Archive for the ‘OFAC’ Category


Apr

15

Justin Timberlake Shows the U.S. Is Not NSYNC With Its Sanctions Songbook


Posted by at 6:30 pm on April 15, 2014
Category: Economic SanctionsOFACRussia SanctionsSDN List

By Mandy Coombes [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AJustin_Timberlake_-_Justified_World_Tour_-_Earls_Court_-_2.jpg

Armed with over 30 million Twitter followers and a shelf-full of Grammy and Emmy awards, Justin Timberlake may be staring down U.S. sanctions better than Putin himself.  Reuters reported last week that JT’s sold-out show next month at Helsinki’s Hartwall Arena will go on despite the fact that the largest indoor venue in the country is owned by Gennady Timchenko, Arkady Rotenberg and Boris Rotenberg.  All three Russians are on the SDN List because they are, in OFAC’s words, members of the Putin “Inner Circle.”  Perhaps equally as important to Finnish music fans, Miley Cyrus, Aerosmith and Nine Inch Nails are also scheduled to perform at the Hartwall Arena between now and June 1st.

Because U.S. company Live Nation is the concert promoter for these U.S. musicians, there is an understandable concern that dealings with Hartwall Arena may be impermissible under U.S. sanctions law because the 15,000-seat venue is entirely owned by a troika of billionaires on the SDN List.  But no one will have to stop the music as Live Nation announced that “U.S. officials had indicated at the weekend that the sanctions would not prevent the concerts going ahead.”

Some have speculated the shows would go on because Live Nation may have already paid in full Arena Events Oy, the entity owned by Timchenko and the Rotenbergs which owns the Hartwall Arena, prior to the three Russians being added to the SDN List.  But that logic doesn’t hold up because, if paying Arena Events Oy would be a violation, so would, according to the relevant executive order, providing services “for the benefit of” Arena Events Oy.  If Live Nation could not pay for the concert, Justin and Miley could not perform their services.

The most likely response that OFAC may have given Live Nation has been a recent focus of ours: the so-called 50 percent rule.  We reported a few weeks ago that Visa and Mastercard resumed transactions with banks owned by the Rotenbergs because, as we understand it, no one Rotenberg owns 50 percent or more of the banks.  Presumably, then, Timchenko and the Rotenberg Brothers do not individually hold more than 50 percent.  Of course, an entity owned entirely by three Russian SDNs is a good candidate for designation at any time.  You have to imagine that OFAC may have made some assurances to Live Nation else Live Nation would be ill-advised to fly its pricey talent in private jets to Finland only to have the Arena designated moments before the stars arrive.

These concerts are, however, a hallmark of how out of tune sanctions enforcement appears to be in relation to the zeal of the President’s executive orders authorizing the sanctions in the first place.  What better opportunity for OFAC to elucidate the 50 percent rule in order to explain how U.S. sanctions will permit four American musical acts, who are each listened to by millions around the world, to perform before tens of thousands of people about a two-hour drive from the Russian border in an arena owned solely by three Russian individuals on the SDN List.

Enforcing sanctions against entities owned or controlled by someone already targeted by sanctions is an important arrow in any country’s sanctions quiver.  How such an enforcement policy is defined and articulated publicly is critically important to its effectiveness.

As it stands now, U.S. sanctions would permit Miley Cyrus to sing her hit song “Party in the U.S.A.” to a concert with Putin in attendance.  For a whole host of reasons, we don’t want to see that.

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Apr

8

The Best Question on Burma Sanctions Is Still Unanswered


Posted by at 6:28 pm on April 8, 2014
Category: Burma SanctionsCompliance Programs and ProceduresEconomic SanctionsGeneralOFACSDN ListZimbabwe Sanctions

By Bild von Stefan Grünig, CH-3752 Wimmis (de:Benutzer:Sgruenig)Sgruenig at de.wikipedia [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/)], from Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ABurma06.jpg

OFAC announced last week that it issued additional Frequently Asked Questions and respective answers relating to what remain of U.S. sanctions against Burma.  None of the additional questions or answers is surprising or resolves an issue that is not otherwise answered by other OFAC guidance or applicable general licenses.

The questions and answers are, for the most part, a helpful recitation of the current landscape of sanctions involving Burma that summarize in one place the state of sanctions based on an assortment of scattered statutes, executive orders, regulations and licenses.  But one question stands out along with its non-responsive answer, in part, as follows:

What are the plans to update the SDN List for Burma?

Listings and any potential delistings under our Burma authorities will be pursued as appropriate to meet changing conditions in Burma.

The question itself has a colloquial quality to it as if the frequently asked question really put to OFAC has been along the lines of “What’s going on here?”

As other questions and answers describe, a number of banks remain on the SDN List but General License 19 authorizes U.S. persons to conduct most transactions with the banks.  In a similar situation about a year ago dealing with Zimbabwean banks, we posted about OFAC’s decision to keep those banks on the SDN List but, through a general license, to authorize almost all transactions with them.  At that time, I termed both the Burmese and Zimbabwean banks as SDN-lite designations and warned of the potential compliance difficulties such situations presented.

Keeping an entity on the SDN List would have the effect of blacklisting it from possible business with U.S. persons who rely solely on software to screen names on the SDN List to decide with whom to do business.  The results, of course, would create false positives because most transactions with these Burmese and Zimbabwean entities are permissible under U.S. law.  In fact, running these banks through OFAC’s SDN Search tool produces hits with no mention of any general license permitting dealings with them.

Delisting would, of course, be one option to correct the problem, but that would unblock any currently blocked assets, something OFAC might not wish to do.  Failing that, OFAC should at least put some annotation on the SDN List to denote that these very few entities are to be treated very differently than the thousands of others on the SDN List with whom U.S. persons may have no dealings.  At the moment, the question is back to OFAC, “What are the plans to update the SDN List?”

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Apr

2

New Russia Sanctions Passed by Congress Are Needlessly Confusing


Posted by at 2:16 pm on April 2, 2014
Category: Economic SanctionsOFACRussia Sanctions

Putin Feeds Animals by premier.gov.ru [CC-BY-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3APutin_animals.jpegAbout the only thing the current partisanly-split Congress can agree on is sanctions legislation: first Iran and now Russia. So the Ukraine Aid bill passed yesterday contains the obligatory sanctions provisions. The problem is, however, that even though both sides of the aisle love economic sanctions, neither side understands them, and, as a result, the bill is a mess.

Mostly the new sanctions mandate the President to impose sanctions on people he finds have done bad things: “undermin[ing] the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine” or “ordering, controlling, or otherwise directing, acts of significant corruption in Ukraine” or the Russian Federation.  Of course, it’s up to the President to determine who these folks are, and this is a power he already has under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) as evidenced by the last two rounds of designations. But, hey, this allows Congress to get in the game too and tell the voters at home they stood up for Ukraine, even if it is, more or less, an empty gesture.

The problem comes with respect to the particular sanctions that Congress tells the President to impose on those who have engaged in undermining security of Ukraine or directing corruption in Ukraine or the Russian Federation. At first, these look pretty standard: asset blocking and visa bans. But then we get to the exception:

The requirement to block and prohibit all transactions in all property and interests in property under paragraph (1)(A) shall not include the authority to impose sanctions on the importation of goods.

What this means is far from clear. Let’s say that the White House sanctions Alexei Kirillovich Vronsky (we’ll call him Captain Vronsky for convenience). Now let’s say that he’s short of cash after having all of his assets blocked, so he decides to sell $300 million dollars of Oblonsky Vodka to the United States. In a normal blocking scenario, the $300 million destined to Captain Vronsky would be blocked by the U.S. banks before they could be wired. Does this contravene the exception? The vodka can still be imported into the United States without problem as long as Captain Vronsky isn’t paid. On the other hand, doesn’t the blocking in this case effectively prohibit the importation of the vodka into the United States? Who knows? Certainly no one on the Hill does.

But there’s an even more hilarious mistake. The bill doesn’t define importation. Does it mean importation into the United States or Russia? Or anywhere else for that matter? An exportation from the United States is, after all, an importation somewhere else, whether Russia or some place else. So can Captain Vronsky import a shiny new Corvette into Russia from Detroit? Does the exception prohibit blocking the funds he uses to pay for the imported/exported Corvette?

Of course, the only thing clear as a result of this mess of an exception is that Captain Vronsky, even if he can buy a car from Detroit, can’t buy a condo in Detroit, since there would clearly be no importation (whichever way you define it) in that case.  I also predict the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), which will administer these sanctions, will take the narrow view of the exception and say that blocking payment for the goods does not prohibit their importatiion, which can still occur as long as no payments are made.

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(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

24

Issuing Credit Cards to Russian Oligarchs Again: Priceless


Posted by at 5:05 pm on March 24, 2014
Category: OFACRussia Sanctions

SMP Bank Credit Cards via http://smpbank.ru/uploads/show/c20c2f8bd8d7d2550bdd3b4c38bbdd00839d8fd2.jpg [Fair Use]Last week, this blog reported that the effect of the Russia sanctions was, at least in certain instance, the imposition of sanctions on certain parties not named in the designation lists. This would occur due to OFAC’s rule that treats entities not named in specific designation orders as blocked if the unnamed entity is owned 50 percent or greater by parties blocked in a designation order (or as a result of the 50 percent rule). In this regard, we noted that SMP Bank in Russia was blocked because of the ownership interests of Arkady and Boris Rotenberg in the bank. Both Rotenbergs were specifically named in designation orders. As a result, MasterCard and Visa stopped allowing their credit cards to be processed through SMP Bank.

Well, today Visa and MasterCard had a change of heart and permitted SMP Bank to continue serving its Russian oligarchs and other customers. Although details of this change of heart are scarce, this blog has learned that the reason for this has to do with informal guidance from OFAC. Since neither Arkady nor Boris Rotenberg individually hold 50 percent or greater in SMP Bank, their interests are not aggregated merely because of their family relationship. This does not, however, preclude OFAC from adding SMB Bank by name to a future designation list based on the participation and control of the brothers Rotenberg.

So, for the moment at least, oligarchs can go back to charging their purchases of Almas Beluga caviar once again.

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Mar

18

University Medical Researcher Prosecuted for Sending Medical Device to Iran


Posted by at 8:21 pm on March 18, 2014
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran SanctionsOFAC

By Erin! Nekervis [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3APlanking_on_an_MRI_machine.jpgAccording to this article in the San Diego Union Tribune, Mohamad Nazemzadeh, who was a Research Fellow in the Neurology Department of the University of Michigan at the time of his arrest, is being prosecuted for sending a medical device to Iran. At issue is a coil for a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) machine. The coil is the assembly of wires that generates the necessary radio signals when electricity flows through them to permit imaging the part of the body within the coil. Mr. Nazemzadeh is currently a researcher at the Henry Ford hospital in Detroit and his area of specialty is, not surprisingly, magnetic resonance imaging.

A part for an MRI machine would, under the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, be eligible for an export license notwithstanding the embargo on Iran. Nazemzadeh’s failure to obtain a license would, of course, be a violation of the embargo. Even assuming that it was a criminal violation in his case, one has to wonder why prosecutorial resources are being consumed to prosecute a researcher for trying to send life-saving medical equipment to Iran. Aren’t there dangerous people out there with guns and bombs who might warrant the attention instead?

An affidavit in support of a search warrant for Nazemzadeh’s mobile phone provides more detail on the case than the Union-Tribune article and casts some doubt on whether Nazemzadeh actually had the criminal intent necessary to support a criminal prosecution for the attempted export of the MRI part. According to the affidavit, Nazemzadeh was negotiating with the undercover federal agent (who had been tipped off by the used medical device company that Nazemzadeh had contacted) to ship the MRI coil to Iran through a company in the Netherlands. As is often the case, it is not uncommon for people to believe (incorrectly) that if it is legal to ship an item to a particular country, no laws are broken if the item is then re-exported to a prohibited destination. Here, according to the affidavit, Mr. Nazemzadeh continued to say to the undercover agent that he believed the transaction was legal and says this is true because the export from the United States is to the Netherlands, not Iran.

Just tell that, you sold that item to some company in the Netherlands, and you have the request so you’re, you issued pro forma form for them and they sent money from the bank account to you, everything is legal between you[r] two companies …. [T]here’s nothing to do with Iran. You actually have sold that coil to one company in Netherland [sic], ok?

Granted that isn’t a true statement of the law, but a good faith legal mistake is not a criminal act. Instead, this is precisely the sort of case that ought to be handled as an administrative matter by OFAC. Such a proceeding could result in the imposition of substantial civil penalties on Mr. Nazemzadeh notwithstanding his mistaken belief that the transaction did not violate U.S. law.

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)