Archive for the ‘Iran Sanctions’ Category


Sep

5

Let Them Eat (Yellow)cake: The Effect of Stretching U.S. Sanctions Too Thin


Posted by at 10:59 pm on September 5, 2013
Category: Criminal PenaltiesEconomic SanctionsICEIran SanctionsSanctions

Yellowcake Uranium source:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Uranium_conversion_1.jpg [Public Domain]On August 22nd, Patrick Campbell of Sierra Leone was arrested by ICE agents at JFK Airport and charged with violating the Iranian Transactions Regulations. Campbell’s arrest made global headlines because he concealed raw uranium inside shoes in his luggage. According to an affidavit attached to the criminal complaint against Campbell, he had communicated for over a year prior to his arrest with an undercover ICE agent about selling Uranium 308 (or yellowcake) from Sierra Leone to Iran. In 2013, apparently without any assistance from ICE, Campbell was able to obtain on his own a U.S. travel visa in order to meet with the agent in the United States about the sale of uranium. He was arrested after clearing U.S. Customs.

It would appear that Campbell could be charged with any number of crimes under U.S. law because of his possession of uranium and, as the AP reported last week, his travelling on a fake passport. The only offense alleged in the criminal complaint, however, is “[b]rokering the supply of goods which the defendant knew were destined and intended for supply to Iran.” The affidavit alleges that Campbell impermissibly furthered the brokering by “flying into JFK” to finalize the sale and “bringing with him a sample of Uranium [and] a contract for the sale.”

Prosecuting Campbell for violating U.S. sanctions is a case of compelling facts making shaky law. It does not appear that Campbell met, spoke or even texted with the undercover ICE agent once he entered the United States. Had he done so, a federal prosecutor would be in a much better position to show Campbell attempted to “act as broker” in the United States as required under the Regulations.

U.S. sanctions’ severe penalties are obviously enticing for law enforcement to use wherever a case could be made. But what if a foreign person is attempting to fly out of the United States to conduct business relating to Iran and has on his laptop contract documents evidencing such business? Under the logic of the Campbell complaint, the foreign person could be arrested for his attempt to leave the United States in order to conduct eventual business relating to Iran. While prosecution under such circumstances alone is unlikely, it would not seem so unlikely after the Campbell case for the government to prosecute someone under such circumstances if the foreign person faced other charges and sanctions violations carried the largest penalty.

The United States has been recently expanding its reach over foreign persons’ dealings with Iran, most notably foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent companies. As the stretch of sanctions includes more foreign individuals and their subsequent imprisonment, the United States may find itself retreating from expanding prosecution after a successful defense or even international criticism that U.S. sanctions as so applied are too attenuated for a reasonable interpretation of the sanctions’ purpose or the laws themselves.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jun

25

OFAC v. ATP: Game, Set, Match to OFAC


Posted by at 9:27 pm on June 25, 2013
Category: Iran SanctionsOFAC

J. Edmond Barre http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:J._Edmond_Barre.jpg [Public Domain]In its quest to keep the world safe from an Iranian nuclear bomb, the Office of Foreign Assets Control has focused its laser-like scrutiny on an Iranian tennis referee. Obviously, the same skills required to call a ball out or to halt a match for rain are critical to the process of uranium enrichment.

In this regard, OFAC has just fined ATP Tour, Inc. $48,600 as part of a settlement of charges that ATP had made “salary payments to an individual who is ordinarily resident in Iran … for services rendered and expenses incurred in connection with ATP tournaments the individual officiated.” The settlement documents do not reveal the individual involved but it almost certainly has to be Ali Nili, a well-known Gold Badge tennis umpire who has frequently officiated ATP and other international tennis matches.

One of the things that probably, and somewhat justifiably, hacked off OFAC is that apparently ATP made 8 payments to the Iranian referee after it had received a warning letter from OFAC about the payments. That was probably a bad idea, since even OFAC admits in the settlement papers that paying Iranian refs “represent[s] relatively low harm to the sanctions program.” You think? OFAC also indicates that the payments were probably licensable.

Another interesting area of speculation, not directly revealed in the settlement documents, is what is currently being done with Ali Nili who is still officiating ATP matches, like this one at the Shanghai Rolex Masters in 2012. I’m assuming that ATP has now in fact applied for, and received,  an OFAC license.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jun

17

FCPA Totally Useful As a Secondary Sanctions Program


Posted by at 6:14 pm on June 17, 2013
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDoJEconomic SanctionsFCPAIran SanctionsOECDSEC

Total Gas Station in France http://www.total.com/MEDIAS/MEDIAS_INFOS/1564/FR/station-service-morinvilliers-France-media.jpg [Fair Use]

The U.S. Department of Justice recently announced that Total, S.A., the French oil and gas company, agreed to pay $245.2 million to resolve charges that it paid bribes to an Iranian government official by way of purported consulting agreements from 1995 to 2004 in order to secure, among other things, oil and gas rights in Iran. The Justice Department described the case against Total as “the first coordinated action by French and U.S. law enforcement in a major bribery case.” The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission also reached a settlement with Total pursuant to which Total agreed to pay $153 million to resolve related FCPA allegations.

There is a lot to be said about Total’s settlement. At almost $400 million combined, Total’s payments are in the pantheon of largest payments ever for FCPA matters, along with Siemens, KBR and BAE. Another interesting component to the Total case, however, is its potential effectiveness for economic sanctions enforcement vis-à-vis Iran.

In the past few weeks, Congress and the White House have been busy expanding U.S. economic sanctions against foreign persons for their dealings with Iran. We reported recently on the current House bill that would expand sanctions against foreign banks engaging in certain transactions with Iranian banks. The President last week issued an executive order expanding secondary sanctions against, for example, foreign banks’ rial-based transactions as well as certain dealings by anyone with most persons on the SDN List pursuant to sanctions against Iran.

These secondary sanctions, however, provide U.S. enforcement authorities with a great deal of discretion on if and when to designate foreign persons to the SDN List. Pushing the bounds of secondary sanctions beyond those against foreign persons with substantial ties to the Iranian government, of course, runs the risk of offending other countries who continue to permit their companies to do business with Iran.

Given these limitations, the FCPA would appear to be an effective tool the United States can use in applying pressure against foreign persons doing business with Iran. Although the FCPA carries its own extraterritorial criticisms, corruption is a global issue that many countries have committed itself to address whether by national law or membership to groups like the OECD.

While the United States differs with other countries on precisely what sanctions policies to adopt against Iran, Sudan, Syria or North Korea for current conflict or human rights concerns in those countries, there would seem to be a common allegiance to combat corruption there. It just so happens all four countries are among the most corrupt countries in the world as annually ranked by Transparency International. The Total case at least sends the message to foreign companies that business as usual in Iran can result in significant FCPA penalties and possible cooperation from authorities in the companies’ home countries in bringing them about.

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Jun

2

iOFAC iOkays iPhones for iRan


Posted by at 9:03 am on June 2, 2013
Category: Iran SanctionsOFAC

iRanPhone www.apple.com [Fair Use]Not long ago, I posted on an announcement by Samsung that it was closing its app store for Iranian customers. I speculated that  paid apps were at least part of the problem because they were not covered by the 2010 OFAC general license permitting export of “services and software incident to the exchange of personal communications over the Internet.”

Well, that problem has just gone away. On Friday, OFAC issued General License D which expands the aforementioned general license to cover both fee-based services and software.  It covers personal communications hardware as well, specifically mentioning, not surprisingly, “smartphones.”

That is all well and good, and certainly looks good on paper, but don’t imagine that the folks at Apple are giving each other the iFives over the prospect of selling iPhones in Iran. Nothing in General License D gets over the slight problem of how anyone actually gets paid for goods and services exported to Iran no matter how permissible those exports might be. U.S. banks cannot deal directly with Iranian banks and foreign banks, scared of potential sanctions under CISADA, increasingly refuse to deal with Iranian banks.

But if anyone wants to give away smartphones in Iran, have at it.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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May

29

The Curious Case of Elaf Islamic Bank and the Part 561 List


Posted by at 5:08 pm on May 29, 2013
Category: Economic SanctionsIran SanctionsOFACSanctions

Elaf Islamic Bank via http://www.al-sharq.com/ArticleDetails.aspx?AID=269169&CatID=108&Title=%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7%20%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B8%D8%B1%20%D8%B9%D9%86%20%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%83 [Fair Use]

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) recently announced that it removed Iraq’s Elaf Islamic Bank from its Part 561 List. Elaf became noteworthy last July when it and China’s Bank of Kunlun became the first two foreign financial institutions named to the 561 List.  U.S. financial institutions are prohibited from opening or maintaining a correspondent account or a payable-through account for banks on the 561 List.

As we reported at that time, OFAC provided no details for the reasons of either bank’s designation. In the case of Elaf, however, we have referred to a 2012 New York Times article reporting that the Obama Administration has said that Elaf facilitated transactions worth millions of dollars with sanctioned Iranian banks and has objected to the Central Bank of Iraq’s allowing Elaf to continue to attend its U.S. dollar currency auctions.

OFAC now says that Elaf has offered its mea culpa, frozen the accounts it holds for the Export Development Bank of Iran (“EDBI”) and begun “reducing its overall exposure to the Iranian financial sector.” Quite an about-face from a foreign entity that reportedly had denied any wrongdoing and seemed not to be concerned with U.S. sanctions against it.

One might ask how this development squares with Congress continuing to legislate further sanctions against foreign banks for dealings with Iran, as we reported last week. One answer may be that Congress continues its chest thumping and OFAC does its best to show that these sanctions have some bite behind the bark.  This is a hard case to make when the Part 561 List was only two and is now one.

If the goal, however, is to deter non-U.S. banks from financing the Iranian government and its apparatus, Kunlun and Elaf seem to be examples of the low-hanging fruit of the global financial community. If the United States goes after bigger banks alone, it would, of course, run the risk of jeopardizing cooperation with others, most notably the European Union, on how to advance international sanctions against Iran. OFAC appears cognizant to that point when referring to EDBI as “U.S. and EU-designated.” If sanctions are extraterritorial in nature, it helps to have friends outside the territory to support you.

In any event, it is hard to assess whether the settlement with Elaf or the Part 561 sanctions in general will be effective as part of future sanctions enforcement. The Elaf development appears to be a victory on paper as a non-U.S. person agreed to terms with the U.S. government over its dealings with Iran apparently occurring exclusively outside the United States. One can only wonder about how the United States will monitor Elaf’s frozen accounts or any of its future dealings with Iranian banks.

For now, at least, the Part 561 List just became a lot a lonelier for Kunlun, and it is a bit easier for everyone to comply with a List of one.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)