Archive for the ‘Economic Sanctions’ Category


Jun

17

FCPA Totally Useful As a Secondary Sanctions Program


Posted by at 6:14 pm on June 17, 2013
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDoJEconomic SanctionsFCPAIran SanctionsOECDSEC

Total Gas Station in France http://www.total.com/MEDIAS/MEDIAS_INFOS/1564/FR/station-service-morinvilliers-France-media.jpg [Fair Use]

The U.S. Department of Justice recently announced that Total, S.A., the French oil and gas company, agreed to pay $245.2 million to resolve charges that it paid bribes to an Iranian government official by way of purported consulting agreements from 1995 to 2004 in order to secure, among other things, oil and gas rights in Iran. The Justice Department described the case against Total as “the first coordinated action by French and U.S. law enforcement in a major bribery case.” The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission also reached a settlement with Total pursuant to which Total agreed to pay $153 million to resolve related FCPA allegations.

There is a lot to be said about Total’s settlement. At almost $400 million combined, Total’s payments are in the pantheon of largest payments ever for FCPA matters, along with Siemens, KBR and BAE. Another interesting component to the Total case, however, is its potential effectiveness for economic sanctions enforcement vis-à-vis Iran.

In the past few weeks, Congress and the White House have been busy expanding U.S. economic sanctions against foreign persons for their dealings with Iran. We reported recently on the current House bill that would expand sanctions against foreign banks engaging in certain transactions with Iranian banks. The President last week issued an executive order expanding secondary sanctions against, for example, foreign banks’ rial-based transactions as well as certain dealings by anyone with most persons on the SDN List pursuant to sanctions against Iran.

These secondary sanctions, however, provide U.S. enforcement authorities with a great deal of discretion on if and when to designate foreign persons to the SDN List. Pushing the bounds of secondary sanctions beyond those against foreign persons with substantial ties to the Iranian government, of course, runs the risk of offending other countries who continue to permit their companies to do business with Iran.

Given these limitations, the FCPA would appear to be an effective tool the United States can use in applying pressure against foreign persons doing business with Iran. Although the FCPA carries its own extraterritorial criticisms, corruption is a global issue that many countries have committed itself to address whether by national law or membership to groups like the OECD.

While the United States differs with other countries on precisely what sanctions policies to adopt against Iran, Sudan, Syria or North Korea for current conflict or human rights concerns in those countries, there would seem to be a common allegiance to combat corruption there. It just so happens all four countries are among the most corrupt countries in the world as annually ranked by Transparency International. The Total case at least sends the message to foreign companies that business as usual in Iran can result in significant FCPA penalties and possible cooperation from authorities in the companies’ home countries in bringing them about.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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May

29

The Curious Case of Elaf Islamic Bank and the Part 561 List


Posted by at 5:08 pm on May 29, 2013
Category: Economic SanctionsIran SanctionsOFACSanctions

Elaf Islamic Bank via http://www.al-sharq.com/ArticleDetails.aspx?AID=269169&CatID=108&Title=%D8%A3%D9%85%D8%B1%D9%8A%D9%83%D8%A7%20%D8%AA%D8%B1%D9%81%D8%B9%20%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B8%D8%B1%20%D8%B9%D9%86%20%D8%A8%D9%86%D9%83 [Fair Use]

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) recently announced that it removed Iraq’s Elaf Islamic Bank from its Part 561 List. Elaf became noteworthy last July when it and China’s Bank of Kunlun became the first two foreign financial institutions named to the 561 List.  U.S. financial institutions are prohibited from opening or maintaining a correspondent account or a payable-through account for banks on the 561 List.

As we reported at that time, OFAC provided no details for the reasons of either bank’s designation. In the case of Elaf, however, we have referred to a 2012 New York Times article reporting that the Obama Administration has said that Elaf facilitated transactions worth millions of dollars with sanctioned Iranian banks and has objected to the Central Bank of Iraq’s allowing Elaf to continue to attend its U.S. dollar currency auctions.

OFAC now says that Elaf has offered its mea culpa, frozen the accounts it holds for the Export Development Bank of Iran (“EDBI”) and begun “reducing its overall exposure to the Iranian financial sector.” Quite an about-face from a foreign entity that reportedly had denied any wrongdoing and seemed not to be concerned with U.S. sanctions against it.

One might ask how this development squares with Congress continuing to legislate further sanctions against foreign banks for dealings with Iran, as we reported last week. One answer may be that Congress continues its chest thumping and OFAC does its best to show that these sanctions have some bite behind the bark.  This is a hard case to make when the Part 561 List was only two and is now one.

If the goal, however, is to deter non-U.S. banks from financing the Iranian government and its apparatus, Kunlun and Elaf seem to be examples of the low-hanging fruit of the global financial community. If the United States goes after bigger banks alone, it would, of course, run the risk of jeopardizing cooperation with others, most notably the European Union, on how to advance international sanctions against Iran. OFAC appears cognizant to that point when referring to EDBI as “U.S. and EU-designated.” If sanctions are extraterritorial in nature, it helps to have friends outside the territory to support you.

In any event, it is hard to assess whether the settlement with Elaf or the Part 561 sanctions in general will be effective as part of future sanctions enforcement. The Elaf development appears to be a victory on paper as a non-U.S. person agreed to terms with the U.S. government over its dealings with Iran apparently occurring exclusively outside the United States. One can only wonder about how the United States will monitor Elaf’s frozen accounts or any of its future dealings with Iranian banks.

For now, at least, the Part 561 List just became a lot a lonelier for Kunlun, and it is a bit easier for everyone to comply with a List of one.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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May

22

Do Newly Proposed Iran Sanctions Target Iraq?


Posted by at 8:53 pm on May 22, 2013
Category: Economic SanctionsIran SanctionsOFAC

Central Bank of Iraq [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Baghdad-bank-hires.jpg
ABOVE: Central Bank of Iraq


Another day on the Hill, another round of sanctions against Iran. As if there were nothing else for these politicians to do. Academic question: how many could actually point out Iran on an unlabeled map? Just a thought.

The newly proposed sanctions are in H.R. 850, imaginatively titled the Nuclear Iran Prevention Act of 2013 which today was voted out of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. The bill, with the euphonic acronym NIPA, is likely to pass both the House and the Senate, there being nothing else, apparently, on the legislative agenda.

One of the major features of the proposed legislation is to extend the secondary sanctions on foreigners who deal with Iran. Currently those secondary sanctions basically cover petrochemical transactions. NIPA would give the President the authority to impose sanctions on foreign individuals who engage in a “significant” transaction with the Central Bank of Iran or other designated Iranian financial institutions for the purchase of goods or services by or from a person in Iran.

But the most interesting provision was one that was slipped into today during the committee markup. In an Amendment in the Form of a Substitution a new section 205 was added That section prohibits a foreign financial institution from opening a correspondent account at a U.S. financial institution if the foreign bank facilitated a “significant” transaction with the Central Bank of Iran or any other designated Iranian bank in a currency other than that of the country in which the foreign bank is operating.

The target of these sanctions is unstated but seems clear. The United States has objected to the Central Bank of Iraq permitting Elaf Islamic Bank to participate in its weekly hard currency dollar auctions even though Elaf had been designated under CISADA for supplying U.S. dollars to Iran. Perhaps implicitly acknowledging the political and diplomatic repercussions of sanctioning the Central Bank of Iraq, the proposed bill permits the President to grant waivers.  This gives Congress a version of plausible deniability and the ability to blame the Executive Branch if these new sanctions go awry.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

May

16

Palestine: A Reminder of the OFAC Regulatory Labyrinth


Posted by at 1:36 pm on May 16, 2013
Category: Economic SanctionsOFACSanctionsSDN List

SUPARCO HQ http://www.suparco.gov.pk/assets/images/hq.jpg [Fair Use]

OFAC this week issued a general license redefining the term “Palestinian Authority” as that term is used in three sets of U.S. sanctions regulations relating to terrorism. The change was only to add a phrase to account for Prime Minister Salam Fayyad’s resignation. You may be asking yourself how we got to the point where OFAC issues licenses to redefine a regulatory term because of the resignation of a foreign political leader. The answer is, not surprisingly, not so simple.

The Palestinian Authority (PA) is not, and never has been, on the SDN List. But back in 2006, OFAC announced, by virtue of the Hamas victory in the PA legislative elections, it determined that Hamas “has a property interest in the transactions of” the PA and, therefore, “U.S. persons are prohibited from engaging in transactions with” the PA. The strained logic that an entity has a property interest in the transactions of a government because individuals affiliated with the entity won a plurality of a legislative election vote was implemented into the terrorism regulations as interpretive provisions, which still exist. This was a harbinger for things to come.

In 2007, as a result of Prime Minister Fayyad’s appointment, OFAC issued a general license authorizing U.S. persons to engage in all transactions with the PA that were otherwise prohibited by defining the PA to be the government of President Abbas and Prime Minister Fayyad. OFAC could have, instead, at that point explained the situation and removed the interpretive provisions from the terrorism regulations. It did not, and we commented here on the oddity of this situation over five years ago. The new general license this week perpetuates the situation further. Now the regulations include the interpretive provisions, the 2007 general license and the new general license clarifying the other general license.

It should not be this complicated. If OFAC’s goal is to hedge its bets that the PA may at any time fall back under control of Hamas, which the Gaza Strip effectively has been since 2007, there are more direct ways to make the PA subject to sanctions that are easier for U.S. persons to follow and understand. The most obvious candidate, if the United States believed there was a Hamas-related terrorism threat with the PA, would be adding the PA to the SDN List or some form of direct sanctions. If not direct, then an interpretive provision is second-best, but one that provides a more realistic justification than the current “property interest” logic. Of course, a new interpretive provision would put the onus on OFAC to explain further notions of ownership and control that have thus far not received enough attention.

Until then, we will wait for the next general license when the new prime minister is determined.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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May

12

Re:  Burma (or is it Myanmar?):  Why We Are All Lost in Translation


Posted by at 10:33 am on May 12, 2013
Category: Burma SanctionsEconomic SanctionsOFACSanctions

Baganmyo http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Baganmyo.jpg [Public Domain]The White House last week issued a notice continuing the national emergency with respect to Burma. The notice itself is an annual rite of passage for all U.S. sanctions programs under IEEPA, including those relating to Burma. What is surprising this time around is that nothing has changed from past notices.  The current notice still refers to the “unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States” by “the actions and policies of the Government of Burma.”

This is where the head-scratching should begin.  A lot has happened in the past year or so that one would think warrants an updated (and apt) notice.  In late 2011, Secretary of State Clinton made the first State visit to Burma since 1955.  Last May, the President nominated the first U.S. ambassador to the country in over two decades.  Just this past November, the President became the first sitting president to visit Burma.  Most important to U.S. businesses was OFAC’s significant relaxation last year of countrywide sanctions prohibiting the export of financial services to Burma, new investments in Burma and imports from Burma.

All of these events are major developments in U.S.-Burmese relations.  So why would the White House use a boilerplate notice when it could have taken the opportunity to depict an accurate picture of what U.S. foreign policy currently is?  The notice is, of course, a legal requirement and the Burmese government has not shed all doubt over its commitment to democracy and human rights.  But describing the situation as an “unusual and extraordinary threat” to the United States without any further context?  In light of all this Administration has accomplished with Burma, it seems odd and misleading to use an off-the-shelf response in this instance.

One consequence of this on the U.S. business community will likely be time and resources many spend confirming that the sanctions that have been lifted against Burma have now not been repealed.  Such a sanity check would be reasonable given the notice and especially for those who have begun exploring business with Burma.

The Administration should have a complete and consistent script of what U.S. foreign policy is with respect to Burma so it, and the rest of us, can all be on the same page.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)