The folks at iRobot not only make the Roomba, which will robotically vacuum your floors and drive your dog insane, but also they make military iRobots, which will chase down and, er, vacuum up terrorists, enemy combatants, and other assorted malefactors. I, for one, would not like to see the bad boy pictured on the right chasing me down some hallway or alley. Not every iRobot, however, packs heat, and many perform certain defensive military missions such as handling and disabling IEDs, detecting chemical and biological warfare agents, and other cool stuff.

According to this recent post at Planetary Gear, the iRobot is attracting as much foreign interest as the iPhone and the iPod. And that, of course, raises a few export issues. Depending on how the robot is decked out, it can either be a killer robot of doom or WALL-E, the trashbot. The iRobot can be just as useful to first responders as to military troops.

A review of the iRobot product literature indicates that the company has played it safe and simply takes the position that the tactical iRobot is USML whether or not it’s been given the naughty or nice accoutrements. But technology is quickly outpacing the creaky old United States Munitions List, and it’s not very clear what is the correct USML category for the robot. Of course, there’s always Category XI: “electronic equipment . . . which is specifically designed, modified or configured for military application.” Or “catch-all” Category XXI for an article not enumerated in the other categories “which has substantial military applicability” and “which has been specifically designed, developed, configured, adapted or modified for military purposes.” But that seems rather unsatisfying, doesn’t it? Shouldn’t something this deadly have its own category?

And suppose that iRobot took a hard line position that a robot not outfitted with military gear but capable of being so outfitted wasn’t USML, what would be the ECCN of the robot?

(For those confused about the title, go here.)

Earlier this week, Rep. Anthony Weiner (D-NY) introduced H.R. 6361, or the “Stop Business with Terrorists Act of 2008,” which was introduced into the Senate earlier this year as S.1234 by Senators Lautenberg (D-NJ) and Clinton (D-NY). The purpose of the bill is to reverse current law which permits, in limited circumstances, dealings by foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms with Iran.

Under current law, a foreign subsidiary could do business with Iran in the following circumstances. First, it must be a foreign subsidiary incorporated in a foreign jurisdiction, not a branch operation of a U.S. company. Second, the transactions with Iran cannot involve any U.S. persons. Third, some have argued that in order not to be seen as a device to evade the sanctions, the foreign subsidiary must have some business other than dealing with Iran.

Under the Stop Business with Terrorists Act of 2008, a parent company will be liable for acts of its foreign subsidiaries with respect to Iran that violate Executive Order 12959 and Executive Order 13059 notwithstanding its incorporation in a foreign jurisdiction and the absence of U.S. involvement in the transaction at issue. Those Executive Orders prohibit, among other things, exports and reexports of U.S. origin goods, services and technology to Iran.

Although this legislation doesn’t fall directly within the purview of the European Union’s blocking legislation, Council Regulation (EC) No 2271/96, one has to wonder whether yet another effort by the U.S. to extend the scope of its sanctions regulations outside its own borders will provoke any countermeasures or retaliation by Europe. Of course, the extraterritorial scope here is more limited than it was in the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act because only the U.S. parent is penalized under the proposed legislation. Still, the legislation will have a direct impact on the operations of E.U. companies insofar as their U.S. parents prohibit them from dealings with Iran.

Back in 1997, the folks at Omega Engineering were very bad. They applied to the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) for a license to ship laboratory equipment to Pakistan. The license was denied. The appeal of the license denial was denied. They shipped the goods anyway with an intermediate stop in Newport, Germany. BIS was not amused. Omega agreed to a $187,000 fine and an order, entered in November 2003, forbidding it from being involved in any exports to Pakistan for five years.

Fast forward to 2008. Omega is no longer an export scofflaw. Indeed, Omega helps BIS obtain a criminal indictment against an individual who was trying to export U.S.-origin goods to Iran without a license. The reward? BIS agreed last week, in consideration of the “extraordinary cooperation” of Omega, which helped BIS obtain “crucial” evidence, to suspend the reminder of the export denial order which otherwise would have remained in effect until November 2008.

And who says you never get a second chance?

A Florida man and a California man who ran separate aviation parts businesses have been arrested and charged, in a criminal complaint unsealed yesterday, with violations of the Arms Export Control Act and the U.S. embargo on Iran in connection with alleged exports to Iran of spare parts for F-14s and other military aircraft. According to the criminal complaint (not yet available on Pacer but as described by the Miami Herald), orders for the parts were received by email and then shipped to Dubai — that’s a huge surprise!! — for re-export to Iran.

One of the defendants is represented by Robert Abreu, a Miami criminal defense attorney who appears to have made the mistake of speaking to the New York Times before actually reading the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations that govern the case:

Robert Abreu, a lawyer for [one of the defendants], said in an interview that based on his initial reading of the case: “It does not deal apparently with any weapons or munitions. As far as I know, it was simply dual-use aircraft parts, and I think this is being trumped up to an arms violation where it’s not.”

Perhaps Mr. Abreu was misquoted, but this seems to suggest that he thinks that aircraft parts can’t be the predicate of an Arms Export Control Act prosecution because they aren’t “weapons or munitions.” Aircraft parts “specifically designed or modified for” military aircraft fall under Category VIII(h) of the United States Munitions List, and their exports are controlled by the Arms Export Control Act. One of the parts mentioned in the criminal complaint was an F-14 harness, and this is clearly a part specifically designed for the F-14 and not usable in any other craft.

ABOVE: John L. Withers, II

---

On Friday, a federal grand jury indicted arms dealer AEY and four company officials on charges, among others, that they committed procurement fraud and lied to U.S. officials about the origin of Chinese manufactured ammunition supplied by the company to Afghan forces in Afghanistan pursuant to a U.S. Government contract. Section 126.1 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations provides that it is the policy of the United States to deny approvals for exports and imports of defense articles originating in China.

Today, Henry Waxman, the Chairman of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, released a letter detailing evidence the Chairman said suggested that John L. Withers, II, the U.S. ambassador to Albania, was involved in efforts to conceal the origin of the Chinese ammunition. The Chinese-made ammunition was being sold to AEY by the Albanian Ministry of Defense through the Military Export Import Company of Albania (MEICO). Because the Ministry, AEY and MEICO knew that Chinese ammunition couldn’t be sold by AEY, the Chinese ammunition was being repackaged at a facility in Albania prior to its export. When a New York Times reporter wanted to inspect the facility, the Albanians became alarmed.

According to testimony before the Oversight and Government Reform Committee by Major Larry Harrison, a Defense Department official working in Albania, the Albanian Defense Minister requested an urgent meeting with the U.S. Ambassador in November 2007:

Major Harrison stated that in response to the Albanian Defense Minister’s request, he contacted the U.S. Embassy’s Deputy Chief of Mission, Stephen Cristina, who arranged for a meeting to take place at his private residence in Tirana that evening. Major Harrison personally attended the meeting, along with the Albanian Defense Minister, Ambassador Withers, Deputy Chief of Mission Cristina, and the Embassy’s Regional Security Officer, Patrick Leonard.

According to Major Harrison, the meeting lasted for several hours, ending around midnight. Major Harrison told the Committee that during this meeting, the Albanian Defense Minister asked for help from the U.S. Ambassador?l According to Major Harrison, “He made several comments to the effect of how he had been a friend of the U.S., he’d help the U.S…. He felt the U.S. owed him something.”

Major Harrison stated that the officials then discussed how to handle the New York Times reporter. He stated that his advice was to not allow the reporter to visit the facility, but that his advice was not accepted. Instead, the Albanian Defense Minister called the commanding general of the Albanian military forces and instructed him to remove all Chinese ammunition boxes from the site of the repackaging operation so that “there would be nothing for the reporter to see.” According to Major Harrison, “the Ambassador agreed that this would alleviate the suspicion of wrongdoing, if Mr. Wood [the New York Times reporter], while he was at Rinas, did not see Chinese ammo boxes.”

Waxman also alleges that U.S. embassy officials also attempted to conceal information about the November 2007 meeting from the Committee. This allegation is based on a document which the Embassy supplied to the Committee on its meetings with Albanian officials with respect to AEY contract and which did not fully describe the meeting at issue.

Neither the State Department, nor Ambassador Withers, has issued a response to these charges, but we won’t be surprised if the State Department makes allusions to a certain novel by Joseph Conrad and a character named Kurtz.