Archive for January, 2013


Jan

30

It’s Always Harder the Second Time Around


Posted by at 6:08 pm on January 30, 2013
Category: DDTCPart 122

Clickenbeard HQWell, today is truly a red letter day in the annals of ITAR registration puffery. For the first time ever (at least that I’ve seen), we have a company boasting that it has received ITAR re-certification. This blog has reported plenty of instances of companies that breathlessly announce that they have received “certification” upon their first ITAR registration filing, but until now no company has tried to make a news event from filing their renewal of that registration.

The proud company is Illinois-based Clickenbeard & Associates, Inc., and their press release really slathers it on thickly:

Clinkenbeard … has received official International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) re-certification from the United States Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.

… Companies receiving this certification demonstrate that they have knowledge and understanding to fully comply with the AECA and ITAR as well as having corporate procedures and controls in place to ensure compliance.

“This re-certification is evidence of our commitment and ability to safeguard all defense- and government-related data for our customers and our country. Further, it demonstrates our government‘s trust in our doing so,” explains Steve Helfer, Clinkenbeard general manager.

I particularly like the statement that registration renewal demonstrates the “government’s trust” in Clickenbeard. To repeat (for the, oh, four thousandth time), all that ITAR registration (or re-registration for that matter) demonstrates is that the company had the filing fee in its bank account, could figure out how to fill out a form and send it to DDTC, and was able to pay for the postage required to send it in. Registration numbers are given by DDTC to everyone who can do those three things, even if they don’t know the difference between “registration” and “certification,”  between an export and a deemed export or between a DSP-83 and a salt shaker.

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Jan

28

Specially Designated Global Twitterers Booted


Posted by at 6:45 pm on January 28, 2013
Category: OFAC

Al-ShabaabLast Friday, there were news reports, like this one in the BBC, that the Twitter account of Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab, had been suspended by Twitter. Apparently, some of its more outrageous tweets violated the Twitter terms of service. Of course, my first thought ran along these lines: how did Al-Shabaab, which is listed on the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s List of Specially Designated Entities and Blocked Persons as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (“SDGT”) get a Twitter account in the first place? And why are they just now getting booted off the service?

One of the sections of the regulations under which Al-Shabaab was designated, 31 C.F.R. 594.201, explicitly forbids any U.S. person from providing any “technological support for, or financial or other services to” anyone designated as an SDGT. A Twitter account is certainly a “technological” or “other” service, and Twitter, headquartered in San Francisco, is clearly a U.S. person subject to the rules. And there is no provisions in the regulations for SDGTs, as there are in the Iran and Cuba sanctions regulations, permitting “services incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet.”

Part of the explanation for what may have happened is that the group used the Twitter handle @HSMPress and not @Al-Shabaab or something that might have given its identity away to the computers that screen new accounts for Twitter. Of course, this raises an interesting question. As we all know, there is no intent or knowledge requirement needed to violate OFAC’s economic sanctions regulations. Even if Twitter didn’t know that HSMPress was Al-Shabaab, it was still providing services to Al-Shabaab in violation of the rules and potentially liable. But with that in mind, what was Twitter supposed to do? Is it supposed to read every tweet and try to figure out who might be an SDN?

Another issue, I suppose, would be proving that @HSMpress was, in fact, Al-Shabaab. Again, it’s doubtful that the account was registered in such a way as to indicate that connection even if this was the official account of Al-Shabaab rather than, say, the account of someone who was merely sympathetic to the group. It reminds me of the famous New Yorker cartoon with one dog, seated at a computer, telling another dog sitting on the floor nearby: “On the Internet, nobody knows you’re a dog.”

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Jan

24

Private Navy May Run Aground


Posted by at 9:19 pm on January 24, 2013
Category: Arms ExportPiracy on the High Seas

Jolly RogerThe normally perspicacious Spencer Ackerman of the Danger Room at Wired, posted a story on a British start-up that promises a private navy to protect commercial shipping from pirates (for a jolly fee, of course). However, Ackerman ignores the 800 pound parrot on the pirate’s shoulder: namely, laws restricting the import and export of arms.

The company, Typhon, promises its own  armed flotilla, but Ackerman doesn’t explain how it plans on moving this armed flotilla in and out of ports, unless, of course, the flotilla will be a modern day Flying Dutchman, cursed to roam the seas forever.

I’ve discussed this issue in a blog post some time back. Export and import licenses will be needed for Typhon’s private navy  to come and go from most ports. And even if a Typhon  ship leaving the United States gets an export license, as required, it will be forbidden thereafter to dock in countries, such as China, subject to U.S. arms embargos. And each port of call is likely to require import permits, or in the case of countries that have signed the U.N. Firearms Protocol, transit permits.

So, I guess you might say, that the idea of a private navy to fight pirates is an idea that is better in Wired than in practice.

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Jan

22

South African Bank Closes All OFAC Listed Accounts


Posted by at 6:31 pm on January 22, 2013
Category: General

FNB HQFirst National Bank, one of the oldest banks in South Africa, has announced that it will close all accounts held by any person or entity listed on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list of the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”). No U.S. person may engage in any transaction with a person or entity on that list, commonly referred to as the SDN list, without a license from OFAC, and any property of any person or entity on that list that comes into the possession of a U.S. person must be blocked.

Needless to say, First National Bank is not a U.S. person and is not, strictly speaking, subject to OFAC’s rules with respect to persons and entities on the SDN list. Nevertheless, it said yesterday that it would close all accounts held by anyone on the SDN list. The announcement followed the bank’s decision to close the account of the Al Aqsa Foundation of South Africa, which is, indeed, on OFAC’s SDN list. In explaining its decision, the a spokesperson for the Bank stated:

It has come to the bank’s attention that the foundation is expressly listed by the US Department of Treasury‚ [OFAC] and other international sanctions lists. The listing of the foundation has been verified with reference‚ inter alia‚ to the addresses contained in the listings documents.

The international financial community impose stringent obligations in respect of the maintenance of banking relationships with entities listed by OFAC‚ and the decision by FNB to terminate its relationship with the foundation is a consequence of this fact alone.

What this probably means, in more direct terms, is that the bank feared that there was some risk that transactions it might engage in on behalf of Al Aqsa as a customer might come into the possession of a U.S. bank which would then block the funds. And even though the bank shouldn’t be liable to reimburse Al Aqsa for the lost funds, the whole affair would be a giant headache for the bank. In response, Al Aqsa accused the bank of killing orphans, saying:

This will force a reputable‚ decade-old organisation that supports 1500 orphans every month to shut its doors‚ thus terminating the only lifeline these children have.

OFAC, when it designated Al Aqsa, said that the group used its humanitarian activities as a disguise for its role as “financier of terror.”

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Jan

17

Canadian Group Criticizes U.S. Exports of Network Equipment


Posted by at 9:31 pm on January 17, 2013
Category: General

Blue Coat HQAn article in the New York Times describes a report by Citizen Lab, a Canadian Internet research firm, that reveals that equipment useful for Internet surveillance and censorship manufactured by California-based Blue Coat is being used by repressive regimes such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Venezuela and Russia.

The Canadian group concedes that the equipment detailed by its report was not subject to U.S. export controls:

The researchers also noted that the equipment does not directly fall under the dual-use distinction employed by the United States government to control the sale of equipment that has both military and civilian applications, but it can be used for both political and intelligence applications by authoritarian governments.

The ECCN that most likely would be applicable to the equipment in question is ECCN 5A980, which covers equipment “primarily useful for the surreptitious interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications.” My guess is that the equipment at issue fails the “primarily useful” test.

Even if this equipment did meet this test, licenses could easily be obtained to export the equipment to the countries singled out by the Citizen Lab report. Under current policy licenses to export such equipment to government agencies in countries other than Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria are generally approved.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)