Archive for August, 2008


Aug

6

Chinese Company Fined $1.2 Million Over Cuba Trade


Posted by at 8:21 pm on August 6, 2008
Category: Cuba SanctionsGeneral

Moa Region of Cuba
ABOVE: Nickel Production in Cuba

The latest release by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) of recent civil penalty cases reports that Minxia Non-Ferrous Metals, Inc., remitted $1,198,000 to settle allegations that between 2003 and 2006 it purchased or otherwise dealt in Cuban metals. The matter was not voluntarily disclosed to OFAC.

Even though this is the highest fine imposed this year and is substantially higher than the typical fine for a violation of the Cuba embargo, OFAC is, as usual, parsimonious about the details of what happened. The information provided above is all OFAC had to say about the matter. So what led to such a large fine? We can only speculate, but there are some things on which to base such speculations.

Minxia Non-Ferrous Metals is a subsidiary of China Antimony Chemicals Co., Ltd., which, in turn, is a subsidiary of China Minmetals Non-Ferrous Metals Co., Ltd., which is, in turn, a subsidiary of the giant Chinese metal conglomerate China Minmetals Corporation. This climb up the corporate ladder may reveal what had OFAC in a snit about Minxia’s trades — namely, the $600 million joint venture between China Minmetals Corporation and Cuba to exploit Cuba’s large nickel supplies. China is one of the largest consumers of nickel which is a key component of stainless steel, and nickel is Cuba’s largest export — plenty there to get OFAC in a tizzy. In fact, the Bush administration announced a crackdown on nickel exports in July 2006, claiming that they constitute more than half of Cuba’s foreign income.

Sadly for the Chinese, if this was the cause of the fine, the Chinese interest in the nickel joint venture was recently bought out by Venezuela in what may not have been an arms-length, consensual transaction.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Aug

5

In Cyberspace You Could Be Anywhere


Posted by at 7:52 pm on August 5, 2008
Category: Iran Sanctions

Lost in CyberspaceApplication of country-based sanctions in cyberspace may pose some interesting problems and pitfalls as two cases recently reported by the Office of Foreign Assets Control illustrate:

One individual has agreed to a settlement totaling $840 for alleged violation of the prohibitions in the Iranian Transactions Regulations: OFAC alleged that in August 2006, the individual attempted to transfer funds to Me-Gold Kish, Co. in Iran in an apparent attempt to purchase electronic gold without an OFAC license. The individual did not voluntarily disclose this matter to OFAC.

One individual has agreed to a settlement totaling $400 for alleged violation of the prohibitions in the Iranian Transactions Regulations: OFAC alleged that in June 2006, the individual attempted to purchase electronic gold from Me-Gold Kish Co. in Iran in apparent violation of §§ 560.201, 560.203 and 560.204 of the Iranian Transactions Regulations. The individual did not voluntarily disclose this matter to OFAC.

Although it is possible that the two individuals here knew that they were dealing with a business located in Iran, it is also quite possible that they did not. Me-Gold is an on-line e-currency exchange business. Its current website claims that it is incorporated in Singapore. A company affiliate site states that Me-Gold has offices in Internet City, Dubai. Apparently, however, an earlier version of Me-Gold’s website stated that the company was located on Kish Island, Iran, although there’s no evidence that the fined individuals read that part of the website.

Even though the references to Iran have been scrubbed from Me-Gold’s site, this is a business that the owners could run from their computers in Iran using banks in, and a fake address in, Dubai. If a U.S. citizen does business with the company, he or she will be violating the Iran sanctions without having the faintest idea that, on the other side of his computer screen, are a bunch of people in Iran.

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Aug

1

A Dubious Hook To Hang A Scienter Hat On


Posted by at 4:37 pm on August 1, 2008
Category: GeneralSanctions

Certified LetterDonald Wayne Hatch, the owner of Rigel Optics, an online distributor of Russian night vision equipment, entered into a plea agreement yesterday in connection with an indictment that alleged that he had illegally exported night vision equipment without a license. Hatch had been the subject of a 14-count indictment accusing him, inter alia, of violations of the Arms Export Control Act. Under the plea agreement, the government would drop 13 of the 14 counts in the indictment and Hatch would plead guilty to the one remaining count, which alleged that he made misrepresentations to the government in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). At the same time, Rigel Optics entered into a plea agreement under which, in exchange for the government dropping the remaining counts in the indictment against Rigel, Rigel would plead guilty to one count of violation of the Arms Export Control Act.

The plea agreement for Hatch sets forth the factual predicate for his plea and describes two exports of generation 2 night vision rifle scopes by Hatch. At his instruction, a shipping employee entered the notation “NLR” — or “No License Required” — on the Shipper’s Export Declaration (“SED”) filed in connection with the exports, even though a license from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) was required.

To support a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, the misrepresentation must have been with knowledge that it was false. The only factual predicate for knowledge by Hatch that the NLR notation was false is an allegation that the Office of Export Enforcement (“OEE”) of the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) sent Hatch a letter:

In November, 2002, the Department of Commerce, BIS, OEE, sent a letter via U.S. certified mail to the attention of Mike Hatch c/o Rigel Optics at 1510 Ninth Street, DeWitt, Iowa. The letter advised that the night vision scopes sold by Rigel Optics were subject to the export licensing authority of the Department of State, Office of Defense and Trade Control (DTC). The letter further instructed Rigel Optics to cease exporting all night vision rifle scopes until the rifle scopes were properly classified by the Department of State, and any applicable export licenses had been received.

Oddly, there is no allegation that Hatch signed for or read the letter or even that the certified mail receipt was returned to OEE. Nor does the plea agreement allege that Hatch mislabeled the exported scopes — an oft-cited and usually reliable indicium of knowledge and criminal intent. Instead, all we have is a letter mailed to him saying that the rifle scopes required DDTC licenses. It’s not clear why no agents visited Mr. Hatch and directly informed him of the export requirement, a more common practice used to establish criminal intent by defendants for exports after the visit.

UPDATE: The Associated Press report on Hatch’s and Rigel’s plea agreements can’t seem to get things right, referring to the “Arms Exportation Control Act” and, better yet, the “U.S. Missions List.” Don’t reporters at the AP have access to Google?

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)