Archive for March, 2011


Mar

30

eBay Drone Auction Leads to Sting, Arrest


Posted by at 9:29 pm on March 30, 2011
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesUSMILUSML

Robot Attack!Henderson Chua, a resident of the Philippines who was arrested when he traveled to Los Angeles in February, was indicted on March 10 on charges that he illegally engaged in a temporary import into the United States of parts for an AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven drone without the required State Department license. Mr. Chua had listed the Raven on eBay, which had attracted the attention of undercover federal agents in both California and in Florida. Agents in both states had entered into discussions with Mr. Chua to purchase the parts.

According to the criminal complaint filed in the case, the parts consisted of the nose cone, fuselage, and the horizontal surface of the tail assembly, but not the main wing, the entire tale assembly, the battery or the ground control equipment. (Almost all of the press stories, such as this one, this one, this one, and this one incorrectly reported that the illegal temporary import involved the entire drone.)

It’s important to understand that only parts were involved because a permanent import of these parts is not illegal. Aircraft and drone parts are not listed on the United States Munitions Import List. They are, however, listed in Category VIII(h) of the United States Munitions List, which means they require a State Department license for temporary (as opposed to permanent) imports, i.e., imports which will be followed by an export back out of the United States. As you will see, this distinction between legal permanent imports and illegal temporary imports opens up some major holes in the government’s case.

The narrative in the criminal complaint shows that Mr. Chua initially entered into negotiations with the federal agents to sell them the Raven parts, which apparently he was doing on behalf of a third party who claimed to have bought them in a Philippines government auction. During the negotiations, the agents frequently and incorrectly indicated that the import of these parts into the U.S. would be illegal. At one point, Mr. Chua responds that it should not be a problem because he is only shipping “as a part not a whole unit [and] can be declared as a spare.” (Paragraph 17.) At this point the agents might have realized that a permanent import of the parts would not be illegal, so they told Chua, for the first time and the very next day, that they were buying the parts for someone in Russia and the parts would be immediately exported after they received them. (Paragraph 18.)

After hearing this, Mr. Chua and the owner of the parts wisely consulted lawyers to see if the parts could still be shipped. Based on that consultation, Chua told the undercovers that they would need a State Department license (Paragraph 29.) After repeated statements by the agents that they would not obtain a license, Chua told the agents that he could only sell the parts to them if they would sign an agreement stating:

The Buyer shall not export, re-export, or transfer directly or indirectly either by laws applicalbe in the customer’s own courntry or by laws of the United States of America to countries/companies developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to companies/persons listed under the U.S. Department of Commerce Denied List.”

(Paragraph 39.) The agents did sign such an agreement prior to the export of the parts by Chua to them. (Paragraph 42.)

As this blog has noted again and again, a criminal export violation requires knowledge by the defendant that he or she is violating the law. This is going to be tough in this case. The defendant correctly believed that he could ship the parts to the United States until the agents said that they were going to re-export the items to Russia. At that point, Chua and his seller consulted lawyers and told the undercovers they would need State Department licenses to ship the parts. When the agents declined to get licenses, Chua determined, apparently in consultation with legal counsel, that the items could only be shipped without a license if the agents agreed not to export them from the United States. Granted the advice was a bit flawed because the agreement no to re-export was limited to countries involved in developing WMD or to parties on the Department of Commerce’s Denied Parties List. But there is not a shred of evidence that Mr. Chua didn’t believe that this advice was a correct statement of U.S. law. Chua may be liable for civil penalties under the Arms Export Control Act but criminal penalties can’t be imposed without proving he knew he was relying on bad legal advice.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Mar

28

Robot Attack!


Posted by at 3:36 pm on March 28, 2011
Category: General

Robot Attack!This morning I received a curt email from my web-hosting provider that Export Law Blog was being crawled by a number of robots making so many file requests that they had to shut down my site temporarily and then add robot blocking code to my system files. Apparently the volume was sufficient that they were worried that the out-of-control robots would not just take down my site but all the other sites on the shared server.

So I asked my web host where the robots were coming from. Get this: one group of them was coming from the Department of State. Judging from some activity I saw on my logs, the State robots were trying to scrape the entire site with simultaneous requests. Bad robot! (Brownie points to anyone on whom that last reference is not lost.) The hosting administrators have now blocked all access from that IP address from the State Department.

As the people at the State Department are our friends, it seems harsh to impose this permanent time out on them just because one of their robots ran amok this morning. If someone from State knows how the robots got loose this morning and swarmed the blog, please let me know and I’ll try to get the IP address unbanned by the folks at my web host. (I could go in an change the commands they put in the .htaccess file, but if I do, and there’s another recurrence of an early morning unsanctioned State Department robot party at my site, I’m likely to rendered homeless and in search of a new web host.)

The other robot(s) came from JPMorgan. Any word from JPMorgan on what caused their robots to go into a feeding frenzy at my site this morning, would also be welcome.

We now return you to your regularly scheduled programming.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

24

Software Engineer Caught in Export Sting Pleads Guilty


Posted by at 11:50 pm on March 24, 2011
Category: Arms ExportCriminal Penalties

satelliteNotwithstanding an apparent slip-up by undercover agents in a sting which caught a Seattle-area software engineer in a plan to export ITAR-controlled radiation-hardened semiconductor chips to China, the target of the sting, Lian Yang, pleaded guilty today to charges that he violated the Arms Export Control Act. This blog reported on this case back in December when the criminal complaint filed by the government in the case was unsealed.

The criminal complaint suggested some convincing evidence that Yang knew he was breaking the law with these proposed exports. Apparently he had contemplated effacing the part numbers on the chips. He also proposed shipping them under false invoices that concealed the names of the parts.

However, at one point the undercover agents, who were posing as the suppliers of the parts, told him that there would be a delay in shipping the parts. The delay, they said, “is with the government,” further stating that the “compliance paperwork” was “waiting to be reviewed and signed.” That certainly seems like an implication by the undercover agents that the transaction was legal and was being approved by the government, which would certainly complicate the government’s proof that Yang had the requisite criminal intent to be convicted of the crime. In the end, however, with the defendant’s guilty plea, this slip-up had no impact on the case.

The Seattle Post-Intelligencer also reported on Yang’s plea. Its online report deserves both an award for the most obnoxious online advertisement I’ve ever seen (click the link at your peril) and the worst description of the AECA I’ve ever seen. Here’s the description of the AECA:

In charging information filed Monday in U.S. District Court, federal prosecutors accuse Yang of conspiring to violate the U.S. Arms Export Control Act, which bars the sale of potentially sensitive technologies.

You have to wonder where the reporter came up with that. There is quite the difference between a statute that requires government licenses for the sale of goods and technologies versus one which “bars” the sale of those goods or technologies, not to mention that the AECA involves the sale of military items and technologies, which is not really co-extensive with “potentially sensitive technologies.” The Post-Intelligencer reporter apparently didn’t even take the time to read the Wikipedia entry on the AECA which, at least, accurately describes the act as “control[ling] the import and export of defense articles and defense services.”

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Mar

23

Oh, The Things You Can Buy on the Internet


Posted by at 8:40 pm on March 23, 2011
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Iran's Saegeh JetU.S. prosecutors announced today that four members of a Colombian family were indicted by a grand jury on charges that the family attempted to export J85 jet engines from Miami to Iran in violation of the U.S. embargo on Iran.

The criminal complaint filed earlier this month provides a good deal of detail on the case against the four defendants. Apparently, an Internet advertisement offering to sell twenty-two J85-CAN-15 jet engines led an undercover agent to contact the seller Felipe Echeverry and to indicate that he wanted to purchase the engines for shipment to Iran. The engines in question can be used on the F-5 fighter jets still used by Iran and by the Saegeh fighter jet (pictured right) built by Iran on the F-5 platform. The agent also indicated that he wanted the sellers to handle shipping the engines to Iran.

The transaction proceeded smoothly until the agent first mentioned to the sellers that the U.S. had an embargo on Iran, at which point the sellers began to get cold feet. At first, the sellers said that they would not be involved in shipping the engines, but would only sell them to the agent for pickup in Miami. The agent insisted that this was unacceptable and that the family would at least have to ship the engines as far as Panama. Again, the sellers refused, after which the agent said he was walking from the deal. Later that afternoon, the sellers agreed to ship the items to Panama and the rest, as they say, is history.

The prosecution’s main problem here is that to prove a violation of 50 U.S.C. § 1705, the law alleged to have been violated, the government will need to prove scienter, i.e., that the defendants knew that their actions were a violation of law. Coincidentally, this blog reported yesterday on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in US v. Guo which relied on the scienter requirement of § 1705 to rebut a constitutional challenge that the statute was vague.

In this case, it is reasonable to assume that the defendants believed that they would violate the law only if the shipped the items to Iran, which explains their refusal to ship the items at all when advised of the Iran embargo and later only agreed to ship the items as far as Panama. This is particularly true for defendants that are not even citizens of the United States and are unlikely to be familiar with U.S. law.

It seems to me that the better target of the government’s efforts would be to investigate the circumstances under which military jet engines in the United States were sold to Colombians, likely without a license and likely in violation of the Arms Export Control Act.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

22

Ninth Circuit Upholds Export Statute against Vagueness Challenge


Posted by at 10:17 pm on March 22, 2011
Category: Criminal Penalties

FLIR ImageLast week the Ninth Circuit upheld the conviction of Zhi Yong Guo for unlicensed exports of thermal imaging cameras in violation of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. According to the facts recited by the Ninth Circuit, Mr. Zhi was a Chinese citizen who enlisted a friend, Tai Wei Chao, a United States citizen working in China, to assist him in the purchase of the thermal imaging cameras. Mr. Tai, in turn, enlisted the help of a printing business in California which ordered the cameras and had them shipped to its address in California. The printing company then exported the camera to Tai in China, who thereafter delivered the cameras to Zhi in exchange for a commission.

The court then notes:

[Tai’s] order aroused the suspicions of FLIR’s export compliance staff. They thought it strange that a printing company needed highly developed thermal imaging cameras. FLIR alerted the Department of Commerce to [Tai’s] order, and agents from the Department of Commerce began to track [Tai’s] activities

Thereafter Zhi and Tai travelled to the United States to pick up more cameras that had been ordered from the printing company. Both men packed the cameras in their luggage and then were arrested at the airport by the friendly folks from ICE. The lower court convicted Zhi for the exports, and the appeal to the Ninth Circuit followed.

Zhi’s lawyers appealed on the ground that the statute under which Zhi was convicted was unconstitutionally vague. The basis of the vagueness argument was that a number of sources needed to be consulted to figure out that the export was a crime:

To understand the crime with which Defendant was charged, one must look at four sources and read them together: the statute, § 1705(a); Executive Order No. 13,222; and two implementing regulations, the Commerce Control List in 15 C.F.R. Part 774 and the Commerce Country Chart in 15 C.F.R. Part 738.

The court easily dismissed Zhi’s efforts to confuse complexity with vagueness:

But a statute does not fail the vagueness test simply because it involves a complex regulatory scheme, or requires that several sources be read together, and Defendant has not directed us to a single case in which we have held otherwise.

The final blow to Zhi’s vagueness argument was the scienter requirement for conviction

The requirement that [the statute] places on the government to prove Defendant’s knowledge of the law ‘mitigate[s] a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed.

Although the court’s opinion does not discuss the evidence used by the lower court to find that the defendant knew that the exports were illegal, that criminal intent was likely inferred from Zhi’s numerous prior unsuccessful efforts to obtain the cameras from the United States. The court also notes that Zhi concealed the cameras in shoes that he packed in his suitcase.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)