Archive for November, 2012


Nov

29

New Rules Might Require Export Licenses For Certain Corporate Security Systems


Posted by at 5:48 pm on November 29, 2012
Category: DDTCUSML

Unattended Ground SensorYesterday the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) released its proposed revisions to Category XI of the United States Munitions List (“USML”). Category XI covers military electronics. For the most part, the proposed revisions implement the laudable policy of converting the USML into a “positive” list which will cover items with specific performance characteristics rather than, as is currently the case, cover a broad category of items “specifically designed, modified or configured for military application.”

So, for example, Category XI now covers “underwater sound equipment to include active and passive detection, identification, tracking and weapons control equipment” that are “specifically designed, modified or configured for military application.” Under the proposed new rule, to be covered the underwater sound equipment must meet certain specific requirements such as being able to classify surface vessels and submarines and having certain defined characteristics, such as using an operating frequency less than 20kHz. An item that might have been modified for military purposes (whatever that means!) and that doesn’t meet those characteristics wouldn’t be on the USML at all.

In addition to adding specificity to the current types of military electronics covered by Category XI, the proposed rules add some new types of military equipment. Of most significant interest is the new Category XI(a)(8) which covers:

(8) Unattended ground sensor (UGS) systems or equipment having all of the following:
(i) Automatic target detection;
(ii) Automatic target tracking, classification, recognition, or identification;
(iii) Self-forming or self-healing networks; and
(iv) Self-localization for geo-locating targets;

The problem here is that none of these terms are defined and that they aren’t even modified by the qualifier that they were “specifically designed, modified or configured for military application.” Certainly the language seems broad enough to cover certain corporate security systems, thereby creating a potential export problems for the company if it has non-U.S. employees with visual access to these systems. This problem would be alleviated, in this instance at least, by including unattended ground sensors if they are ” “specifically designed, modified or configured for military application.”

For an interesting account of the history and development of unattended ground sensor systems, going back to when the U.S. deployed them along the Ho Chi Minh trail in 1966, I highly recommend Noah Shachtman’s excellent article “The Rock That Could Spy On You For Decades” in Wired. Interestingly, that article quotes an industry spokesman saying that the next big market for UGS systems is here in the United States for, among other things, corporate headquarters security.

Permalink Comments (1)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Nov

27

Iranian’s Actions in Iran Lead To U.S. Criminal Export Charges


Posted by at 7:02 pm on November 27, 2012
Category: Criminal Penalties

MEC 2010 Cavity Backed Spiral AntennaThere have been about 10 million breathless newspaper articles on the recent indictment of Amin Ravan, an Iranian, in connection with his efforts to export certain military antennas from the United States to Iran through Singapore. Most of these articles just parrot the DOJ release, so I thought that some additional insight into the case might be useful at this point.

According to the indictment, Ravan and his company, IC Market Iran, both based in Iran, conspired with Corezing, a company in Singapore, and some of its employees, to obtain cavity backed spiral antennas listed on the United States Munitions List and ship them to Iran through Singapore. The indictment refers to the manufacturer of the antennas as “Company B,” but we know that the company in question is Midwest Engineering Corporation which we posted on here back in January 2012 in connection with the indictment of one that company’s employees who was involved in the scheme to ship antennas to Iran through Corezing in Singapore.

We noted in that post that four Corezing employees were awaiting extradition in Singapore. In August 2012, a court in Singapore denied extradition of two of the Corezing employees and permitted the extradition of the other two employees — Lim Kow Seng and Hia Soo Gan Benson, who are now named in the Ravan indictment

Since Ravan engaged in all of his activities in Iran, it was unlikely for about 234,656 reasons or more, that the U.S. could extradite him from Iran to stand charges on export violations in the United States. But lucky for us, Ravan traveled to Malaysia and was promptly arrested by Malaysian authorities there pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant issued by the United States under the extradition treaty between Malaysia and the United States. It is probably not unreasonable to speculate that some undercover action by the U.S. was used to lure him into Malaysia.

Whether or not Ravan can be extradited from Malaysia is a more difficult question. The extradition treaty permits extradition for an offense

if it is punishable under the laws in both Contracting States by deprivation of liberty for a period of more than one (1) year, or by a more severe penalty.

Assuming that the antenna is listed on the USML, this condition is satisfied with respect to the Arms Export Control Act. The Malaysian Strategic Trade Act of 2010 appears to adopt the Wassenaar List as its control list even though Malaysia is not part of the Wassenaar Arrangement, meaning that the antennas will likely be deemed as controlled under ML11 of that list. And as to the penalties, well the Strategic Trade Act provides for a minimum imprisonment of five years for violations and in some instances, involving arms, even the death penalty or life imprisonment are available penalties. (Let’s hope this doesn’t give anyone any bright ideas about amending U.S. export control laws to keep up with the Malaysians in this respect.)

The problem, however, is that the actions of which Ravan are accused occurred in 2006 and 2007 prior to the adoption of the Strategic Trade Act. In order to extradite Ravan, it appears that the Malaysian court will have to find that the Strategic Trade Act is retroactive, and I could find nothing to indicate that it is, but that is ultimately a question of Malaysian law. I suppose that if the Act imposes the death penalty for export violations it is not a huge leap to imagine that it might be retroactive as well.

Permalink Comments (1)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Nov

20

What Makes The Dawn Come Up Like Thunder? Imports!


Posted by at 3:59 pm on November 20, 2012
Category: Burma Sanctions

Burma LandscapeThe Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) has taken another step in polishing off the economic sanctions against Burma by issuing General License 18 which authorizes most imports from Burma. This action was no doubt timed to coincide with the presidential visit to Burma which just took place.

Under the General License, all imports of items from Burma are now permitted, with two exceptions. First, the license prohibits import of any items from persons whose assets are still blocked under the Burma sanctions. A number of individuals associated with the Burmese military dictatorship are still blocked. Second, the new license does not authorize the import of rubies or jadeite mined in Burma or articles of jewelry containing rubies or jadeite mined in Burma.

If it seems odd that OFAC would leave in place the import ban on rubies and jadeite while permitting all other imports, it is odd, but OFAC had little discretion here. The ban on rubies and jadeite is mandated by the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta’s Anti-Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008, so OFAC has no discretion here without Congressional authorization. Don’t hold your breath that Congress will get around to recognizing that things in Burma have changed and that the Lantos Act no longer serves any real purpose.

A second obstacle to Burmese imports also complicates matters somewhat. On November 18, 2003, the Secretary of the Treasury designated Burma as a jurisdiction of primary money laundering concern; and then, on April 12, 2004, applied a “special measure” against Burma under Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. That special measure prohibits any U.S. financial institution from maintaining a correspondent account for any Burmese bank, which will certainly complicate paying for imports from Burma. There is an exception in the special measure for correspondent accounts only used for permitted activities, which may ameliorate the situation somewhat, but banks may be justifiably hesitant to worry about whether correspondent accounts satisfy this requirement and may not permit accounts that would otherwise be permissible under this exception.

[Thanks to Rudyard Kipling, via the Cowardly Lion, more of less, for the title!]

Permalink Comments Off on What Makes The Dawn Come Up Like Thunder? Imports!

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Nov

16

Call Kevin Wolf


Posted by at 4:57 pm on November 16, 2012
Category: BIS

Kevin Wolf
ABOVE: Kevin Wolf


Do you want to talk to an important official at the Bureau of Industry and Security about export reform? Well, here’s your chance. BIS is resuming its weekly teleconferences with Kevin Wolf, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce, on December 12, 2012, at 2:30 p.m. EST. The dial-in number for the conference calls is: 1-888-455-8218 and the participant code: 6514196. Callers should dial in 10 minutes early.

These calls will occur weekly on Wednesdays (except for December 26 when I hope the Assistant Secretary and this blog’s readers will all be spending a well-deserved Christmas vacation at home with family and friends). The purpose of these calls is to provide information on export control reform initiatives and to assist parties in preparing comments in pending rulemaking proceedings related to export reform.

There’s only one small catch: Questions for Kevin should be sent in advance of the call to [email protected] with a subject line of “teleconference questions.” So, if you were planning to ask Mr. Wolf about his thoughts about what will happen in the next season of “Mad Men” or some other topic of burning, but non-export, interest, don’t bother to push the send button. I have it on good authority that public comment on export control reform is both wanted and valued by BIS, so don’t pass up this opportunity.

Permalink Comments Off on Call Kevin Wolf

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Nov

15

Diamonds Are An Ogre’s Best Friend


Posted by at 2:13 pm on November 15, 2012
Category: OFACZimbabwe Sanctions

Robert Mugabe
ABOVE: Robert Mugabe

A report in the Zimbabwe Herald, the state-owned mouthpiece for the Mugabe dictatorship, provides an entertaining, if somewhat fictive, account of the recently concluded Zimbabwe Diamond Conference in Victoria Falls. The purpose of the conference was to provide some support for the diamond industry in Zimbabwe which, although free of Kimberly Process Certification issues, is severely crippled by economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control against the Mugabe regime.

The pro-Mugabe news outlet had this to say:

KIMBERLEY Process Certification Scheme chairperson Mrs Gillian Milovanovic yesterday came under fire from delegates attending the inaugural Zimbabwe Diamond Conference here for failing to protect Zimbabwe’s diamond industry from America. Delegates expressed concern that Zimbabwe’s diamond sector continues to face obstacles despite the country receiving the KP’s nod to trade its gems.

They unanimously agreed that the American approach towards Zimbabwe’s gems sought to promote conflict diamonds.

During an open session, delegates said Mrs Milovanovic, who is American, should recuse herself from chairing the KP because she was failing to protect Zimbabwe from America’s Office of Foreign Assets Control sanctions.

This blog has noted before that the Kimberly Process certification and OFAC sanctions against the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (“ZMDC”), which has a monopoly on sales of Zimbabwe diamonds, deal with completely separate issues.

The Kimberly Process certification is limited to finding that the certified diamonds are not conflict diamonds, which are defined as ‘“rough diamonds used by rebel movements or their allies to finance conflict aimed at undermining legitimate governments.” Obviously, Zimbabwe diamonds aren’t being used to undermine a legitimate government; indeed, they are being used to prop up the existing dictatorial regime in Zimbabwe.

The OFAC sanctions, however, arise not from any insurgency or rebel conflict in Zimbabwe. Instead, they are premised on human rights abuses by the Zimbabwe dictatorship. In the case of ZMDC, OFAC sanctions are presumably a response to documented reports of torture and forced labor in the diamond fields run by ZMDC.

Just because something isn’t a conflict diamond under the Kimberly Process, doesn’t mean it isn’t a blood diamond.

[For extra added amusement, unrelated to export issues, look carefully at the caption to the picture illustrating the Herald story.]

Permalink Comments (2)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)