Feb

6

White House Blocks Government of Iran and All Iranian Banks


Posted by at 9:20 pm on February 6, 2012
Category: Iran SanctionsOFAC

Ayatollah KhameneiThe White House issued an executive order today blocking all property of the Iranian government and all Iranian financial institutions. Prior to this action, the Iranian Transaction Regulations (“ITR”) required U.S. persons to reject transactions with these parties rather than to block them.

Simultaneously with the executive order, the Office of Foreign Assets Control issued two new general licenses — cleverly named General License A and General License B — that would nevertheless permit certain transactions involving the newly blocked parties. It also updated the FAQs on the OFAC website to provide further explanations of the effect of the executive order and the two new general licenses.

The first fear that you might have is that the blocking of the Government of Iran and all Iranian financial institutions might effectively end certain transactions authorized under the ITR, say, for example, the payment of fees in connection with the registration of trademarks in Iran permitted under section 560.509 of the ITR. General License A was issued to take care of that. It permits activities already authorized under specific licenses or general licenses issued under the ITR. “General license” in this context doesn’t just refer to documents titled “General License” like this General License A but also refers to activities specifically authorized by the regulations itself, like the previously mentioned authorization of certain activities relating to trademarks in Iran. General License A specifically excludes from its scope transactions relating to closing or liquidating Iranian accounts otherwise authorized by section 560.517.

General B permits non-commercial personal remittances as long as they are not made through Iranian banks or other entities that were previously blocked, such as Bank Saderat or Bank Melli, not including the Iranian financial institutions that were blocked by this latest executive order.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Feb

2

Russkies No Longer Bullish on Dual Use . . . Cows


Posted by at 8:17 pm on February 2, 2012
Category: BISGeneral

Virginia P. HolsteinWell, who would have thought that a Google news search on “dual use exports” would turn up a WaPo story on the export of bulls from Virginia to Russia? Or that the story would talk about “dual use cows”? I certainly did not, which is what mooo-ved me to write this post.

According to the story, twenty-nine Holstein bulls have already been exported to Russia and another thirty are to follow. The bulls are set to, er, revitalize (at least that’s what the kids call it now) Russian Holstein dairy herds. The need for bulls with that certain American panache was explained as follows in the story:

Russian farmers want American bulls to improve dairy-herd genetics in a land hampered first by collective farming, then by the collapse of the Soviet Union. …

Instead of raising dairy cattle for milk and beef cattle for meat, Soviet collective farms had “dual-use” cattle, which would be milked for a while, then killed for meat, Osipenko said. Those one-size-fits-all cattle may have embodied an egalitarian ideal, but both milk and meat were mediocre, said Osipenko, a native of Ukraine who recalled his mother boiling beef for hours in a fruitless attempt to tenderize it.

After the Soviet Union collapsed, many dairy herds were all but wiped out as hungry Russians consumed them for food.

“There was a terrible crisis, apparently, and they pretty much ate their seed stock,” said Patrick Comyn, a large-animal veterinarian with the private Virginia Herd Health Management Services who worked on the deal.

And that’s where the exported bulls come in. I am sure that the Virginia bulls will be delighted, to the extent that bulls can be delighted in the first place, that they are fulfilling both a carnal and a patriotic duty.

Of course, these mail-order American husbands may never have seen their wealthy Russian wives if they had been horses because, as all export geeks know, export of horses by sea (ECCN 0A980) requires a license from the Department of Commerce. Personally, I think this is another example of wanton discrimination against American cows in favor of American horses which are spared from both the dinner table and long ocean voyages.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jan

31

With Friends Like That . . .


Posted by at 11:18 am on January 31, 2012
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Sharif University of Technology
ABOVE: Sharif Univ. of Technology

Seyed Mojtaba Atarodi, a professor at Tehran’s prestigious Sharif University of Technology was arrested on December 7, 2011, when he stepped off a plane in Los Angeles where he had arrived for a medical visit to his brother’s cardiologist. The criminal complaint against him is sealed and the arrest was only made known because his name shows up in the Federal Bureau of Prisons inmate locator.

A bail hearing was held last week and Atarodi has been released on bail, partly due to his health problems. He has recently had two heart attacks, two heart surgeries and a stroke. Articles published by Atarodi that can be found on the web appear to deal mainly with semiconductor and microchip technology without any specific defense applications.

The U.S. government has still not released any information on the charges against Atarodi, although it is widely, and legitimately, assumed that they are export related. A spokesman for Sharif University said that Professor Atarodi was charged with buying scientific equipment from the United States, stating:

He was trying to buy some equipment for his lab, and the equipment was very, very simple, ridiculously simple stuff that anybody can buy. …

An official statement released by Sharif University, which appears to be aware somehow of the items mentioned in the indictment, said this about the items in question:

The items mentioned in the indictment, if truly purchased by him are all simple, basic, and elementary components and equipment that are easily sourced and can be found in every electrical engineering department. It is so disappointing to note that most of the items in question are not even the so called “dual use” equipment.

Of course, the Iran sanctions cover all items of any sort exported from the U.S., although an arrest and criminal prosecution is rare for items without some further strategic significance.

Even though the U.S. government’s lips are sealed, Atarodi’s defense counsel is not quite so taciturn and said to the Associated Press reporter that his client was more or less guilty:

Kohn said prosecutors “meticulously” built their case against Atarodi, who had come to Los Angeles seeking treatment from his brother’s cardiologist.

Meticulously? A statement like that, if he has been accurately quoted, makes you wonder which side of the case the defense attorney is being paid to argue. I suppose that if the government case is so “meticulous,” the alleged defense attorney can just teach Mr. Atarodi how to say “guilty” in English, collect his CJA reimbursement, and wait for another appointment.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jan

24

Bye Bye, TSRA?


Posted by at 6:34 pm on January 24, 2012
Category: Iran SanctionsOFAC

Bank TejeratYesterday, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) added Iran’s Bank Tejerat to the list of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (the “SDN List”). This means that no U.S. person may engage in financial transactions with Bank Tejerat and all assets of Bank Tejerat that come into the possession or control of U.S. persons must be blocked.

The real impact of this is that this may well signal the end of legal exports of agricultural products, medicine and medical devices to Iran under the authority of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, or TSRA (tis’-ruh) in Exporteranto, the lingua franca of export professionals. Exports to Iran licensed by OFAC require that the exporter must deal directly with a non-Iranian bank and that the non-Iranian banking intermediary may not use an Iranian bank on the SDN List to complete the financial aspects of the transaction.

Here is a link to a comprehensive list of Iranian financial institutions on the SDN List. As you can see, the U.S. has now designated what I believe to be all Iranian banks that are involved in international financial transactions. Here is a list on Wikipedia purporting to be all the private banks in Iran, but I am unaware of whether any of these other banks are able to engage in international transactions, although the website of EN Bank suggests that it may be able to handle international financial transactions.

That may mean, I’m afraid, that as a practical matter, TSRA exports to Iran will be cut off because there is no way for the U.S. exporter to be paid. If anyone is aware of any other banks that can be used for TSRA exports to Iran and that are not on the SDN List, please share that in the comments section.

Couple this with OFAC’s recent action putting most (and perhaps all) shipping ports in Iran on the SDN List when it designated Tidewater Marine, the executive branch has now effectively nullified the intent of Congress when it passed TSRA. This nullification could easily have been avoided if OFAC issued (or issues) general licenses that permit licensed TSRA transactions to use Iranian banks even if they are on the SDN List and to use ports on the SDN List for licensed TSRA transactions. But there is no indication that this is going to happen.

Of course, in the present environment, it is unlikely that Congress will protest this de facto executive repeal of the act.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jan

23

Massachusetts Man Pleads Guilty to Illegal Export Charges


Posted by at 8:00 pm on January 23, 2012
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDDTC

Microwave Engineering CorporationRudolf Cheung, who is the head of the Research & Development department of Microwave Engineering Corporation in North Andover, Massachusetts, pleaded guilty on January 20, 2012, to charges that he violated the Arms Export Control Act in connection with unlicensed exports of military antennae to Singapore. A copy of the criminal information detailing the charges can be found here.

The story begins in June 2006 when an unnamed company in Singapore sought to order certain military antennae from Microwave Engineering. In preparation for requesting an export license, Microwave Engineering asked the Singapore company to execute a Form DSP-83 (Nontransfer and Use Certificate). When the company, citing its own internal policies, refused to sign the DSP-83, the sale and export were cancelled by Microwave Engineering’s export compliance officer.

When Cheung learned of the cancellation of the sale, he contacted another Massachusetts company, and agreed with that local company that it would purchase the military antennae and ship them to the company in Singapore. Thereafter, the local company purchased antennae from Microwave Engineering and exported them without license to the company in Singapore. The local company also purchased antennae from Microwave Engineering for export to another company in Singapore, Corezing International. Corezing is subject to another indictment, and the U.S. is seeking extradition, in connection with its role in the exports of radio modules from the United States to Iran which were later found in improvised explosive devices in Iraq.

The criminal information alleges that Cheung was aware that the purchases by the unnamed local company were destined for the customer in Singapore and that he took no action to stop these exports or to obtain the required licenses from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”).

Moral of the story: if your export compliance officers stops a sale, it is probably not a good idea to try to find another way to make the sale.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)


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