Archive for the ‘OFAC’ Category


Mar

28

Before You Name Your Kid, Check the SDN List


Posted by at 7:10 pm on March 28, 2007
Category: OFAC

DeniedIf your name is Daniel Garcia, don’t even think of applying for apartment, a job, a mortgage or a car loan. Because you’ll be denied. Thanks, apparently, to increased use of OFAC’s SDN list to scan routine domestic transactions from used car sales to lease applications.

This is the conclusion of a report issued today by the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area. The report trots out a half-dozen horror stories of OFAC screening gone wrong and finds:

  • A couple whose mortgage application was denied simply because the husband’s middle name “Hassan” was listed on the SDN list as an alias for one of Saddam Hussein’s sons;
  • A couple whose first home purchase couldn’t close because the first and last name of the husband, both common Hispanic names, matched a name on the SDN list;
  • An individual who couldn’t purchase a car simply because his last name, Muhammad, caused a credit agency to report that he was a hit on the SDN list
  • An individual that could not pick up $50 that had been sent to him by a money transfer service because his first and middle names were Mohammed Ali;
  • A PayPal customer named Yusuf Mohammed who had his account closed; and
  • A man who couldn’t buy a treadmill because his first name is Hussein.

The problem occurred in these instances for one of three reasons: (1) the company didn’t know how to properly identify a hit; (2) the company didn’t want to take time to determine if a proper hit was a false positive; or (3) even if the company was willing to take that time, the SDN entry lacked sufficient identifying information (e.g. no date or place of birth) to determine whether the hit was a false positive.

Our not-so-hypothetical SDN Daniel Garcia (not one of the Lawyer’s Committee’s examples) has a common Hispanic name and his SDN entry has no place of birth or date of birth that would allow a simple ID check to verify that the hit was a false positive. See for yourself:

Daniel Garcia's SND Entry

Needless to say as more and more companies with less and less screening experience screen customers against the SDN list, anyone named Daniel Garcia might consider changing his name.

The Lawyer’s Committee report raises two interesting issues. First, although the real SDN has the legal right to challenge his designation, the mistaken SDN has neither the right to challenge the designation nor to obtain an official determination that he or she isn’t the real SDN. OFAC’s refusal to provide such an avenue of relief is, indeed, hard to rationalize. OFAC is giving more rights to the alleged terrorist than to an ordinary American. (Would somebody get Lou Dobbs on this?)

Second, because of the abundance of common Hispanic and Middle Eastern names on the SDN list, careless use of the list may hide unlawful discrimination in the provision of housing, credit or employment. A company that simply refuses to provide service to a hit without taking steps to verify whether the hit really is an SDN will have a hard time justifying that the SDN list was the real reason for the denial rather than an intent to discriminate based upon national origin.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Mar

16

Banana Flambé


Posted by at 8:11 am on March 16, 2007
Category: Criminal PenaltiesOFACSanctions

Chiquita Banana LogoNews accounts of the circumstances surrounding the agreement of Chiquita Brands to pay a $25 million criminal fine for payments made to a rebel group in Columbia don’t really tell the whole story. That story can be found in the information filed by the U.S. Attorney with the District Court in the District of Columbia. The information — a legal document that is serving as the predicate for Chiquita’s plea agreement — shows the struggle of the company, generally unreported by the media, to deal with the predicament in which it found itself: it could protect its employees from physical harm and violence threatened by the rebels only by making payments that might be illegal under U.S. law. Nor do the news reports reveal at least one significant deficiency in the government’s case against Chiquita.

The basic story is this. In 1997, Carlos Castaňo, the head of Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (“AUC”) met with officials of C.I. Bananos de Exportación, S.A. (“Banadex”), Chiquita’s wholly-owned Colombian subsidiary. During that meeting, Castaňo indicated to the General Manager of Banadex that it should make certain payments in order to avoid physical harm to Banadex employees. As a result, Banadex began to make the requested payments to AUC. At the time that Banadex began to make the payments to AUC, AUC had not been declared by the United States as a “Foreign Terrorist Organization” (“FTO”) or a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist” (“SDGT”) meaning that the payments to AUC did not violate U.S. law. Senior executives of Chiquita (unnamed by the information) were aware of and approved the payments to AUC.

In September 2001, the Department of State designated AUC as an FTO. Thereafter in October 2001, AUC was designated an SDGT by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”). After both of those designations, payments by a U.S. person to AUC would be illegal.

It was not, however, until February 2003 that management of Chiquita learned that AUC had been designated as an FTO and an SDGT. At that point, Chiquita consulted with legal counsel which advised Chiquita that the payments were illegal. In April 2003, the Board of Chiquita was first advised of the payments by Banadex to AUC. The Board instructed the company to disclose the matter immediately to the DOJ. Additionally one member of the Board proposed that the company should sell its operations Columbia.

Pursuant to the Board’s directive, officials of Chiquita met with the DOJ in April 2003. After the meeting, those officials believed that DOJ had indicated that it wouldn’t pursue Chiquita for prior payments. According to the information, Department of Justice officials stated that “the issue of continuing payments was complicated.” Employees of Banadex, however, continued to make these payments. These continued payments were revealed to the Chiquita Board in December 2003. One member of the Board reiterated his opinion that the company should sell its operations in Columbia.

Banadex made three more payments to AUC after that meeting, the last being paid in February 2004. In June 2004 Chiquita sold Banadex to a third-party.

The central difficulty with the government’s case here is that the U.S. law forbids payments by U.S. persons. Section 594.315 of the SDGT regulations make clear that a U.S. person is a U.S. citizen or a company organized under the laws of the United States. Banadex, which made the payments, was not a U.S. person under that definition and its payments were not a violation of U.S. law. Individual employees of Chiquita were aware of and facilitated the payments and were arguably guilty as individuals. It is not clear, however, that their behavior could be attributed to Chiquita or result in criminal liability for Chiquita. Nonetheless, the criminal information asserts charges only against Chiquita and not against the individual executives who were aware of and facilitated the payments by Banadex.

Even if Chiquita can be held liable for the Banadex payments, the $25 million payment seems excessive. After all, even though the laws at issue don’t provide an exception for protection or ransom payments, Chiquita’s decision to act to protect the safety of its employees is understandable. Perhaps the prosecutors didn’t really believe the AUC threats, but that seems inconsistent with the demonstrated record of murder and violence that landed the AUC on the Specially Designated Nationals (“SDN”) list in the first place.

Additionally when the company began to make the payments, they were perfectly legal. After the company learned in 2003 of the designation of the AUC, it promptly turned itself in. The information tries to suggest that Chiquita didn’t act promptly by noting that the “AUC’s designation was first reported in the national press . . . on September 11, 2001.” My guess is that given the other events of that date, many people (including the federal prosecutors in DC who filed the information) might have missed that story.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

12

Subs Gone Wild!


Posted by at 5:24 pm on March 12, 2007
Category: BISOFAC

Varian LogoThe Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) released on Friday its civil penalty information for February 2006 and reported that Varian, the Palo Alto scientific instrument giant, agreed to pay $114,958 to settle allegations that its Swiss and German subsidiaries had sold software to customers in Iraq and Iran without an OFAC license or outside the scope of an existing license. The payment was made after a voluntary disclosure by Varian.

So does that give you a little twinge of déjà vu? It should. It was only last July when Varian entered into settlement agreements with the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) over similar antics by its overseas subsidiaries. Varian paid $26,400 for computers and associated software shipped to Syria by its Dutch subsidiary without a BIS license. The Dutch subsidiary paid an additional $39,600 for separate unlicensed shipments of computer hardware and software to Syria. Finally, the company’s Swiss subsidiary paid $8,800 for shipment of computers and associated software to North Korea without a BIS license. All of these settlements also followed voluntary disclosures.

In my view the single weakest link in current compliance programs are overseas subsidiaries. All too often the foreign subsidiaries believe that only the local law of their own country governs the re-export of merchandise once they have received it. Moreover, shipment of merchandise from the subsidiaries to North Korea, Iran or other sanctioned countries won’t raise the red flags that such shipments do in the United States. Companies that do not make sure that their compliance training also covers employees of their subsidiaries really should set aside several hundred thousands dollars in reserves for the inevitable day when a European subsidiary sends a shipment to Iran.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Feb

23

Bad Missionaries (Cont’d)


Posted by at 3:48 pm on February 23, 2007
Category: Criminal PenaltiesCuba SanctionsOFAC

Restaurante Floridita: La Cuna del DaiquiriThe criminal complaint filed against the two Florida men who obtained Cuba travel licenses for fake churches is amusing reading, at least if you enjoy reading about gangs that couldn’t shoot straight. Some 4,500 people traveled on the fake churches’ licenses and it’s easy to see how the authorities caught wind of the scheme:

During interviews by Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”), travelers returning to the U.S. after traveling on these licenses admitted . . . that they were not traveling for religious purposes.

That is ICE-Special-Agent-Speak for what probably really happened:

CBP Agent: Welcome to the U.S., sir.

Tourist (dressed in tropical shirt and Oakley sunglasses): It’s great to be back.

CBP Agent: I see you were in Cuba doing missionary work.

Tourist: Me? No, dude, I was there drinking mojitos and smokin’ Cohibas. I was too wasted to do any missionary work.

The complaint also states that the defendants made up the names of churches and pastors and opened up mailboxes for the fictional churches at various UPS stores. Made-up church names included the First Church of Christ, the Assumption Church of Christ, Woodland Church of Christ, Outreach Hispanic Ministries. and the Church of Life of Ocoee.

According to the complaint, the defendants then filed OFAC license applications for these churches using the maildrops as addresses and providing fictional congregation sizes for the churches. One of the other things that tipped off authorities to the scheme — aside from the distinctly nonreligious demeanor of the tourists — was that the numbers of people traveling on these licenses exceeded the number of congregants for the churches.

The two defendants were stopped in Miami on a return trip from Cuba and they produced the Assumption Church of Christ license. When questioned separately, one of the defendants allegedly admitted immediately that the Assumption Church of Christ didn’t exist. “You have me dead to rights,” he is alleged to have said.

That would be, fairly, an understatement.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Feb

22

United Church of Castro Tours Havana


Posted by at 6:29 pm on February 22, 2007
Category: Criminal PenaltiesCuba SanctionsOFAC

Weekend in HavanaAccording to this AP wire story, two men in Florida were charged with violating the Cuban Sanctions Regulations by applying for Cuba travel licenses using “fake” religious organizations. Prosecutors charged that the two men then sold these licenses to travel agencies which, in turn, sold these licenses to over 4,500 people who used them to travel to Cuba.

Adam Szubin, OFAC Director, provided a novel explanation of the harms caused by travel on fake licenses. Abandoning the traditional OFAC line that money spent by tourists on mojitos goes straight into Castro’s pockets, Szubin said this:

Those who fraudulently obtain or traffic in such licenses not only commit a crime, but also undermine the good works of legitimate religious groups traveling to Cuba.

Frankly it is hard to see how these tourists are harming the work of other religious groups. That could happen, I suppose, if a bunch of rowdy and over-served American tourists traveling on these licenses were pretending to be missionaries. That, of course, seems highly doubtful at best. Indeed, the fact that these tourists were likely not even making a pretense of being religious will pose more than a few difficulties for them when OFAC inevitably comes knocking at their doors.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)