Archive for April, 2009


Apr

30

Different Month, Same Sanctions


Posted by at 7:43 pm on April 30, 2009
Category: Cuba SanctionsOFAC

Fidel CastroOFAC released today its monthly civil penalties report and it is, as is usually the case, all Cuba all the time. EFEX Trade, LLC, a company that provides both management consulting and massage therapy services, paid $2,000 for unlicensed remittance forwarding to Cuba. The fine paid is, of course, much less interesting than EFEX’s unusually diverse business model. Please feel free to suggest possible synergies between the company’s two lines of business in the comments section.

In addition, Texas-based Varel Holding, a manufacturer of drill bits, agreed to pay $110,000 for exports made by one of its foreign subsidiaries to Cuba between June 2005 and June 2006. Varel voluntarily disclosed the exports. The OFAC notice indicated that the case was handled under prior enforcement guidelines which provided for a maximum penalty of $11,000 per violation. It’s hard to understand then why the penalty ultimately imposed was only slightly less than the maximum penalty ($121,000) notwithstanding the company’s voluntary disclosure.

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Apr

29

Three Brits Prosecuted in U.K. for Illegal Exports of Aircraft Parts to Iran


Posted by at 7:24 pm on April 29, 2009
Category: General

Iranian F-14Today’s edition of London’s The Guardian reports on a trial in London of three men accused of shipping military aircraft parts to Iran. These parts are used to maintain its aging fleet of U.S. military aircraft sold by the U.S. to the Shah prior to the revolution. The scheme was uncovered when oxygen cylinders used by fighter pilots to breathe at high altitudes were intercepted at Heathrow with bogus paperwork claiming that the oxygen cylinders were for medical use. According to the prosecution, the three men had engaged in parts trade with Iran well in excess of £1.2 million (or almost US$ 1.8 million)

According to the article, the three men maintained U.S. business addresses so that they could acquire the aircraft parts from U.S. suppliers without having to obtain export licenses. The parts were then shipped by the trio back to London using misleading and innocent descriptions of the parts in the export documents.

This once again underscores that U.S. suppliers need to exercise caution even with respect to domestic shipments of export-controlled goods. The Iranian supply network is utilizing every available technique to disguise the ultimate destination of the military parts that it acquires, including setting-up front companies and front addresses in the United States, hoping to diminish scrutiny of the transactions in military-related goods. Although no penalty proceedings have yet been instituted against domestic parts suppliers for ignoring red flags that suggest that a domestic sale might in reality be intended for export, that day may not be far off. Sooner or later, a U.S. parts dealer who supplies a Tomcat part to a U.S. customer without any due diligence on the customer or that customer’s need for the product may find itself looking at the same fines as it would have confronted if it had simply shipped the parts directly to Iran.

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Apr

28

Valve Exports Lead To Massive Fine


Posted by at 7:09 pm on April 28, 2009
Category: BIS

BJ ServicesBJ Services, the Houston-based oil and gas field service provider, recently agreed to pay $800,000 to settle charges that it illegally exported certain valves without the requisite licenses from the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”). The BIS investigation, and the subsequent fine, arose from a voluntary disclosure by BJ Services and serves as a potent reminder that a voluntary disclosure to BIS may well result in a substantial civil penalty.

The valves in issue were controlled by ECCN 2B350.g. Under that ECCN, a valve is controlled if the valve has a nominal size of more than 1.0 centimeter and is composed of nickel, titanium, zirconium or other specified metals, alloys or substances. (Nominal size is the size a pipe or valve is sold under; it may vary from actual size.) It can be safely said that this is an ECCN which doesn’t pose significant technical challenges in determining the appropriate classification, which might have been a factor in the hefty fine that BIS insisted on to settle the matter.

Prior to BIS’s April 14, 2005 amendment to the Export Administration Regulations, valves covered by ECCN 2B350 required licenses only for the 34 countries listed on column CB3 of the Country Chart. By the 2005 Amendment, the ECCN increased its controls to CB2 on the Country Chart, meaning that a license would be required to every country other than the 41 members of the Australia Group.

The first 33 counts in the charging letter relate to periods prior to the 2005 amendment and allege that exports to Kuwait, Kazakhstan, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the U.A.E, all CB3-controlled destinations violate section 764.2(a) of the Export Administration Regulations. The remaining counts 34 to 67 related to exports after the amendment to ECCN 2B350 to such non-Australia Group countries such as Colombia, Mauritania, Mexico, Nigeria and Venezuela. These exports were alleged to violate section 764.2(e) which penalizes knowing export violations.

The allegations of knowing violations under 764.2(e) charged under counts 34 to 67 appear to be separate exports from those charged under counts 1-33, and, thus, don’t appear to be instances of “piling on” multiple charges for the same count in order to increase the possible penalties to be imposed. BIS’s penchant for such piling on appears to have been diminished by the statutory increase in available penalties from $11,000 to $250,000 per violation.

The settlement documents also describe the basis for BIS’s allegations that charges 34-67 represented knowing violations. According to the charging documents, the supplier of the valves had informed BJ Services that they were classified under ECCN 2B350. It is probably this factor that led the BIS to seek such a large fine even after a voluntary disclosure of the exports in question.

UPDATE: My former colleague Dan Fisher-Owens points out in the comments that BJ Services settled charges in 2005 for $142,500 arising from alleged unlicensed exports of ammonium bifluoride and a mixture containing triethanalomine. This was no doubt also a factor considered by BIS in determining settlement amount.

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Apr

23

Botox Bioterror?


Posted by at 8:18 pm on April 23, 2009
Category: Iran Sanctions

Injecting BotoxThe Washington Times published an editorial today advocating that a French pharmaceutical company be denied access to the U.S. market because it allegedly sold “raw botulinum toxin” to Iran. The company, Ipsen, is seeking to market two Botox-alike cosmetic drugs, including Dysport, in the United States that are pending FDA approval, and the newspaper is arguing that the FDA-approval should be withheld because of these sales. In that regard, the editorial endorses legislation introduced this March by Sen. Sam Brownback, and targeted at Ipsen, which would prohibit FDA approvals of drug applications by companies that sold in Iran products that “contain” botulinum toxin.

In researching these allegations by the Washington Times, it became clear that not everything in the editorial adds up. First, there is no substantiation of the claims that Ipsen is selling raw botulinum toxin to Iran. Rather it appears that the concerns that led to questions about approving Ipsen’s products for the U.S. market arose from this report documenting Ipsen’s sale of Dysport to Iran, which although it contains small amounts of Type A Botulinum toxin can’t be accurately characterized as “raw” botulinum toxin. In fact, Dysport is the most widely used Botox substitute in Iran. The low concentrations of the toxin in the drug make it an unlikely choice as a building block for a biological weapon.

Production of raw botulinum toxin is quite easy. Recipes can be found on the Internet and require only basic media to grow the toxin. And there is substantial evidence that Iran has already produced botulinum toxin as part of its CBW program. In light of this, it seems unlikely that cosmetic preparations containing botulism toxin can make a significant contribution to Iran’s bio-weapons program. Or that Iran would even buy raw botulism toxin for its bio-weapon program on the open market.

Other statements in the editorial suggest that the Washington Times might be playing somewhat loose with the facts. For example, the editorial states:

Botulinum is one of the most lethal biological agents in the world. Under certain circumstances, a single gram can kill more than a million people.

Compare this with the following statement from the somewhat more authoritative Journal of the American Medical Association‘s article on botulism as a bioterror agent:

Botulinum toxin is the most poisonous substance known. A single gram of crystalline toxin, evenly dispersed and inhaled, would kill more than 1 million people, although technical factors would make such dissemination difficult.

There are plenty of things that other countries are selling to Iran that should give rise to some concern. Crow’s feet medicine isn’t among them.

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Apr

22

The Pirate and the Talk Show Lawyer


Posted by at 8:26 pm on April 22, 2009
Category: Piracy on the High Seas

Ron Kuby
ABOVE: Ron Kuby

Although U.S. and international laws relating to piracy aren’t strictly within the domain of export laws, the issues are of considerable interest to the export community, both legal and otherwise, because of the impact of piracy on export trade from the U.S. and other countries. Also, it’s an interesting subject and allows the occasional lapse into pirate dialect.

The criminal complaint against Abduwali Muse, the pirate involved in the Maersk Alabama affair who has been brought to New York for trial, has been released. The allegations in the complaint, if true, suggest that Muse is not quite the innocent schoolboy duped by older pirates, as claimed by his mother. Rather Muse was the ringleader of the operation although, sadly for him, a devastatingly incompetent one at that.

Muse was among the first of the pirates to board the ship and, brandishing a gun, he started giving orders to stop the ship, lower a ladder to the pirate boat, and to give him a telephone number for the owners of the ship. He also demanded that the rest of the crew, at that point hiding in the safe room, surrender. A ship crew member convinced Muse that the crew would be to afraid to surrender if he was carrying a gun, thereby causing Muse to leave his gun behind as the crew member led him around the ship. Shortly thereafter several crew members tackled Muse, tied him up and carried him down to the safe room. Oops.

Later Muse was released by the crew to board the lifeboat with the Alabama’s captain as part of a deal to have the pirates leave the ship. On the lifeboat, Muse boasted to the Alabama’s captain that he had hijacked other ships. When the naval warship USS Bainbridge arrived on the scene, Muse requested permission to board where he received medical treatment for the wounds he received in the scuffle on the Alabama. When Navy sharpshooters took care of his compatriots on the life boat, Muse’s dreams of coming to America were realized, although not quite in the manner he had perhaps hoped.

The United States’ claim to have the jurisdiction to bring Muse back to the U.S for prosecution is based not only on the US flag status of the Alabama, but also under the principal of universal jurisdiction under the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”). (The U.S. is a member of the former, but not the latter, although both have nearly identical provisions permitting universal jurisdiction over pirates.)

Of course, that hasn’t stopped lawyer-turned-radio-host Ron Kuby, who is seeking to defend Muse, from trying to concoct a dubious theory questioning U.S. jurisdiction over Muse.

I think in this particular case, there’s a grave question as to whether America was in violation of principles of truce in warfare on the high seas. This man seemed to come onto the Bainbridge under a flag of truce to negotiate. He was then captured. There is a question whether he is lawfully in American custody and serious questions as to whether he can be prosecuted because of his age.

Presumably this is a reference to Article 32 of the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Law and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV), which at least might arguably be said to also state the international law regarding wars at sea. That provision states:

A person is regarded as a parlementaire who has been authorized by one of the belligerents to enter into communication with the other, and who advances bearing a white flag. He has a right to inviolability, as well as the trumpeter, bugler or drummer, the flag-bearer and interpreter who may accompany him.

Even leaving aside the formality of the white flag, and there is no indication that Muse carried one, Hague IV and the international law governing conflicts at sea only applies to nations at war. Historically pirates have been considered hostes humani generis (“enemies of all mankind”) and completely outside protection of maritime law. Conventions relating to the conduct of war by nations have no application to them. Instead, the only protections that pirates have are those set forth in the UNCLOS and the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, both of which give the pirates a right to a trial. (Previously international law permitted summary execution of pirates at sea when caught in the act.)

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(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)