Archive for the ‘Foreign Export Controls’ Category


Sep

22

U.K. Tribunal Rules That Export Agency Can Keep Iran Licenses Secret


Posted by at 5:00 pm on September 22, 2011
Category: Foreign Export ControlsIran Sanctions

Mahmoud AhmadinejadThis blog reported earlier on a lawsuit brought by Bloomberg Business Week against the U.K. Export Control Organization (“ECO”) which had rejected a request by Bloomberg to release information on licenses the ECO had granted to permit U.K. companies to export dual-use materials to Iran. The United Kingdom complies with U.N. sanctions and does not allow export of arms and materiel to Iran but does allow licensed export of dual-use goods listed on the Wassenaar list to Iran.

The ECO argued that disclosure of these names could cause these companies to lose their ability to use U.S. commercial banking facilities, and the Tribunal, saying the the possibility of U.S. meddling was “disturbing,” agreed:

There is a significant public interest in protecting large and small firms, which trade lawfully and legitimately, from economic harm from a form of embargo imposed by banks, competitors, suppliers, clients and possibly foreign governments. … The tribunal felt some concern at the prospect of a U.K. company, trading quite lawfully in terms of U.K., EU and international law, suffering possibly fatal commercial damage through the extraterritorial intervention of our closest ally.

Bloomberg‘s editor Matthew Winkler objected to the tribunal’s ruling, noting that the tribunal relied on “secret evidence” asserting that “banks will withdraw funding for companies if the public knew who is doing business with whom.”

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jan

12

Hey Big Brother


Posted by at 10:18 pm on January 12, 2011
Category: BISChinaForeign Export ControlsWassenaar

Johan Gadolin
ABOVE: Johan Gadolin,
discoverer of yttrium


China Daily is a great source of unintentional humor, and I really wish I had more time to peruse it. I did stumble across a recent opinion piece in China Daily on the rare earth export issue and, not surprisingly, there is much to snicker about in it, unless, of course, your business depends on the availabilities of the lanthanides, known to us non-technical sorts as the rare earth elements.

China initially justified its restrictions on exports of the lanthanides as a measure to encourage companies using lanthanides to relocate to China. Article XI of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs generally prohibits export quotas unless they fall within the exceptions set forth in Section 2 of Article XI or Article XX. Not surprisingly, efforts to distort international trade by forcing companies to relocate to the country imposing the quota is not within the exceptions set forth in GATT.

Somewhat later China began to cite the environmental impact of rare earth mining as a justification for the quotas. That argument was easily dismissed as a transparent ruse because China imposed no restrictions on rare earth mining for domestic use, no matter how loudly they complained the foreign exports of rare earths were killing Chinese workers.

Now, the article referenced by this post attempts to concoct another justification for its export quotas: national security. The article starts with a slam at the Wassenaar Arrangement which it claims is some kind of anti-socialist conspiracy by capitalist Western nations and a broad-based justification for China to impose any export controls it can dream up:

Export regulation was originally introduced for security issues. After World War II, the United States and other countries established the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) against socialist countries; its successor, in effect today, is the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies.

In recent years the restrictions have become ever tighter. On June 19, 2007, the US Ministry [sic] of Commerce listed more than 2,500 kinds of technologies, devices, and materials banned [sic] for export to China.

Those familiar with the 2007 rule cited by China Daily, may wonder where the author came up with the idea that 2,500 kinds of technologies were banned for export. The rule imposed certain new license requirements for dual use items destined for use by the Chinese military but did not ban those exports. There were bans on items controlled for nuclear proliferation, missile technology, or chemical and biological warfare that would contribute to major Chinese weapons systems, but the 2,500 number is more than a little high as an estimate of the number of technologies involved.

More importantly, China’s claim that these restrictions are premised on national security would be more convincing if it had been its initial justification. And, of course, the Wassenaar list, which represents not a capitalist conspiracy but a multilateral consensus of strategic goods that require export controls, would permit China to exert export controls on the items on that list, items that don’t include the lanthanides.

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Jun

16

France Prohibits Export of Flight Control Software to European Rocket Program


Posted by at 9:23 pm on June 16, 2010
Category: Foreign Export Controls

Vega RocketA report in Space News reveals that French export officials have prevented export of French-developed flight control software that was intended for the Vega rocket. The Vega rocket, a joint launch vehicle project of the European Space Agency and the Italian Space Agency, is destined for Arianespace SA. As you probably know, Arianespace SA is a French company founded in 1980 as the first private launch company. France also is a 15 percent participant in the Vega rocket program, making France the largest participant in the program after Italy, which is a 65 percent participant.

France did grant an exemption for the software to be used on the first flight and possibly on the second flight depending upon the status of development of new software to replace the yanked French software. Apparently all involved in the Vega program were blindsided by the French action:

[ESA Launcher Director Antonio] Fabrizi said he is not certain exactly what transpired in the case of the Vega flight-control system. Other French technology, in particular the filament-wound P-80 first stage, was subject to export approval and received authorization without a hitch.

“I have been told that it could have been a problem with the way the export license application was made, or its timing,” Fabrizi said.

Although French bureaucratic stubbornness is second to none, I’m not buying Fabrizi’s story that the French blocked export of the flight control forever because the application was too late or violated some procedural rule. More likely, the French stopped the export because of the technology itself.

That France denied the export even though it is knee-deep in the Vega program itself is perplexing. The only conclusion that can be drawn from this is that the United States isn’t the only country that has used export controls to shoot itself in its own foot.

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Jun

1

Whistleblower Accuses FedEx Canada of Export Violations


Posted by at 8:36 pm on June 1, 2010
Category: Foreign Export Controls

Canadian FlagAccording to this blog post at Narcosphere, a former employee of FedEx Canada has filed a suit in Canada alleging retaliation based on his disclosure to Canadian Customs of various export irregularities by FedEx Canada. Documents filed in the litigation appear to reveal that, between May 2005 to April 2006, almost 20,000 exports by FedEx that required a Canadian export declaration, namely a form B13A, were shipped without that declaration. The plaintiff’s lawyers allege that this is approximately 20 percent of all exports that required a B13A and that, as a result, it is likely that some of these shipments involved sensitive export-controlled technology.

FedEx Canada appears to have had two major responses to these claims. The first, and not very convincing, response is that the failure to file the B13A was the customer’s fault and no FedEx’s fault. I don’t know how far that argument goes in Canada, but regular readers know that in the U.S. such an excuse not only wouldn’t make it out of the starting gate but would be shot to death in the stables. Their second argument has somewhat more force. Even if the B13As had been filed, there is no guarantee that this would have stopped any illegal exports of controlled-technology since devious exporters would have lied on their B13A declarations about the true contents of the exported package.

One U.S. Customs official who spoke with Narco News explains that even if all the proper paperwork is filed with an export shipment, that still does not guarantee an illegal shipment will be caught by Customs officials, in either the U.S. or Canada, since criminals lie on forms and the government “bureaucracy takes time to have the AM coffee, get up, and get going.”

Say what? Did this guy just admit that pretty much anything goes at the border until the Customs agents have their morning coffee? No wonder he didn’t want his name used!

NOTE: Blog posting will be light this week. I’m travelling on Wednesday to Arizona to give a presentation on economic sanctions and the Internet at GoDaddy’s annual registrar summit. I’ll be back on Friday and will try to do some catch up posts over the weekend.

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Jan

28

A Metaphysical Question


Posted by at 8:49 pm on January 28, 2010
Category: Foreign Export Controls

ADE-651
ABOVE: The ADE-651


On Tuesday my colleague in our London Office, Anita Esslinger, forwarded to me a directive from British export authorities adding “electro-statically powered explosive detectors” to its list of export-controlled items, otherwise known as the 2008 Export Control Order. Anita wondered if the U.S. was planning on doing the same thing. I wrote back that I didn’t think it would need to since explosive detectors were already covered under ECCN 1A004.d.

In fact, I was wrong, because these “electro-statically powered” explosive detectors aren’t covered by ECCN 1A004.d, but not for the reason that you might imagine, but rather for what might be called a metaphysical reason. These detectors aren’t covered by the ECCN because they don’t work, and, thus, aren’t really bomb detectors.  At this point, before you accuse of me having read too much Aristotle, hear the rest of the story.

The British order is directed at the ADE-651, a device marketed by a British company named ATSC, which is run by Jim McCormack from a former dairy farm in Somerset. The device, according to ATSC, can detect explosives from a distance of 1 kilometer.  It can also, allegedly, detect other items such as elephants and dollar bills from the same distance, depending upon whether a card programmed to detect elephants or dollar bills is inserted into the device’s card reader. As a further miracle of modern technology, the device has no power supply but is powered by the static electricity generated by the user, hence, the reference to them as “electro-statically powered” in the amendment to the 2008 Export Control Order.

A BBC Newsnight investigative report (video embedded at the end of this post) examined the device and found that the inside of the device was empty (as in being filled with nothing but air  . . .  literally). The report also discovered that the cards “used” by the device were no more than RFID tags used to deter shoplifting and not specially programmed cards designed to whiff out the essence of elephant or anything else for that matter.

This would be humorous were it not for the fact that the use of these devices may have resulted in death and injury. A recent wave of successful car-bomb attacks in Baghdad has led even some Iraqis to question the efficacy of the device even though Iraq has bought $85 million dollars worth of the non-functional plastic shells at $40,000 to $60,000 per pop.

Jim McCormack has been arrested for fraud and is out on bail.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)