Jun

23

Seeing Through the Smoked-Filled Rooms of Sanctions


Posted by at 6:37 pm on June 23, 2014
Category: Economic SanctionsGeneralOFACRussia SanctionsSanctionsSDN List

By Erifnam at en.wikipedia [GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/)], from Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AK_Street_NW_at_19th_Street.jpg

The Canadian newspaper The Globe and Mail reported last week that lobbying records made public this month show the CEO and a lobbyist for Kinross Gold Corp., a Canadian gold mining company and one of the world’s largest, “have had numerous communications” with Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s foreign affairs policy adviser, Canada’s deputy minister of foreign affairs and the Canadian ambassador to Russia in order to discuss “policies and regulations related to the imposition of economic sanctions.”

With almost a third of Kinross’s global gold production reportedly coming from its two mines in Russia, Kinross has good reason to to try to find out, to the best extent possible, whether the Canadian government plans to impose sanctions relating to Russia that may affect Kinross business in that country.

Canadian sanctions against Russia, like U.S. and EU laws, involve prohibitions on dealings with targeted persons and give government authorities wide latitude to designate individuals and entities with essentially no public notice or consultation.  Under U.S. law, for example, OFAC can designate an SDN at any time without having to comply with public notice and review requirements imposed on almost all government agencies so long as the person meets the often broad criteria of a sanctions target under an executive order.

Moreover, OFAC deems any entity owned 50% or more by an SDN to be treated as an SDN itself.  As we previously reported, the so-called 50% rule has caused a variety of compliance conundrums relating to Russia as a few individuals, like Gennady Timchenko, Arkady Rotenberg and Boris Rotenberg, own major companies in many sectors of the Russian economy.  To boot, Kinross may have gotten understandably skittish when, south of the border, President Obama issued his latest Russian sanctions-related executive order in late March permitting imposition of sanctions on those operating in various sectors of the Russian economy, including metals and mining.  Under that criteria, Kinross itself might later be designated an SDN.

Sanctioning governments have, of course, reasons for their secrecy.  Intended targets can’t be announced prior to sanctions being imposed and, therefore, given a head start in transferring their property and money to safe haven countries.  But with little guidance and a lot at stake, Kinross has every reason to reach out to government officials to gain any clarity possible and do one’s best to make sure business can continue as usual or, if not, how to adjust its operations to comply with applicable laws.

Kinross is not alone.  U.S. federal lobbying records for this year’s first quarter are now publicly available.  For example, Coca-Cola, Xerox and Citgo are among the variety of companies that have reported lobbying efforts relating to sanctions against Russia.  Because sanctions against Russia weren’t imposed until the end of the first quarter in March, we expect to see disclosures in subsequent quarters from more companies involved in such efforts.

If there are smoke-filled rooms in economic sanctions, the smoke is mostly from government cigars (and maybe Cuban-origin for the Canadians).  The smoke arises where statutes, regulations and executive orders give government agencies dangerously broad discretion in identifying the sanctions targets and enforcing sanctions laws in ways that are not readily apparent from the laws themselves.

Future economic sanctions laws are not likely to be written any clearer.  Much of their effectiveness lies in not knowing who will be targeted and, as a result, the better chance there is that companies and individuals will police themselves in order to avoid possible violation.  In such an uncertain environment, finding people who can get as much information as possible from government officials enforcing sanctions will always be an invaluable resource.

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Jun

20

New Russia/Ukraine Designations (June 20, 2014)


Posted by at 11:10 am on June 20, 2014
Category: Russia Designations

OFAC just announced new Russia/Ukraine additions to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN”) List:

BOLOTOV, Valery (a.k.a. BOLOTOV, Valeri; a.k.a. BOLOTOV, Valeriy); DOB 1970; alt. DOB 1971 (individual) [UKRAINE].

GIRKIN, Igor Vsevolodovich (a.k.a. STRELKOV, Igor Ivanovich; a.k.a. STRELKOV, Ihor; a.k.a. STRELOK, Igor), Shenkurskiy Passage (Proyezd), House 8-6, Apartment 136, Moscow, Russia; DOB 17 Dec 1970; citizen Russia; Passport 4506460961 (individual) [UKRAINE].

KAUROV, Valery Vladimirovich (a.k.a. KAUROV, Valerii Volodymyrovych; a.k.a. KAUROV, Valeriy; a.k.a. KAUROV, Valery); DOB 02 Apr 1956; POB Odessa, Ukraine (individual) [UKRAINE].

MENYAILO, Sergei Ivanovich (a.k.a. MENYAILO, Sergei; a.k.a. MENYAILO, Sergey); DOB 22 Aug 1960; POB Alagir, North Ossetia, Russia; Acting Governor of Sevastopol (individual) [UKRAINE].

PONOMARYOV, Vyacheslav (a.k.a. PONOMAREV, Vyacheslav; a.k.a. PONOMARYOV, Vachislav); DOB 02 May 1965 (individual) [UKRAINE].

PURGIN, Andrey Yevgenyevich (a.k.a. PURGIN, Andrei; a.k.a. PURGIN, Andrej; a.k.a. PURGIN, Andriy; a.k.a. PURGYN, Andriy; a.k.a. PURHIN, Andriy); DOB 26 Jan 1972 (individual) [UKRAINE].

PUSHILIN, Denis (a.k.a. PUSHYLIN, Denis; a.k.a. PUSHYLIN, Denis Volodymyrovych; a.k.a. PUSHYLIN, Denys); DOB 09 May 1981; POB Makeevka, Ukraine (individual) [UKRAINE].

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Jun

19

The Unverified List Rises Again


Posted by at 7:01 pm on June 19, 2014
Category: BISRussia SanctionsUnverified List

By Daderot (Own work) [CC0], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3APatent_quote_-_United_States_Department_of_Commerce_-_DSC05103.JPGAs we reported back in January of this year, in a sort of Christmas amnesty, the Bureau of Industry and Security(“BIS”) freed all current prisoners on the Unverified List (“UVL”) and announced that it was building a bigger and more uncomfortable jail for the next set of UVL inmates. Under the rules of the new jail, all exports to parties on the UVL, regardless of the value of the export, would require an AES filing. If the export to the UVL party required a license, no license exceptions could be used. And, most importantly, UVL parties would have to sign a lengthy statement promising to obey the Export Administration Regulations, revealing the end use and end user of the item (including the address,  favorite ethnic food and Facebook password for each end user), committing to cooperate in all future end use checks and swearing on a religious book of choice that they would be home and in bed by 9:00 p.m. every night, no exceptions. (I exaggerate, of course, but the required statement is lengthy, contains most of the things I’ve listed and must be signed even if the U.S. exporter is planning to send a set of steak knives or other EAR99 item to the UVL party.)

On Monday, the gates of the new prison opened and 29 new UVL inmates were welcomed to the new and improved UVL correctional facility. I scanned the list and did not see any former entities on the UVL on this new list, although it’s possible I might have missed a few. The announcement of the new list does not reveal the particular crimes committed by each entity on the list but under BIS rules they would have had to have failed an end-use check in one way or other, either by not submitting to it, not being where they were supposed to be, or not being able to explain what happened to an item previously exported to them.

Five Russian companies were added to the UVL, and this was probably unconnected to recent sanctions on Russia over the Crimea and Ukraine issues. Given that BIS has suspended issuing licenses for Russia, being on the list may be somewhat more burdensome for the Russian parties.  Although licenses might in theory be available as a fall-back option to UVL parties outside Russia who could no longer use license exceptions, this fall-back option will not be available to the Russian entities on the UVL.

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Jun

16

It’s A Small World After All, Even For Economic Sanctions


Posted by and at 8:02 pm on June 16, 2014
Category: ChinaEconomic SanctionsEURussia SanctionsSanctionsSudan

It's A Small World by Darren Wittko https://www.flickr.com/photos/disneyworldsecets/2767829714/ CC BY 2.0 [https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/] (cropped)G-7 countries recent meeting in Brussels understandably grabbed global headlines for their unified message that they “stand ready to intensify targeted sanctions and to implement significant additional restrictive measures to impose further costs on Russia should events so require.”

While sanctions imposed by G-7 countries, as well as the EU, drive the engine of global sanctions enforcement, there are almost 200 other countries in the world and many of them want to have their position on sanctions known.  Last week, for example, Serbian President Tomislav Nikolić surprised no one on Earth (or anywhere else for that matter) when he told Serbian media, “It’s impossible to imagine Serbia imposing sanctions on Russia.”  Of course, Nikolić’s pronouncement is hardly going to cause the E.U. to rethink, even for a fraction of a nanosecond, its position on Russian sanctions.  On the other hand, the E.U. sanctions may cause Serbia, given that Russia is one of it’s largest trading partners, to rethink the wisdom of its application to become a member of the E.U.

Besting Serbia’s population by over a billion, China is emerging as a critical Russian ally and the most important country that is not imposing sanctions against it.  As with Serbia, economic self-interest and the volume of China’s trade with Russia may be at the heart of this.  In fact, reports on the recent $400 billion, 30-year deal for Gazprom to supply natural gas to China suggest the deal would be based on a ruble-yuan exchange and bypass Western financial systems altogether.

With developed countries like China and Serbia using economic self-interest to justify trading with Russia despite its shenanigans in Ukraine, some developing countries may be acting against their own economic self-interest in imposing sanctions to deal with regional conflicts.  Reuters reported this week, for example, that members of the Intergovernmental Agency for Development, an East African trade group made up of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda, have threatened sanctions against South Sudan if warring factions do not cooperate to end conflict in that country.  The United States imposed sanctions in early May against military leaders involved in the conflict, but they likely will provide no meaningful impact.  However, when everyday trade with your neighboring countries starts to become restricted, sanctions are far more likely to achieve the goal of ending conflict.  If East African sanctions succeed against South Sudan while E.U and U.S. sanctions have no impact on Ukraine,  then we will certainly have a situation where it’s the mice that roar while the elephants squeak.

Sanctions news runs on the front page when it involves the United States and Europe but also on the back pages as it involves the rest of the world.  You have to read the whole paper to make sure you have the full story.

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Jun

13

Blame Canada!


Posted by at 9:18 am on June 13, 2014
Category: BIS

Bass Pro Store via http://content.basspro.com/outdoorworld/storeGalleryXML/storegalleries/67_6683939_0.jpg [Fair Use]Gun and sporting equipment retailer Bass Pro agreed to pay to the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) a $25,000 fine for exporting nine rifle sighting devices classified as ECCN 0A987 to China, Cyprus and Canada.

Wait, did you say Canada? Canada??? As in the 51st state? Surely this must be a mistake. Is that even an export? I thought you could export everything but Justin Bieber to Canada.

Of course, that’s a common misconception, and this case is an object lesson in one of the few things that can’t be exported to Canada. Items covered under ECCN 0A987, such as rifle scopes and sighting devices, have Firearms Convention (FC) as a reason for control and require BIS licenses for exports to all signatories to the Convention, including Canada.

The convention in question is the OAS’s Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials. All members of the OAS except Cuba have signed the convention. The United States, mostly as a result of the NRA’s desire to protect the right of Mexican drug lords to own automatic weapons, has signed but not ratified the treaty.

So even though you can ship a rifle scope to France without an export license from BIS, under the OAS Firearms Convention you can’t ship one to Canada without that license.

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