Archive for the ‘DDTC’ Category


Oct

22

Exporting While Chinese


Posted by at 6:21 pm on October 22, 2007
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDDTC

Piezoresistive AccelerometerQing Li, a Chinese permanent resident in the United States, was recently indicted for attempting to export piezoresistive accelerometers to China without a license from the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”). Ms. Li had sent an email to undercover investigators asking to buy the accelerometers. Although the woman never received the accelerometers, she was arrested as she was boarding a flight to China at JFK Airport.

Julie Myers
, Assistant Secretary at the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and head of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) had these comments on the indictment:

These devices are simply not for export to China or anywhere else without explicit permission from the U.S. government. … Accelerometers are a designated defense article frequently used in missiles, ‘smart bombs’ and other major weapons systems and in the wrong hands, could prove catastrophic.

This case may not, however, be as cut and dried and Ms. Myer wants us to believe.

Piezoresistive accelerometers have a number of non-military uses, including automobile crash testing, flutter testing, and biomedical motion studies. Nor are all accelerometers designated defense articles. Category XII(d) of the United States Munitions List (“USML”) covers only “military accelerometers.” The Missile Technology Control Regime Annex of the USML only covers accelerometers with specified performance characteristics. Item 9, Category II covers only “continuous output” accelerometers “specified to function at acceleration levels greater than 100 g” or

Accelerometers with a threshold of 0.05 g or less, or a linearity error within 0.25 percent of full scale output, or both, which are designed for use in inertial navigation systems or in guidance systems of all types

The accelerometers in question were Endevco accelerometers. The Endevco website has a listing of available piezoresistive accelerometers and detailed specifications. Not one of the data sheets on the available accelerometers, at least that I could find, indicated that the particular accelerometer required a State Department license for export or that it was a military accelerometer. This accelerometer comes the closest, since the website states that it can be used in crash test dummies and in flight navigation systems. Nor did any of these products, as described in the data sheets, appear to me to meet the other specific technical specifications (e.g., designed to function at over 100g) listed above.

This indictment illustrates the dangers faced by exporters. Even if an exporter checks the USML and compares it to the technical specifications of the product to be exported, that may not reveal that the item is, in fact, export controlled. At a very minimum, companies that sell export-controlled items should clearly mark such items as export-controlled in their sales literature and data sheets. Absent that, there is a non-frivolous argument that the company itself has some liability for illegal exports of items that were not clearly disclosed as such.

I am trying to get the indictment, which may reveal other information that indicates the Ms. Li knew that the particular accelerometers she was seeking were, in fact, subject to export controls and listed on the USML. Once I obtain a copy, we’ll post it here and look at what evidence, if any, supports any claim that she had knowledge of the controlled status of the items she was trying to export.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Sep

12

New Details on Oz Defense Trade Treaty


Posted by at 4:27 pm on September 12, 2007
Category: Arms ExportDDTC

United States of AustraliaThe fact sheet released by the State Department’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs on the defense trade treaty recently signed by President Bush and Australia’s Prime Minister Howard provides few details on what the treaty says. Fortunately, a detailed FAQ on the treaty was posted on the Australian Prime Minister’s website. Here are some of the more interesting portions of the FAQ.

First, unlicensed exports under the treaty will still require governmental notification:

Under the Treaty, US exporters will only need to advise the State Department that they have engaged in an eligible defence export activity; they will not need to apply for a licence.

Second, although government-to-government sales under the Foreign Military Sales programs are not addressed by the treaty transfers of technical data relating to the approved FMS equipment will not be required:

The arrangements for approving the export of US defence equipment to Australia on a government-to-government basis under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program will not be included under the Treaty. But once the equipment has been received in Australia, retransfers of the FMS-origin technology within the approved community of Australian companies will be permitted without the need for further approvals, significantly enhancing our ability to support this equipment in country and creating improved opportunities for Australian companies.

Third, the treaty permits unlicensed exports to companies in the “approved community.” The FAQ provides more detail on the requirements to be in that community. An Australian company would be excluded if

– There is a serious failure to comply with Australian export control laws and regulations and/or the commitments undertaken in joining the approved community;

– A company fails to meet its security obligations under the Defence Industry Security Program;

– There is a failure to provide written notification of material changes in the facts provided with the company’s application for qualification;

– There is a significant risk that there will be unauthorised diversion of articles or data provided under the treaty;

– There are false statements, misrepresentations or omissions of fact in the application or export related documentation, or significant failures to provide or maintain records of US defence articles and data in the company’s possession.

Fourth, the treaty will include verification procedures:

The Treaty will stipulate the setting up of a compliance and audit regime, the details of which have yet to be mutually determined.

Finally, as with the analogous U.S.-U.K. treaty, the treaty with Australia will exclude “highly sensitive exports” although there is not yet any agreement as to what articles will be deemed to be “highly sensitive.”

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Sep

6

Scramjet Conference Conundrum


Posted by at 10:17 pm on September 6, 2007
Category: DDTCDeemed ExportsIran Sanctions

Scramjet engines title=An alert reader pointed out this interesting article in Aviation Week which raises the issue, which we last talked about in relation to the Chi Mak prosecution, of deemed exports at scientific conferences. The conference in question was an American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics conference in July on propulsion technologies, including scramjet and related technologies.

The Cincinnati meeting differed from a traditional U.S. industry gathering, because nearly a dozen engineers from Iran also submitted papers on Iranian solid and liquid rocket technologies. The Iranian engineers are based at the Sharif University of Technology and the KNT Technical University, both in Tehran. They apparently did not deliver the papers in person. However, as participants, the Iranians have access to all of the highly detailed U.S. aircraft and rocket propulsion presentations made at the conference.

Of course, the non-attendance of the Iranians isn’t surprising, since the probably didn’t apply for visas and even if they had those visas would likely have been denied. And the sanctions against Iran would not forbid access to presentations from the conference under the informational exception.

But, of course, if the information at the conference went beyond public domain information or fundamental research under section 120.11 of the ITAR, then companies and individuals at the conference may have committed export violations, not only because of any access to that information by Iranians nationals but also because of access to that information by any other foreign nationals. And it would appear that all the papers presented at the conference can be purchased from the AIAA website.

So, was any such information available? Consider this:

[O]ne [of] the more interesting historical papers presented at the forum was a detailed description of how the U.S. Air Force and Lockheed combined top-secret ramjet propulsion technologies with segmented solid rocket boosters for the Mach 3 D-21B reconnaissance drones that were launched by modified SR-71s and B-52Hs in the late 1960s. … This was the first time details on the segmented rocket booster portion of the D-21B program have been presented publicly, says Robert Geisler of Geisler Industries, who led the analysis with retired Pratt & Whitney and ATK Tactical Propulsion engineers.

Yikes. If I were the one who presented that paper, I might be a little nervous right now.

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Aug

29

U.K. Legislative Committee Tackles Brokering Issues


Posted by at 10:25 pm on August 29, 2007
Category: DDTCPart 129

Big BenEarlier this month, the the House of Commons’ Quadripartite Committee released a report entitled Strategic Export Controls: 2007 Review. In the report, the Committee recommends that the U.K. adopt a broker registration system that is interesting both in itself and in comparison to the current treatment of brokers in the United States under the provisions of Part 129:

We accept that the EU Council Common Position on the control of arms brokering, adopted on 23 June 2003, does not call for the registration of arms brokers. Article 4 suggests that Member States “may” establish a register of arms brokers, and that “registration or authorisation to act as a broker would […] not replace the requirement to obtain the necessary licence or written authorisation for each transaction”. We conclude that the EU Common Position on the control of arms brokering sets the best practice and we recommend that the Government follow best practice to establish a register of arms brokers. We conclude that a register will help to ensure that brokers meet defined standards, requirements and checks as well as deterring those—for example, with a relevant criminal conviction—for applying for registration. We also recommend that any brokering or trafficking in arms by a person in the UK or a British citizen abroad who is not registered be made a criminal offence.

The report doesn’t address, or even seem aware of, the difficulty of defining what activities in connection with the sale of a defense article constitute brokering. But leaving aside that question, it approaches the registration issue in ways that are significantly different from Part 129.

First, under Part 129, the registration process is purely informational. There is no endorsement by the DDTC when it issues a registration number that it has made a determination that the registrant is indeed qualified to act as a broker. The Committee’s proposal, however, clearly contemplates the enforcement of certain standards, including background checks, that more closely resemble a professional licensing system.

Second, the U.K. proposal relating to brokers requires registration only. There is no suggestion that broker participation in particular transactions may require specific licenses as is the case under Part 129 of the ITAR.

Third, one of the most significant controversies relating to Part 129 has been its jurisdictional scope. Part 129 requires registration by brokers “otherwise subject to” U.S. jurisdiction. The question here has been whether “otherwise subject to U.S. jurisdiction” covers brokers who are outside the United States, have no contacts with the United States and are not U.S. citizens but who are engaged in brokering with respect to U.S. origin defense articles. The U.K proposal applies only to British citizens engaging in brokering in the United Kingdom and throughout the world and to citizens of other countries engaging in brokering in the United Kingdom. It does not apply to parties that are not British citizens and are brokering outside the United Kingdom.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Aug

7

DDTC to Change Rules on Foreign Employees of Defense Companies


Posted by at 10:48 pm on August 7, 2007
Category: DDTC

Stephen MullStephen D. Mull, formerly the U.S. Ambassador to Lithuania and now the Acting Assistant Secretary for Political Military Affairs at the State Department, testified last week at the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee’s hearing on export control. Most of the testimony was a not very convincing effort to defend the long processing times for Technical Assistance Agreements at the State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”). Mull repeatedly referred to the “complexities” of TAAs to justify these processing times.

Another part of his testimony, however, suggested a possible change in procedures relating to employment by defense contractors of foreign nationals from NATO, E.U and the “plus three” countries (i.e. Japan, Australia and New Zealand):

We are set to initiate a policy change that will permit employees of foreign companies who are nationals from NATO or EU countries, Japan, Australia and New Zealand to be considered authorized under an approved license or TAA. This will alleviate the need for companies to seek non-disclosure agreements for such nationals and recognizes the low risk to of transferring technologies to nationals of these countries under an approved license or TAA.

A welcome change to be sure, but if there is such a low risk of transferring non-classified defense technologies to such nationals, why not eliminate the requirement for a DSP-5 license application for them as well?

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)