May

13

Russian Sanctions Creep


Posted by at 6:39 pm on May 13, 2014
Category: Economic SanctionsEURussia SanctionsSanctionsSDN List

By President of Russia [CC-BY-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Volodin_V_V.jpeg?uselang=ru
ABOVE: Vyacheslav Volodin


The EU yesterday added new names to its sanctions list.  The latest additions include Russian President Putin’s deputy chief of staff, Vyacheslav Volodin, and Vladimir Shamanov, the commander of the paratroop unit that allegedly took part, despite Russian denials, in the annexation of Crimea.

Also added were a number of Crimean companies:  One is Chernomorneftegaz, a Crimean gas company; another is Feodosia, a Crimean oil supplier.

Volodin but not Shamanov and Chernomorneftegaz, but not Feodosia, are on the U.S. sanctions list. Differences like these suggest incoherence and, at the least, create compliance challenges for multinationals.

Being on a U.S. or EU sanctions list means that the assets of the listed person are frozen and dealings with them by those subject to U.S. or EU jurisdiction are prohibited.

Whether these sanctions will deter further Russian involvement in the Ukrainian crisis is anyone’s guess.  The reluctance to impose so-called sectoral sanctions, that is, prohibitions on dealings with anyone in a given sector like oil and gas, exposes concerns about the double-edged sword of sanctions:  They truly cut both ways.

Individuated sanctions are, nonetheless, a headache for companies subject to U.S. and EU law because of the broad-based shadow lists of those subject to sanctions under the U.S. rule freezing the assets of any company that is 50% or more owned by a designated person and the EU rule  freezing any assets “controlled by” a designated person.

Shadowing the shadow list means that simple screening of listed persons is not enough.

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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May

8

“Too Big” May Be the Perfect Size for U.S. Sanctions Enforcement


Posted by at 5:09 pm on May 8, 2014
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDoJEconomic SanctionsOFACSanctions

By Laurent Vincenti (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ALaurent_Vincenti_BNP_Paribas.jpg

The Washington Post this week reported on U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder’s Monday video message reiterating that no company can be “too big” to be “immune from prosecution.”  The Post went on to report, as others have, that the Justice Department, in keeping with its own edict, is “getting closer to wrapping up an investigation” of French bank BNP Paribas, “which allegedly allowed millions of dollars from [Cuba, Iran, Sudan and other countries] to illegally move through the U.S. financial system.”

As the Post partially excerpts, BNP’s 2013 annual financial report stated that BNP “identified a significant volume of transactions that could be considered impermissible under U.S. laws and regulations including, in particular, those of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).”  The report went on to state the following:

The Bank has presented the findings of this review to the U.S. authorities and commenced subsequent discussion with them.  Although the amount of financial consequences, fines or penalties cannot be determined at this stage, the Bank has, in accordance with [International Financial Reporting Standards] requirements, recorded a provision of USD 1.1 billion (EUR 0.8 billion) in its financial statements for the fourth quarter of 2013.

Because BNP claims there “have been no discussions” with U.S. authorities as to the amount of any penalty, “[t]he actual amount [of a penalty] could thus be different, possibly very different, from the amount of the provision.”  (I am sure BNP hopes “different” means “less.”)

A set-aside of $1.1 billion is, of course, remarkable for costs associated with a sanctions penalty, but BNP’s situation should sound very familiar as OFAC, in partnership with the Justice Department, has not shied away from going after “too big” banks for sanctions violations.  Banks that have settled OFAC enforcement actions with significant penalties chronologically over the last few years is a who’s who in the global banking community: Royal Bank of Scotland (over $33 million), HSBC ($375 million), Standard Chartered ($132 million), ING ($619 million), JP Morgan Chase (over $88 million), Barclays ($176 million), Lloyds TSB ($217 million) and Credit Suisse ($536 million).

What must not be lost in any action against BNP or other banks is what this means for everyone else.  With credit to OFAC, the global banking system has become an effective deputy for U.S. sanctions enforcement.  Banks hawkishly review activity transiting through it with sophisticated software and a discretion erring on the side of caution if anything, in the words of BNP, “could be considered impermissible.”  The trickle-down effect is that any company thinking about a U.S. dollar transaction, which will almost certainly transit a U.S. correspondent account, has to ensure itself that its transactions are free and clear of U.S. sanctions violations unless it is willing to risk having funds blocked in the United States.

Although it is right to observe that OFAC has preferred of late to hunt big game, OFAC has astutely turned the game into successful hounds.

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)



May

7

Incorporating in Delaware Leads to Huge OFAC Fine for Argentinian Company


Posted by at 11:51 pm on May 7, 2014
Category: Cuba SanctionsOFAC

By Almonroth (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AU.S._Treasury-3.jpgYesterday the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced that it had imposed a $2,809,800 fine on Argentina-based Decolar.com, Inc. Decolar is an online travel agency and attracted the ire of OFAC for booking trips by non-U.S. persons to Cuba, trips for 17,836 people to be precise. This made OFAC very, very angry:

Decolar demonstrated reckless disregard for U.S. sanctions requirements when it failed to ascertain the U.S. sanctions requirements applicable to its business operations, relying instead upon a third party’s oral assurances that Decolar’s conduct did not require an OFAC license. With the exercise of appropriate due diligence, Decolar’s senior
management reasonably should have been aware of the applicable prohibitions under the CACR. Based upon the number of apparent violations and the length of time over which they occurred, the apparent violations also appear to have resulted from a pattern or practice of conduct

So, you’re no doubt wondering where OFAC gets the right to fine a company based in Argentina for violating the U.S. sanctions on Cuba. Simple. Even though the company was based in Argentina, it was incorporated in Delaware. This was probably the most expensive incorporation in Delaware ever.

One thing that  is odd about the OFAC release is its coy reference to the “third party” that told Decolar that it had nothing to worry about. My guess, particularly due to OFAC’s reluctance to identify this party, is that it was likely a lawyer. Saying that relying on a lawyer is “reckless” is harsh, even by OFAC standards, but it seems that if this mysteriously anonymous third party had been, say, the company janitor, OFAC could not have resisted mentioning that. After all, that would indeed be reckless. And, of course, the company was even more reckless for not ignoring their legal counsel and doing the research themselves. You know, by looking at the Spanish version of the Cuba sanctions which OFAC keeps on its website. Oh wait, there isn’t a Spanish version.

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)



Apr

30

U.S. Long Arm Stretches But Likely Won’t Reach Its Chinese Target


Posted by at 6:12 pm on April 30, 2014
Category: ChinaDoJEconomic SanctionsExtraditionIran SanctionsSDN List

FBI Wanted Poster [Public Domain]

The U.S. Department of Justice announced yesterday that it charged Li Fangwei, a Chinese national, with violating U.S. sanctions against Iran as well as with federal fraud violations.  Li, also known by a panoply of aliases including Karl Lee, Sunny Bai and Patric, is accused by the Justice Department of using a number of Chinese companies he controls to sell “metallurgical goods” and other items to Iran that are prohibited from sale to Iran under U.S., UN and other sanctions around the world because of their potential use in nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles. Li himself was added to the SDN List in 2009 and his Chinese companies have been added to the SDN since 2006.  In fact, OFAC added eight Li companies to the SDN List yesterday.

With respect to U.S. sanctions, Li is alleged to have used front companies to engage in funds transfers through U.S. banks in order to conduct his business with Iran.  In a related matter, the Justice Department announced yesterday that the U.S. Government has already seized almost $7 million in funds attributable to Li’s companies that were held in U.S. correspondent accounts of foreign banks used by the Chinese companies.

The seizures are, of course, a success for U.S. sanctions enforcement.  It raises, however, the question of whether a criminal prosecution of Li is fruitful or may be even necessary in an effort to curtail his dealings with Iran.  In announcing the indictment, Assistant Attorney General John Carlin described the criminal prosecution as “part of the ‘all tools’ approach our government is taking against Li Fangwei.”  Indeed, other tools like those used by OFAC, in cooperation with the FBI and the Marshals Service, have so far seized millions attributable to Li front companies on the SDN List.  If OFAC can designate entities to the SDN List and funds in the United States attributable to them can be seized, what more can U.S. sanctions be expected to accomplish under the circumstances.

On that score, Li was part of a post here over five years ago when Robert Morgenthau, as then New York County District Attorney, announced a 118-count indictment against Li and one of his companies, LIMMT, alleging Li and LIMMT falsified business records in violation of New York law in transferring funds through New York banks in connection with transactions with Iran.  Back then, we questioned the legitimacy and efficacy of New York trying, in effect, to enforce U.S. sanctions and wondered whether OFAC wanted any assistance (or ultimately the distraction) from New York in its attempt to enforce U.S. sanctions policy.

History has a funny way of repeating itself.   Although the Justice Department actually has the authority to prosecute a U.S. sanctions violation, the same question of efficacy lingers.  Under a fair assumption that Li is in China now and the Chinese government knows Li’s exact whereabouts, there is almost no reason to think China will extradite him or even possibly curtail his activities with Iran.  Perhaps the Department is hoping that the $5 million bounty the FBI placed on Li’s head might prompt someone in China to nab Li, tie him up, put a bag over his head, put him in a container and ship him to the U.S. in order to claim the reward.

The case of Li Fangwei, therefore, should not be sidetracked to the U.S. justice system.  This is in OFAC’s bailiwick and OFAC should lead the charge, in cooperation with other U.S. agencies, to seize blocked property in the United States and liaise with Canadian, EU, Swiss and other foreign sanctions enforcement authorities to convince them that similar seizures should take place around the world and intelligence should be shared with each other on what new companies Li, and possibly others, are using to do impermissible business with Iran.

In the words of the Justice Department, Li Fangwei is a “fugitive.”  That could not be more of a misnomer.  The case of Li Fangwei simply does not fit the parlance used by U.S. prosecutors.  The Justice Department is right, however, that the United States is afforded a lot of tools in sanctions enforcement.  Sometimes, there are tools best left in the toolbox.

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Apr

29

Bad Times for Timchenko


Posted by at 9:45 pm on April 29, 2014
Category: BISEntity ListOFACRussia SanctionsSanctionsSDN List

Gennady Timchenko via http://www.timchenkofoundation.org/en/about/trustees/1/ [Fair Use]The Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) yesterday added thirteen companies to the Entity List as part of new sanctions against Russia. Many of these companies are connected to Gennady Timchenko who was added to the SDN List in the first round of sanctions and whom we have discussed previously on this blog. Under the Export Administration Rules, licenses are required for exports of all items “subject to the EAR” (i.e., U.S. origin items or foreign produced items with specified percentages of U.S. content) to anyone placed on the Entity List. BIS has said that there will be a presumption of denial for license applications to export items to the thirteen companies newly added to the list.

The companies added to the entity list are the following:

Stroytransgaz Holding, located in Cyprus; Volga Group, located in Luxembourg and Russia; and Aquanika, Avia Group LLC, Avia Group Nord LLC, CJSC Zest, Sakhatrans LLC, Stroygazmontazh, Stroytransgaz Group, Stroytransgaz LLC, Stroytransgaz-M LLC, Stroytransgaz OJSC, and Transoil, all located in Russia.

The Volga Group is owned by Timchenko and itself owns Aquanika, Avia Group, Avia Group Nord, Transoil, Sakhatrans and Stroytransgaz. The only company on the list not connected to Timchenko is CJSC  Zest, which is a leasing company owned by Rossiya Bank.

Interestingly, if you are on pins and needles about whether Justin Timberlake will perform at Hartwall Arena in Finland, the Volga Group, owned by Timchenko, is the vehicle by which Timchenko owns 50 percent of Hartwell Arena. Volga Group, like all of the thirteen companies listed above that have been added to the Entity List, was added yesterday by the Office of Foreign Assets Control to the SDN List. So Justin Timberlake fans planning on heading to Helsinki might want to see if they can get refunds.

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)


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