Archive for December, 2007


Dec

13

Do As I Say, Not As I Do


Posted by at 9:40 pm on December 13, 2007
Category: General

True ConfessionsThe Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) issued today a final rule amending section 127.12 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) which governs voluntary disclosures of violations of the ITAR by exporters of defense articles and defense services. Four significant revisions were made.

The new rules require additional specification of details and identifying information in a voluntary disclosure. Second, the new rules state that the voluntary disclosure must link new compliance initiatives in the exporter’s compliance program to the specific violations uncovered. Third, the DDTC may require, in the case of a “systematic pattern of violations,” a signature of “senior officer” on the voluntary disclosure

By far the most significant change effected by the new rule is a time limit between the initial and final disclosures. Under the new rule, the exporter who makes a preliminary disclosure must now file its final disclosure with DDTC within 60 days of the preliminary disclosure. Prior to this change, there was no time limit for the final disclosure, although DDTC staff encouraged the final disclosure to be made reasonably promptly. The new rule provides that the exporter may request an extension of the 60-day period if additional time is needed, although DDTC is under no obligation to grant the extension. Failure to file the final disclosure within the requisite time period may be used as DDTC as a reason to disregard the voluntary disclosure as a mitigating factor in assessing the penalty.

Of course, more than a few eyebrows have been raised in the export community that the notoriously slow agency should be imposing stricter “hurry up an wait” deadlines on exporters. Voluntary disclosures can take more than a year before the agency responds. Amendments to technical assistance agreements can also take a year or more, and commodity jurisdiction requests can fall into a black hole and remain unadjudicated for years. Worse certain agency employees have suggested that if Congress imposes time limits on DDTC for the processing of export licenses and other agency actions, the agency will simply respond by bouncing export license applications for minor technicalities. In view of this, one would hope that DDTC won’t be stingy in granting exporter requests for additional time to complete their internal investigations of voluntary disclosures that have been preliminarily disclosed.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Dec

12

What’s in Your Laptop? License Exceptions Expanded by BIS.


Posted by at 9:28 pm on December 12, 2007
Category: General

What's in Your Laptop?In an earlier post, we noted that License Exceptions TMP and BAG’s “tools of the trade” exception might allow temporary export of laptops and the software on it, but that this exception did not cover technical data. Today the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) amended its rules to permit the export of technology — which would include technical data on dual-use items — under the TMP and BAG license exceptions.

There are several significant limitations on the use of these license exceptions for technical data. First, the license exception is only available to U.S. persons (i.e. citizens and permanent residents) or non-U.S. persons otherwise authorized to receive the technical data or technology. Second, technology exported pursuant to these exceptions may not be thereafter disclosed to anyone who is also not a U.S. person or specifically authorized to receive the data. Third, if the technical data exported under these exceptions is in a form that could facilitate a subsequent disclosure it must be returned to the United States or destroyed within 12 months from the export pursuant to the exception. Finally, adequate security precautions must be taken to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the technical data once it has been exported pursuant to the exception.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Dec

11

Iranian “Supercomputer” Made with U.S. Parts


Posted by at 6:04 pm on December 11, 2007
Category: Iran Sanctions

Amirkabir University of TechnologyAccording to a piece published yesterday in Information Week, the Amirkabir University of Technology in Tehran announced that it had used 218 AMD microprocessors to build a supercomputer with a theoretical peak performance of 860 gigaflops. The fastest supercomputer in the world currently is ranked for 478 teraflops, more than 500 times faster than Amirkabir’s computer.

Of course, the point here isn’t the paltry performance of the Iranian kinda-supercomputer, but rather that such a computer could be built with U.S. components despite the U.S. sanctions on Iran. Obviously U.S. sanctions, despite their purported reach against re-exports, can’t always stanch the flow of mass-produced products to sanctioned countries.

AMD’s response was, not surprisingly, both predictable and believable:

AMD fully complies with all United States export control laws, and all authorized distributors of AMD products have contractually committed to AMD that they will do the same with respect to their sales and shipments of AMD products. Any shipment of AMD products to Iran by any authorized distributor of AMD would be a breach of the specific provisions of their contracts with AMD.

Lesson to be learned here: make sure all your contracts have a clause dealing with illegal exports. That way when you read in the newspaper that your product was found in Iran, you can say the same thing AMD did.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Dec

7

California Man Sentenced to Two Years for Brokering Violations


Posted by at 12:18 am on December 7, 2007
Category: DDTCPart 129

Panther Thermal Imaging CameraOn December 3, Philip Cheng from Cupertino, California, was sentenced to a two-year prison term for his involvement in a scheme to export night vision equipment to China. Cheng, an export broker, had been involved in a transaction in which Night Vision Technology, a U.S. company, agreed to sell Panther thermal imaging cameras to two Chinese companies — North China Research Institute of Electro-Optics and the China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation. As a result, Cheng was indicted in 2004 for illegal exports, illegal defense brokering activities and money laundering. After a hung jury, Cheng pleaded guilty to the brokering charges under 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii)(III) and 22 C.F.R. § 129.6.

The DOJ press release on the guilty plea concentrates on the Department’s proof that the night vision exports to China were illegal. But, of course, that doesn’t demonstrate why Cheng’s activities were violations of the requirements of Part 129 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) to obtain licenses or provide prior notification for certain brokering activities. The evidence seems clear that Cheng was involved in brokering under Part 129. But not all brokering activities require a license. Nor does brokering of illegal exports violate the brokering rules, even though such activity would support a conviction for conspiracy.

Section 129.7 of the ITAR sets forth those situations in which a broker must obtain a license. First, of course, the brokering must involve significant military equipment (“SME”), and it seems clear that the night vision in question was SME under the ITAR. Additionally, in order to require a license, a brokering transaction must meet one of four criteria: (1) the value of the transaction must exceed $1 million; (2) the same significant military equipment had not been license for export to the armed services of the country involved; (3) the agreement would require the manufacture of SME abroad; or (4) the items involved were being sold to non-governmental entities. Alternatively, prior notification might be required under section 129.8 for transactions involving SME valued at less than $1 million.

It seems likely that at least the notification requirement was breached. Arguably, the license requirement was also breached on the grounds that the Panther thermal imaging camera had never been licensed to the Chinese military. Even so, the DOJ press release on the conviction seems not to have understood that more than an illegal export is required to support a conviction for illegal brokering.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Dec

4

Freight Forwarders: Export Cops or Counselors?


Posted by at 6:24 pm on December 4, 2007
Category: BISOFAC

Proclad PipelinesThere has been some discussion here at Export Law Blog about the proper role of freight forwarding companies in export enforcement. If a customer of a freight forwarder proffers a package addressed to Iran without an OFAC license, should the freight forwarder decline the package and tell the customer that shipments to Iran must be licensed? Or should the freight forwarder accept the package and call the authorities? The recent settlement agreement entered into between Kuwaiti-owned Proclad International Pipelines and the Bureau of Industry and Security shows, I think, a freight forwarder that struck exactly the right balance.

At issue were attempted exports by Proclad of nickel alloy pipes classified as EAR99 to Iran without a license. The company attempted to export the pipes to Iran by transshipping them through the UAE. In the recitation of the various counts with which Proclad was charged is this interesting language:

Proclad altered markings for use on the crates of nickel alloy pipes that it was attempting to export to Iran. The altered markings were provided to the U.s. manufacturers in lieu of markings previously provided indicating that pipes were being exported to Iran. Proclad altered the markings to conceal the true ultimate destination of the items after it had been informed by a freight forwarder of the applicable licensing requirements during a previous attempt to export the pipes to Iran.

What apparently happened was that once the freight forwarder said the pipes couldn’t be shipped to Iran, Proclad simply slapped on new labels saying that the pipes were going to the UAE. I suspect the freight forwarder then called the authorities.

The freight forwarder did the right thing by initially telling the exporter that exports to Iran required licenses. Clearly any exporter that hands documents to the freight forwarder showing Iran as the ultimate destination is clueless about U.S. law. Proclad Pipelines is located in Scotland, so it’s a reasonable assumption that they may not have been familiar with U.S. export restrictions.

But what initially might be seen as an innocent mistake quickly became an illegal undertaking when Proclad decided that the appropriate response wasn’t to decline to export items to Iran but to pretend to export the Iranian-bound goods elsewhere. And a freight forwarder who saw that a package previously bound for Iran now had on shipping labels for the UAE would have to be well-aware that the exporter was attempting some shenanigans. And that, in my view, fully-justified the freight forwarder ratting out Proclad.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)