a general license, to authorize almost all transactions with them.  At that time, I termed both the Burmese and Zimbabwean banks as SDN-lite designations and warned of the potential compliance difficulties such situations presented.

Keeping an entity on the SDN List would have the effect of blacklisting it from possible business with U.S. persons who rely solely on software to screen names on the SDN List to decide with whom to do business.  The results, of course, would create false positives because most transactions with these Burmese and Zimbabwean entities are permissible under U.S. law.  In fact, running these banks through OFAC’s SDN Search tool produces hits with no mention of any general license permitting dealings with them.

Delisting would, of course, be one option to correct the problem, but that would unblock any currently blocked assets, something OFAC might not wish to do.  Failing that, OFAC should at least put some annotation on the SDN List to denote that these very few entities are to be treated very differently than the thousands of others on the SDN List with whom U.S. persons may have no dealings.  At the moment, the question is back to OFAC, “What are the plans to update the SDN List?”

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Apr

7

When a Firing Squad Gives You Lemons, You Can’t Make Lemonade


Posted by at 7:11 pm on April 7, 2014
Category: EU

Vietnam Firing Squad via Amnesty International http://www.amnesty.org/sites/impact.amnesty.org/files/PUBLIC/Regions/ASA/viet-nam-death-penalty-250x161.jpg [By Permission]The recent decision by Vietnam to execute corrupt bankers has garnered world-wide attention. Rather surprisingly, however, the case has an interesting intersection with export law issues.

As has been reported, the bankers will be subject to rather gruesome execution by firing squad.

Vietnam’s traditional means of execution involves binding perpetrators to a wooden post, stuffing their mouths with lemons and calling in a firing squad.

Death Penalty Worldwide adds another gory detail to death by firing squad in Vietnam: “As the prisoner is dying, an officer fires a pistol shot through the condemned’s ear.”

Apparently even Vietnam is somewhat troubled by all this and wants to transition from this barbaric procedure to lethal injection. But it can’t. According to Patrick Winn on the website Global Post, Vietnam is unable to obtain sodium thiopentol used in executions because the European Union refuses to export the chemical to countries that practice capital punishment.

That of course might make the E.U. feel better about itself, but it won’t stop Vietnam from executing anyone and only assures that prisoners in Vietnam will meet their bloody end with a lemon stuffed in their mouth, multiple bullet wounds, and a final coup de grâce of a bullet in the ear. I’m sure that each person executed in Vietnam will appreciate the European Union’s solicitude for their well-being.

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Apr

2

New Russia Sanctions Passed by Congress Are Needlessly Confusing


Posted by at 2:16 pm on April 2, 2014
Category: Economic SanctionsOFACRussia Sanctions

Putin Feeds Animals by premier.gov.ru [CC-BY-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3APutin_animals.jpegAbout the only thing the current partisanly-split Congress can agree on is sanctions legislation: first Iran and now Russia. So the Ukraine Aid bill passed yesterday contains the obligatory sanctions provisions. The problem is, however, that even though both sides of the aisle love economic sanctions, neither side understands them, and, as a result, the bill is a mess.

Mostly the new sanctions mandate the President to impose sanctions on people he finds have done bad things: “undermin[ing] the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine” or “ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, acts of significant corruption in Ukraine” or the Russian Federation.  Of course, it’s up to the President to determine who these folks are, and this is a power he already has under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) as evidenced by the last two rounds of designations. But, hey, this allows Congress to get in the game too and tell the voters at home they stood up for Ukraine, even if it is, more or less, an empty gesture.

The problem comes with respect to the particular sanctions that Congress tells the President to impose on those who have engaged in undermining security of Ukraine or directing corruption in Ukraine or the Russian Federation. At first, these look pretty standard: asset blocking and visa bans. But then we get to the exception:

The requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under paragraph (1)(A) shall not include the authority to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

What this means is far from clear. Let’s say that the White House sanctions Alexei Kirillovich Vronsky (we’ll call him Captain Vronsky for convenience). Now let’s say that he’s short of cash after having all of his assets blocked, so he decides to sell $300 million dollars of Oblonsky Vodka to the United States. In a normal blocking scenario, the $300 million destined to Captain Vronsky would be blocked by the U.S. banks before they could be wired. Does this contravene the exception? The vodka can still be imported into the United States without problem as long as Captain Vronsky isn’t paid. On the other hand, doesn’t the blocking in this case effectively prohibit the importation of the vodka into the United States? Who knows? Certainly no one on the Hill does.

But there’s an even more hilarious mistake. The bill doesn’t define importation. Does it mean importation into the United States or Russia? Or anywhere else for that matter? An exportation from the United States is, after all, an importation somewhere else, whether Russia or some place else. So can Captain Vronsky import a shiny new Corvette into Russia from Detroit? Does the exception prohibit blocking the funds he uses to pay for the imported/exported Corvette?

Of course, the only thing clear as a result of this mess of an exception is that Captain Vronsky, even if he can buy a car from Detroit, can’t buy a condo in Detroit, since there would clearly be no importation (whichever way you define it) in that case.  I also predict the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), which will administer these sanctions, will take the narrow view of the exception and say that blocking payment for the goods does not prohibit their importatiion, which can still occur as long as no payments are made.

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