Archive for October, 2012


Oct

17

Look, Ma, No Export License!


Posted by at 10:40 pm on October 17, 2012
Category: BIS

Sodium FluorideAccording to settlement documents released by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”), New Jersey based Phibrochem agreed to pay $31,000 to settle charges that it exported $14,000 worth of sodium fluoride to Mexico without a license. Sodium fluoride, which is classified as ECCN 1C350, can be used to produce methylphosphonyl difluoride which, in turn, is used to produce the nerve gas sarin.

The first reaction you might have to this case is to wonder whether Phibrochem was even aware of the license requirement. After all, sodium fluoride is everywhere. It’s in tap water for Pete’s sake. The charging documents, however, make clear that this wasn’t an innocent mistake by noting that Phibrochem had previously obtained a license to ship sodium fluoride to the same end user in Mexico.

And your next thought may well be, forget TSA requirements, do I need a license to take a tube of Crest on my next trip to Europe? Do I have to buy some strange brand of toothpaste called Odol-med3 in Berlin to avoid being arrested when I board my flight at Dulles? Thanks to note 2.b, your Crest is safe:

A license is not required under this ECCN for a mixture, when the controlled chemical in the mixture is a normal ingredient in consumer goods packaged for retail sale for personal use.

Whew.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Oct

16

Could Satellites Finally Spin out of the ITAR Orbit?


Posted by at 8:48 pm on October 16, 2012
Category: Arms ExportBISCCLUSML

satelliteAccording to this article in Aviation Week, one aspect of export reform has at least some chance of eeking through the lame duck Congress that will convene after the upcoming elections. The locus of this hope is bipartisan language in the House version of the defense authorization bill that would permit the President to move commercial satellites from the United States Munitions List to the Commerce Control List. One effect of such a change is that commercial satellites, which can’t be exported to China while listed on the USML, could be exported to China pursuant to a license from the Department of Commerce once moved to the CCL.

The Senate version of the defense authorization bill does not contain that language but there appears to be some possibility, according to a Senate Democratic aide, that the Senate, in order to get the bill passed, will consider a pre-conferenced version of the bill with the House language included. A Republican Senate staffer has suggested that Senate Republicans would not oppose such an approach.

UPDATE: A reader sent me a copy of the language from the House version of the NDAA.  That language, which can be found in section 1241, as currently written, would prohibit Commerce from granting licenses for the export of any “commercial satellite or related component or technology” to China.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Oct

11

Executive Order on Foreign Subs in Iran Issued


Posted by at 8:58 pm on October 11, 2012
Category: Iran SanctionsOFAC

Iranian proliferationThe recently passed Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Human Rights Act of 2012 eliminated a loophole that permitted foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies to trade with and in Iran as long as no U.S. persons were involved in the transaction. On October 9, the White House released the Executive Order required under the act implementing its provisions. Not surprisingly, the Executive Order mostly parrots ITRSHRA (pronounced eye-TRASH-rah”), but it does manage to clarify one matter and muddle up another.

So let’s start with what it clarifies. Section 218(d) of ITRSHRA provided an exemption for penalties if the foreign subsidiary was divested within 180 days from the passage of the act. There was some thought that this might mean that the foreign subsidiary could stop the business in Iran within the 180-day period and then avoid penalties even without divestment. That is not the case under the Executive Order. If your foreign subsidiary was doing business with Iran on October 9, 2012, or after, you have until February 6, 2013, to divest that subsidiary in order to avoid the penalties provided under the act.

Now for what gets muddled. Under Section 218(b) of ITRSHRA, any foreign entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person is forbidden from engaging in any transaction with “the Government of Iran or any person subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of Iran” if such transaction would violate U.S. sanctions on Iran if engaged in by a U.S. person. The concept of a “person subject to the jurisdiction of Iran” is not found in the existing sanctions regulations and executive orders. These generally prohibit dealings with the Government of Iran (anywhere in the world) or with Iran (meaning with private citizens and non-governmental entities in Iran.) So the executive order defines “person subject to the jurisdiction of Iran” as follows:

a person organized under the laws of Iran or any jurisdiction within Iran, ordinarily resident in Iran, or in Iran, or owned or controlled by any of the foregoing.

Now part of that definition is not problematic. Current regulations would prohibit dealings with persons and businesses while they are in Iran, but this definition also captures Iranian corporations and Iranian residents while they are outside Iran. Under current law, U.S. persons (as opposed to the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. persons covered by ITRSHRA) can deal with non-governmental and unblocked Iranians and Iranian corporations outside Iran provided that those dealings do not result in the export of goods or services back into Iran.

Under the Executive Order, however, it would appear that U.S. foreign subsidiaries can’t deal with private unblocked Iranians and Iranian corporations anywhere in the world whether or not those dealings would lead to the export of good or services back to Iran or the Government of Iran. So if a U.S. subsidiary owned a cab company in Baghdad, it could not pick up any Iranian and give them a ride, even though Yellow Cab in DC can pick up an Iranian and drive him from his hotel to the Washington Monument or wherever else he wants to go.  There is, however, no evidence that Congress intend to impose stricter sanctions on U.S. subsidiaries overseas with respect to Iranians outside Iran than it imposed on domestic U.S. corporations.  Instead, Congress’s intent was clearly to make the same prohibitions applicable both to overseas subsidiaries and their domestic U.S. parent companies.

Perhaps  this conundrum is solved by the part of the new prohibition that says that the transaction is prohibited “if that transaction would be prohibited” by current orders and regulations “if the transaction were engaged in by a United States person or in the United States.”   To try to determine what this means, lets take as an example Section 560.204, which prohibits the exportation of “goods, technology, or services to Iran or the Government of Iran.” Now if you say that this means that no transaction is prohibited unless it involves persons in Iran or the Government of Iran, then there was no need for a definition of “person subject to the jurisdiction of Iran,” particularly where that definition includes a broader classes of entities such as private Iranian corporations outside Iran.  Even so, it seems that this reading is more consistent with Congress’s intent.

Alternatively, you could try to make sense of this restriction to transactions that would be prohibited to U.S. persons is by saying that it means that the transaction isn’t subject to one of the existing exemptions in the regulations such as the informational exception. In that case, the restriction would mean that a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company in France can sell a pre-existing book or DVD to an Iranian travelling in France but couldn’t sell him a pair of pants.  This interpretation leads to a result that it is hard to imagine was intended by Congress.

Presumably OFAC is going to amend its regulations to take the new executive order into account. Let’s hope that OFAC recognizes the existence of these two conflicting interpretations and clarifies in its Regulations which one is correct . Let’s also hope that one day the Cubs will win the World Series.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Oct

5

Russian Export Case Larded with Bogus Foreign Agent Charges


Posted by at 5:05 pm on October 5, 2012
Category: Criminal Penalties

Alexander Fishenko
ABOVE: Alexander Fishenko

By now you have no doubt read about the Russian “spy” ring accused of exporting CCL and USML items to Russia without required licenses. Many newspapers, like the particularly clueless folks at The Examiner, can’t resist a good spy headline for an otherwise run-of-the-mill export case.   Even the reputable folks at Wired have jumped on the “spy” bandwagon. And the reason for this spy mania is that the DOJ, which has never seen a spy headline it can’t resist, gives everyone the opportunity to pitch this as a spy case by including a count for failure to register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.

As you can see from the criminal indictment, Alexander Fishenko, a naturalized Russian immigrant, and others were charged with procuring various items on the USML and the CCL and exporting them to Russia, allegedly to the Russian government. But the very first count, so even the most slow-witted and slothful reporters can’t possibly miss it, is not for the export violations but for acting as an unregistered foreign agent. The Foreign Agents Registration Act requires that agents of a foreign principal register with the Department of Justice.

That law was passed in 1938 and was directed at the activities of foreign propagandists in the United States. It covers political and lobbying activities in the United States on behalf of foreign persons, foreign companies and foreign governments.  Section 1(c)(1) of the Act, 22 U.S.C. § 611(c)(1), defines the precise activities required to fall under the definition of a foreign agent, including political activities, acting as a publicity agent, or representation of the foreign party before a government agency.

A significant exclusion is set forth in section 3(d) for certain “non-political” activities, including “engaging … in private and nonpolitical activities in furtherance of the bona fide trade or commerce of such foreign principal.” In other words, acting as a commercial agent for foreign governments, foreign companies and foreign individuals by buying stuff for them does not make the person engaged in that activity a foreign agent required to register under the act. (The requirement that the trade be bona fide is to prevent the foreign principal from trying to spread influence in the United States by having its agents buy items that it doesn’t need.)  Because the act covers actions on behalf of not just foreign governments but also on behalf of foreign individuals and companies, this is an important exception. Without this exception, millions of people would become foreign agents required to register under the Act.  Frankly, if buying things for a foreign government, company or person makes the buyer a foreign agent, almost every exporter would be a foreign agent required to register under the Act.

Now if you look at the indictment, you will see immediately that all that Fishenko and his co-defendants are accused of doing is buying things for the Russian government. That doesn’t make them “foreign agents,” much less spies. Of course, the prosecutors probably know this, but they also know that the whiff of espionage from the foreign agent charges is catnip that no journalist can resist. And like everyone else, prosecutors like good headlines.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Oct

4

Kurds and Whey?


Posted by at 11:24 pm on October 4, 2012
Category: BISIran Sanctions

MGN WheyI know you will all sleep safer once I tell you about the recent consent agreement entered into between the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) and Muscle Gauge Nutrition as well as a related agreement between BIS and and one of the owners of Muscle Gauge Nutrition. The company agreed to pay BIS a civil penalty of $62,500 in connection with an attempted export to Iran valued at $93,000. The owner, Robert Reed, agreed to an individual civil penalty in the amount of $22,000.

Did MGN and Reed ship centrifuges or accelerometers or other controlled items that might assist the Iranians in their production of nuclear weapons? No, they shipped — are you sitting down? — whey supplements for bodybuilders. Apparently you need people with really strong biceps to crank up those centrifuges to enrich uranium. That’s a little known fact that you first heard here. In fact, whey protein is arguably much more important to Iran’s efforts at nuclear proliferation than nail polish.

Of course, to put this whopping fine in further context, the whey supplements would have been eligible for a license under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000. Worse yet, the attempted exports occurred on June 30, 2011, yet in less than three months, under amendments adopted by OFAC to its rules effective October 12, 2011, these exports, as food products, would not have even required a license at all!

The fine probably can be seen, in addition to a valiant effort to protect our national security interest against Iranian bodybuilders, as a penalty imposed to punish the Company for being stupid and for making BIS mad. According to the charging documents linked above, the unfortunate incident started when MGN shipped to its freight forwarder the sales invoice for the order which showed the “bill to” party as a customer in Iran and the “ship to” party as a transportation logistics company in the UAE. The freight forwarder, which remarkably enough was paying attention here, noted the “bill to” customer and asked MGN for a license. MGN responded not by applying for the easily obtainable license but by telling the freight forwarder that the “bill to” was just a typo and that the UAE company should have been the “bill to” party as well. Accordingly, MGN supplied a new “corrected” invoice. The freight forwarder then apparently dropped the dime on MGN because the shipment was seized before it could add any muscle mass to any Iranians.

The owner, Robert Reed, was subject to an individual penalty because, according to the charging documents, he told a BIS agent investigating the shipment that the shipment was really intended to go to the UAE and not to Iran. That was probably a bad idea given that BIS apparently had unearthed an email (indeed had probably been given that email by the Company itself) from the company’s sales manager to Reed explicitly stating that the end user was in Iran. Oops.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)