Archive for February, 2010


Feb

25

Balli Exec Tells Alma Mater His Defense to Iran Export Charges


Posted by at 9:14 pm on February 25, 2010
Category: BISIran Sanctions

Vahid Alaghband
ABOVE: Valid
Alaghband


Valid Alaghband, Chairman of the Balli Group, which just agreed to a $17 million fine to settle charges that it exported U.S.-origin commercial passenger aircraft to Iran, took to the pages of the daily student newspaper of his alma mater Cornell University to present his side of the story. Frankly, his story isn’t very convincing, and I doubt that regular readers of this blog or others familiar with U.S. export laws will be swayed by Alaghband’s story. Some may, in fact, chuckle that Alaghband would publicly mount the defense that he does.

The confusion arises from the use of the term “export” which, to a layman, signifies a sale and purchase (or physical trade) of goods across international borders. That is not how the U.S. regulations necessarily define exports and our settlement with the U.S. authorities does not remotely suggest that Balli Aviation sold its aircraft to Iran. Balli Aviation legally and beneficially owned its fleet of aircraft at all material times.

Epic fail, as the kids on the blogs say nowadays. Anybody with even a smidgen of familiarity with U.S. export laws is aware that you can export stuff to Iran which hasn’t been sold to Iran. To begin with, the aircraft in question were flown in an out of Iran carrying commercial passengers. Balli was charged with re-exporting the aircraft to Iran and the Export Administration Regulations, in section 734.2(b), provide a pretty unambiguous definition of re-export:

“Reexport” means an actual shipment or transmission of items subject to the EAR from one foreign country to another foreign country

Hmm. I don’t see anything in that restricting an export to a cross-border purchase and sale, do you? I didn’t think so.

What happened here was that Balli leased the aircraft to an Armenian airline, Blue Sky, that then operated the aircraft in and out of Iran under a code-sharing arrangement with Mahan Airways. Or as Mr. Alaghband admits:

Balli Aviation … [leased] three of the aircraft to an Armenian operator which serviced the civilian passenger traffic under arrangements with a local operator.

The “local operator, which Alaghband can’t bring himself to name, was the Iranian carrier Mahan.

Alaghband also claims that Norton Rose, a prominent U.K. law firm, told him that this scheme would comply with U.S. export laws. If Norton Rose did indeed provide such profoundly awful advice, and I have no evidence of this other than Alaghband’s claim that they did, this would underline what I might have thought obvious: a firm of British solicitors with not even a single office in the United States might not be the best choice for obtaining advice on complying with U.S. export laws.

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Feb

24

ITT Debarment Lifted Two Months Early


Posted by at 9:53 pm on February 24, 2010
Category: DDTCNight Vision

Red TapeOn Monday the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC) published a notice in the Federal Register that the three-year statutory debarment of ITT Night Vision, scheduled to end on March 26, 2010, was ended effective February 4, 2010. DDTC noted, in justifying the early termination, noted that

ITT Corporation has taken appropriate steps to address the causes of the violations and to mitigate any law enforcement concerns.

While the denial order was in effect, ITT Night Vision products could be exported by ITT and by resellers but only pursuant to a specific transaction exception from DDTC. Such transaction exceptions were granted only with respect to exports for end-use by the U.S. government or for end use by certain allies. As a result of DDTC’s actions, license applications to export ITT night vision products will no longer need to contain information supporting a transaction exception.

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Feb

23

More Deemed Export Red Tape Courtesy of BCIS


Posted by at 8:29 pm on February 23, 2010
Category: Deemed Exports

Red TapeDHS’s Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (“BCIS”) wants to make your life more difficult if you hire H-1B workers and need a deemed export license to do so. Under a proposed revision in the form used to apply for H-1B visas for skilled technical workers, employers will now need to obtain the deemed export license from the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) before applying for the H-1B visa. Previously, the license needed to be obtained before the foreign worker could be given information on the controlled technology, but the employer could file for the visa and the deemed export license simultaneously. Now, the export license must be obtained before the visa can even be submitted to BCIS. Here is a copy of the proposed form. Check out page 6.

Oddly, this requirement is only for employees needing BIS deemed export licenses. Those requiring a deemed export license from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) for foreign workers involved with technologies controlled by the United States Munitions List (“USML”) can apply for the visa and the license at the same time.

BCIS, with typical transparency, announced the revision and asked for comments in this public notice in the Federal Register. The public notice doesn’t reveal the nature of the proposed changes or how to find them other than suggesting that employers go try to find the proposed forms at regulations.gov. Good luck with that. We can only thank a loyal reader for tracking down the proposed, but undisclosed, changes in the visa application form.

Comments on this proposed change are due by April 9, 2010. Comments can be submitted by fax to 202–272–8352, or via e-mail to [email protected].

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Feb

17

Don’t Believe Everything You Read in Newsweek


Posted by at 8:31 pm on February 17, 2010
Category: Syria

Bashar al AssadAndrew Tabler, who works for a Washington-based think tank on the Middle East wrote a column in today’s web-edition of Newsweek on the appointment by the Obama administration of a new Ambassador to Syria — the first since 2005 — and what that might mean for U.S. sanctions on Syria. According to Tabler the sanctions have economically crippled Syria, and Syria is now “fanatical about ending U.S. sanctions (which, Damascus has only just admitted for the first time, are truly damaging).”

In trying to explain how U.S. sanctions have economically damaged Syria, Tabler gets into the weeds of export law and the Export Administration Regulations (the “EAR”) and, frankly, doesn’t come out smelling like roses:

[T]he regime had to ground most of its civilian air fleet—as well as President Assad’s personal jets—because the sanctions forbid the sale of spare parts without an export license. (Sanctions classified anything with more than 10 percent American content as an American product, and since U.S. companies dominate the aerospace industry, even third-party retailers from other parts of the world couldn’t sell the parts to Syria.)

This is clearly a reference to the de minimis rule in section 734.4 of the EAR which, for sanctioned countries, only exempts exports to sanctioned countries with less than 10% controlled U.S. content, not exports with less than 10% of all U.S. content. According to the Guidelines for De Minimis Rules set forth in Supplement 2 to Part 734, controlled content consists of content in the item that has an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) requiring a license to the sanctioned country in question. There are plenty of items that might be parts of exported items that aren’t controlled content to Syria, so Mr. Tabler’s misstatement of the applicable regulations is a significant error in this regard and suggests that more items are subject to the Syria sanctions than is in fact the case.

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Feb

17

BIS Assesses Maximum Possible Fine Against Exporter


Posted by at 8:44 am on
Category: BIS

FingerprintFor several years now the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) has had the statutory authority to impose a civil penalty of $250,000 per export violation but has yet impose anything near that fine. So when BIS finally whacks someone with a $2.5 million fine for 10 violations, you might assume that the person paying such a fine did something really terrible like exporting dual-use items to Iran that Iran could use in uranium enrichment facilities. But you would be wrong.

Sirchie Acquisition Company, LLC, agreed to pay a $2.5 million fine for 10 violations arising from acts not committed by SAC but by an acquired company several years before SAC acquired it. And the exports involved included fingerprint equipment that did not require a license to the destinations involved (France and the U.K.).  The exports also included, get this, some magnifying glasses. These exports are detailed in the deferred prosecution agreement with federal prosecutors but the BIS charging documents don’t provide any detail on the exports in question — proof, I suppose, that even BIS was embarrassed about whacking someone with a $250,000 fine for exporting magnifying glasses and fingerprint pads.

These exports were allegedly problematic because the CEO of the company that Sirchie acquired set prices for these exports, which was allegedly a violation of a denial order that BIS had entered against the CEO individually. As I pointed out in my last post on this case, SAC’s actions didn’t violate any of the provisions of the denial order that expressly applied to third parties. And BIS doesn’t claim that they did but claims instead that they constituted “aiding and abetting” the CEO’s violation of his own denial order. The problem here is that the denial order in question doesn’t say that all aiding and abetting activities by third parties are prohibited but instead prohibits particular and specific types of aiding and abetting, none of which occurred in this case.

Other aggravating factors that might justify such a massive fine aren’t mentioned by BIS. There is no claim in the charging papers that SAC, or its predecessor, knew that these activities violated the CEO’s denial order or that SAC, or its predecessor, tried to conceal the exports or that SAC, or its predecessor lied to federal investigators.

Call me old-fashioned, but it seems to me that the highest fines ought to be reserved for the most serious violations and not for exports of magnifying glasses by an acquired company.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)