Archive for the ‘USMIL’ Category


May

15

Export Control Reform Finally Announced for Guns and Ammo


Posted by at 7:04 pm on May 15, 2018
Category: BISCCLDDTCExport ReformUSMILUSML

Guns by Al [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/6gPGbx [cropped]The Directorate of Defense Trade Controls and the Bureau of Industry and Security today announced the proposed rules for the long awaited export control reform of Categories I, II and III of the United States Munitions List.  The proposed rules for DDTC are here; the proposed rules for BIS are here.

Under the proposed rules, the only items remaining in Category I will be firearms that fire caseless ammunition, are fully automatic, or are specially designed to integrate fire control, automatic tracking, or automatic firing.  Other small arms that were once in Category I will be moved to 0A501 and 0A502.  Small arms that are on Category I of the USMIL will still be subject to the brokering rules of the ITAR even if they have been moved to 0A501 or 0A502.

These new proposed ECCNs will be controlled by, among others, RS1 and FC meaning that licenses will be required for all destinations.  (RS1 captures every country but Canada and FC captures Canada).  The BIS proposed rules also exclude the use of most license exceptions so that the new regime will closely parallel the available exemptions that were available under the ITAR.   So the result of the transition of these items from the USML to the CCL will mostly be a change in the agency with licensing authority.

There are a few significant changes, however, worth noting.  First, the proposed rules would eliminate a particular bugbear of mine relating to the classification of rifle scopes.  Currently, rifle scopes are ITAR if they are “manufactured to military specifications,” whatever that means.   Foreign manufacturers of rifle scopes routinely decline to state whether their scopes are Category I(f) or 0A987 and do not provide enough information to decide whether a particular scope is manufactured to military specifications.  Under the proposed rules, a scope is on the USML only if it has night vision or infrared capabilities that would cause it to be captured under Category XII.  Everything else is now 0A987.

Second, these new rules will reverse the questionable position that DDTC has taken in the Defense Distributed case.   In that case, DDTC argued that posting 3D gun plans on the Internet is an export of controlled technical date on Category I firearms to every foreign person with access to the Internet.  BIS has a somewhat different take on posting things to the Internet.   Here’s what the proposed BIS rules say:

The EAR also includes well-established and well understood criteria for excluding certain information from the scope of what is “subject to the EAR.” (See part 734 of the EAR.) Items that would move to the CCL would be subject to existing EAR concepts of jurisdiction and controls related to “development” and “production,” as well operation, installation, and maintenance “technology.” While controlling such “technology,” as well as other “technology” is important, the EAR includes criteria in part 734 that would exclude certain information and software from control. For example, if a gun manufacturer posts a firearm’s operation and maintenance manual on the Internet, making it publicly available to anyone interested in accessing it and without restrictions on further dissemination (i.e., unlimited distribution), the operation and maintenance information included in that published operation and maintenance manual would no longer be “subject to the EAR.”

Part 734 makes clear that publication of technology on the Internet is not an export of that technology to the rest of the world; rather it is a release of that technology from export controls.

Third, the new rules will eliminate the issue as to whether firearms training is a defense service that cannot be provided by a U.S. person to a foreign individual without a license.  Both the existing and latest proposed DDTC rule defining defense services would require a license to provide basic firearms training to a foreign individual.  (The latest proposed rule permits basic training but only if there is an approved license to export the firearm to that individual.)  The BIS analysis of this is somewhat different.  The BIS notice of proposed rulemaking somewhat wryly states:

The EAR does not include a concept of “defense services,” and the “technology” related controls are more narrowly focused and apply in limited contexts as compared to the ITAR.

In fact, of course, under the proposed rules training a foreign individual in firearms use would require a license only if it involved a control of technology covered by proposed ECCNs 0E501 or 0E502.  However, neither ECCN covers information related to the use of 0A501 or 0A502 firearms.   As a result, firearms training that would have required a license under the old rules will not require a license if the new rules are adopted.

Photo Credit: Guns by Al [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Flickr https://flic.kr/p/6gPGbx [cropped]. Copyright 2009 Al

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Jan

9

Understanding the Law You Enforce and Other Minor Details


Posted by at 7:15 pm on January 9, 2012
Category: ICEUSMIL

AD-4N SkyraiderApparently it is not a job requirement at Immigration and Customs Enforcement to have to understand the laws that you are charged with enforcing, as this recent press release from ICE illustrates all too well. The press release announces the forfeiture of a Douglas AD-4N Skyraider and associated parts that were alleged to have been illegally imported into the United States.

Now let’s hear about the case from Special Agent Raymond R. Parmer, Jr., who quickly reveals that he doesn’t understand at least some of the laws that the taxpayers pay him to enforce:

“The Skyraider aircraft, its cannons and parts are all subject to import licensing requirements as ‘defense articles’ under the Arms Export Control Act. Federal law prohibits the importation of defense articles without a license or permit,” said Raymond R. Parmer, Jr., special agent in charge of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) in New Orleans. “ICE aggressively investigates these cases in order to deter this type of illegal activity and protect those who abide by our nation’s laws.” Parmer oversees responsibility for the states of Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Tennessee and Louisiana.

Er, no. The aircraft and the cannons are subject to import licensing requirements as “defense articles.” The parts, well, not so much. Permanent imports of defense articles into the United States are governed by the United States Munitions Import List, which is a subset of the United States Munitions List. Not everything on the USML requires a license for permanent (as opposed to temporary) import into the United States. And aircraft parts are one of those things.

Aircraft parts are covered by Category VIII(h) of the USML. Now let’s take a look at Category VIII of the USMIL:

NOTE: Category VIII (b) through (j) and Categories IX, X, XI, XII and XIII of ‘‘Munitions List’’ deleted as inapplicable to imports

Oops. Maybe Agent Parmer ought to try actually reading the USMIL before speaking up in a press release about what does and does not require an import license.

Not surprisingly, this is not the first time of which I am aware where ICE agents failed to understand that the USML and the USMIL are not co-extensive. I was involved in a case where my client was being prosecuted for illegal exports that the client was alleged to have made to undercover federal agents. During the course of plea negotiations, an ICE agent came zooming in with an announcement that Customs had seized some military electronics that my client was said to be illegally importing without a license, citing Category XI of the USML. The agent urged additional criminal charges and the end of the plea-bargain discussions. I pointed out to the U.S. Attorney involved that Category XI was not on the USMIL and that permanent imports of military electronics did not require a license. He was sufficiently irate over the ICE agent’s misrepresentation of applicable law that he made the agent personally deliver the improperly seized items to my client at my client’s facility.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Mar

30

eBay Drone Auction Leads to Sting, Arrest


Posted by at 9:29 pm on March 30, 2011
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesUSMILUSML

Robot Attack!Henderson Chua, a resident of the Philippines who was arrested when he traveled to Los Angeles in February, was indicted on March 10 on charges that he illegally engaged in a temporary import into the United States of parts for an AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven drone without the required State Department license. Mr. Chua had listed the Raven on eBay, which had attracted the attention of undercover federal agents in both California and in Florida. Agents in both states had entered into discussions with Mr. Chua to purchase the parts.

According to the criminal complaint filed in the case, the parts consisted of the nose cone, fuselage, and the horizontal surface of the tail assembly, but not the main wing, the entire tale assembly, the battery or the ground control equipment. (Almost all of the press stories, such as this one, this one, this one, and this one incorrectly reported that the illegal temporary import involved the entire drone.)

It’s important to understand that only parts were involved because a permanent import of these parts is not illegal. Aircraft and drone parts are not listed on the United States Munitions Import List. They are, however, listed in Category VIII(h) of the United States Munitions List, which means they require a State Department license for temporary (as opposed to permanent) imports, i.e., imports which will be followed by an export back out of the United States. As you will see, this distinction between legal permanent imports and illegal temporary imports opens up some major holes in the government’s case.

The narrative in the criminal complaint shows that Mr. Chua initially entered into negotiations with the federal agents to sell them the Raven parts, which apparently he was doing on behalf of a third party who claimed to have bought them in a Philippines government auction. During the negotiations, the agents frequently and incorrectly indicated that the import of these parts into the U.S. would be illegal. At one point, Mr. Chua responds that it should not be a problem because he is only shipping “as a part not a whole unit [and] can be declared as a spare.” (Paragraph 17.) At this point the agents might have realized that a permanent import of the parts would not be illegal, so they told Chua, for the first time and the very next day, that they were buying the parts for someone in Russia and the parts would be immediately exported after they received them. (Paragraph 18.)

After hearing this, Mr. Chua and the owner of the parts wisely consulted lawyers to see if the parts could still be shipped. Based on that consultation, Chua told the undercovers that they would need a State Department license (Paragraph 29.) After repeated statements by the agents that they would not obtain a license, Chua told the agents that he could only sell the parts to them if they would sign an agreement stating:

The Buyer shall not export, re-export, or transfer directly or indirectly either by laws applicalbe in the customer’s own courntry or by laws of the United States of America to countries/companies developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to companies/persons listed under the U.S. Department of Commerce Denied List.”

(Paragraph 39.) The agents did sign such an agreement prior to the export of the parts by Chua to them. (Paragraph 42.)

As this blog has noted again and again, a criminal export violation requires knowledge by the defendant that he or she is violating the law. This is going to be tough in this case. The defendant correctly believed that he could ship the parts to the United States until the agents said that they were going to re-export the items to Russia. At that point, Chua and his seller consulted lawyers and told the undercovers they would need State Department licenses to ship the parts. When the agents declined to get licenses, Chua determined, apparently in consultation with legal counsel, that the items could only be shipped without a license if the agents agreed not to export them from the United States. Granted the advice was a bit flawed because the agreement no to re-export was limited to countries involved in developing WMD or to parties on the Department of Commerce’s Denied Parties List. But there is not a shred of evidence that Mr. Chua didn’t believe that this advice was a correct statement of U.S. law. Chua may be liable for civil penalties under the Arms Export Control Act but criminal penalties can’t be imposed without proving he knew he was relying on bad legal advice.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)