Archive for the ‘DDTC’ Category


Dec

19

DDTC Amends Rules on Transfers of Technical Data


Posted by at 11:50 pm on December 19, 2007
Category: DDTC

Copy of the ITARThe State Department’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) released today a final rule making it easier to transfer technical data under a technical assistance agreement (“TAA”) to third-country nationals, i.e., nationals of countries other than the country specifically authorized under a TAA. Under current procedures, if a U.S. company enters into a TAA permitting the transfer of technical data on a defense article to a company in France, that technical data can’t be transferred to anyone other than a French national unless the approved TAA provides for such transfer and the non-French national signs a nondisclosure agreement.

Under the new rules, technical data can be transferred to a third-country national without specific authorization and a nondisclosure agreement if four conditions are met. First, the third-country national must be a national “exclusively” of a NATO country, a European Union country, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, or Switzerland. Second, the third-country national’s employer must have either signed the TAA or a nondisclosure agreement. Third, the transfer must take place within the United States or the countries listed in the first condition. Finally, the transmittal letter for the TAA must explicitly state that permission is requested to make transfers to third-country nationals under these new provisions.

In its discussion of the new rules, DDTC restates its controversial position that a person may be a third-country national not only because of dual citizenship but also because of country of birth:

In addition to citizenship, DDTC considers country of birth a factor in determining nationality.

How the DDTC applies these factors is not clear from this statement. In theory, a French citizen born of French parents temporarily in Iran might be deemed Iranian. Or an individual born in Iran of Iranian parents that became a French citizen might still be considered an Iranian even if that individual has not retained dual citizenship.

Admittedly application of the rule in the first example is more controversial than in the second example. Still even the second example involves a double standard that rankles our allies. If an Iranian is made a permanent resident in the United States, he or she is treated the same as a U.S. citizen for deemed export purposes, whereas an Iranian naturalized by France is still treated as an Iranian.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Dec

7

California Man Sentenced to Two Years for Brokering Violations


Posted by at 12:18 am on December 7, 2007
Category: DDTCPart 129

Panther Thermal Imaging CameraOn December 3, Philip Cheng from Cupertino, California, was sentenced to a two-year prison term for his involvement in a scheme to export night vision equipment to China. Cheng, an export broker, had been involved in a transaction in which Night Vision Technology, a U.S. company, agreed to sell Panther thermal imaging cameras to two Chinese companies — North China Research Institute of Electro-Optics and the China National Electronics Import & Export Corporation. As a result, Cheng was indicted in 2004 for illegal exports, illegal defense brokering activities and money laundering. After a hung jury, Cheng pleaded guilty to the brokering charges under 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(1)(A)(ii)(III) and 22 C.F.R. § 129.6.

The DOJ press release on the guilty plea concentrates on the Department’s proof that the night vision exports to China were illegal. But, of course, that doesn’t demonstrate why Cheng’s activities were violations of the requirements of Part 129 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) to obtain licenses or provide prior notification for certain brokering activities. The evidence seems clear that Cheng was involved in brokering under Part 129. But not all brokering activities require a license. Nor does brokering of illegal exports violate the brokering rules, even though such activity would support a conviction for conspiracy.

Section 129.7 of the ITAR sets forth those situations in which a broker must obtain a license. First, of course, the brokering must involve significant military equipment (“SME”), and it seems clear that the night vision in question was SME under the ITAR. Additionally, in order to require a license, a brokering transaction must meet one of four criteria: (1) the value of the transaction must exceed $1 million; (2) the same significant military equipment had not been license for export to the armed services of the country involved; (3) the agreement would require the manufacture of SME abroad; or (4) the items involved were being sold to non-governmental entities. Alternatively, prior notification might be required under section 129.8 for transactions involving SME valued at less than $1 million.

It seems likely that at least the notification requirement was breached. Arguably, the license requirement was also breached on the grounds that the Panther thermal imaging camera had never been licensed to the Chinese military. Even so, the DOJ press release on the conviction seems not to have understood that more than an illegal export is required to support a conviction for illegal brokering.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Nov

29

Legislation Introduced To Improve DDTC Processing Times


Posted by at 7:52 pm on November 29, 2007
Category: DDTC

Brad ShermanRepresentative Brad Sherman (D-CA) recently introduced, with one other Democrat and two Republicans, a bill to “improve the performance of the defense trade controls functions of the Department of State.” The proposed legislation is a clear response to mounting exporter frustration over increasing delays by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) in processing licenses and other export-related requests.

The centerpiece of the proposed legislation is the imposition of mandatory average processing times. For transactions not subject to Congressional notification requirements, for example, licenses to NATO members, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Israel must be processed, on average, within 20 days; 30 days for exports to major non-NATO allies; and 60 days to everyone else. Commodity jurisdiction requests would be required to be acted upon by DDCTwithin 60 days on average.

DDTC’s average processing times for Technical Assistance Agreements (“TAAs”) would need to be 120 days. It’s not clear why the proposed legislation would permit a significant delay in processing TAAs when license requests are put on such a short string. Further, the time limit doesn’t cover approving amendments to TAAs, even though the most significant delays currently being experienced are with respect to such amendments.

The proposed legislation would also significantly change the current provisions of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) relating to exports of spare parts. Under the proposed changes, a DDTC license would not be required for exports of spare and replacement parts to NATO members, Australia, New Zealand and Japan in specified circumstances, including that the parts and components are one-for-one replacements for parts and components for an item previously exported pursuant to a DDTC license. Under section 123.16(b)(2) of the ITAR, components or spare parts can be exported without a license in support of a defense article previously authorized for export as long as the value is under $500, the parts are going to the end user and not a distributor, and no more than 24 shipments are made per year to the end user. If this proposal is adopted, spare parts can be exported even if their value exceeds $500 and more than 24 shipments are made per year.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Nov

7

Microwave Power Modules Added to CCL


Posted by at 12:43 am on November 7, 2007
Category: BISDDTC

Microwave Power ModulesAlmost a year after the last plenary of the Wassenaar Arrangement approved and adopted changes to the Wassenaar List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) yesterday released a final rule implementing those changes on the Commerce Control List (“CCL”). A number of changes have been made, including the addition of some items that were not previously on that list. The list of changes is too long (and in some case too tedious) to fully detail in a blog post, but I did want to discuss briefly the addition of microwave power modules to the CCL which appears to be yet another item which could pose overlapping export control jurisdiction between BIS and the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”)

Microwave power modules are a recent technology that combines solid-state and vacuum electronics to provide highly efficient and powerful amplifiers with very low signal-to-noise ratio and extremely compact size. MPMs are also known for their rapid turn-on times. These properties have made them attractive for use in military applications such as radar, communications, and unmanned aerial vehicles (“UAVs”). In particular, MPMs have been used in the Predator and Global Hawk UAVs for both satellite and line-of-sight communications to and from the remote pilot. Commercial uses for MPMs include civilian satellite communications, wireless communications, and high power RF sources for laboratory use

The new ECCN for MPMs is 3A001.b.9. The controls on the new ECCN are NS2 and AT controls. The NS2 controls mean that licenses will be required for all countries other than those classified on those in Country Group A:1 on the Country List. License requests to any country other than one in Country Group D:1 will be subject to a general policy of approval unless there is evidence of a possibility of diversion to a country in Country Group D:1. License requests for a country in Country Group D:1 are subject to a case-by-case examination and will be approved if BIS determines that the item will not be used for military purposes. AT controls mean that license requests for exports or re-exports to Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Sudan and Syria are subject to a general policy of denial.

ECCN 3A001.b.9 sets forth certain performance requirements for an MPM to be covered. These include the unit’s turn-on time, the size of the unit as a function of its output power, and a measure relating to the unit’s instantaneous bandwidth.

A large number of MPMs are explicitly identified by their manufacturers as designed for military use, in which case they are covered under Category XI (Military Electronics) of the United States Munitions List (“USML”) or possibly Category XV (Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment). Interestingly, the related controls section of ECCN 3A001 only references, and excludes, MPMs covered under Category XV. This leads, of course, to an interesting question of overlapping or conflicting jurisdiction.

Consider, for example, an MPM designed for a military terrestrial communication system which therefore is covered by USML Category XI(a)(4)(iii). If that MPM meets or exceeds the performance characteristics of ECCN 3A001.b.9, then it would also be covered by that ECCN because only items covered by USML Category XV are excluded from the ECCN. Do you file a commodity jurisdiction request for that MPM? Or should you simply file for export licenses from both BIS and DDTC? Given the length of time it takes for a commodity jurisdiction request to be decided, the answer, of course, is to file for licenses from both agencies. To avoid this result, BIS should add to the “related controls” section of ECCN 3A001 an exclusion for MPMs covered by USML Category XI.

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Oct

23

Qing Li Indictment Update


Posted by at 9:27 pm on October 23, 2007
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDDTCGeneral

Engraving from the Qing DynastyI now have a copy of the criminal complaint filed against Qing Li and it answers a number of questions left open by yesterday’s post on that case. The copy I have isn’t suitable for posting, but I should have one by tomorrow that I can post, and I will then update this post with a link to the criminal complaint.

The first open issue was whether the accelerometer was an item on the United States Munitions List (USML). The criminal complaint identifies the part as Endevco Part No. 7270A-200K. That item is not listed on Endevco’s website under its product listing. However, if you enter that part number into the ECCN lookup on the site it returns “ECCN:XII(b), which is clearly a reference to Category XII(d) of the USML which covers “military accelerometers.” It may well be that the product is only sold to the military and that is the reason it is not listed on the website with the other accelerometers available for sale to the general public. The part is, however, listed on a page of the Endevco website showing items that are “guaranteed in-stock”

The second open issue was what did Ms. Li know about the export status of the part. If the allegations of the criminal complaint are true, it seems that she would have known that the item was export controlled. Apparently, Ms. Li first approached Endevco, who then reported her to the authorities, who then promptly set up a sting operation. In her first email to the undercover agent, Ms. Li indicates that she had been referred to the undercover agent’s company by Endevco. Thereafter the undercover agent replied with an email that said this:

I do not think that the US Government will give us a license to export these items to China. If you want to, you can apply for a license but I do not want my companies [sic] name on that application. If you still want to proceed without the license, there are ways of doing it.

If true, that could serve as a basis for a finding of criminal intent

Additionally, the criminal complaint reveals an interesting twist on the case. After receiving several emails from the undercover agent, including the one just quoted, Ms. Li appeared to walk away from the transaction and sent an email saying this:

I don’t need the products. I am just actually doing a favor for a friend in China to find the products. I have forwarded all the information to the friend and it’s up to them for the decision now. I have nothing to do with it. I have told the friend that I won’t be involved anymore due to the risk attached. I think they will contact you directly for any further questions. Sorry for any confusion to you.

But she may not have really walked away from the transaction. After her “good-bye” email, the undercover agent was contacted by an individual using the email [email protected] seeking to purchase the accelerometers. The federal investigative agents obtained the IP Address history of that account from Microsoft and it allegedly revealed something very interesting. All of the emails were sent from an IP address in Beijing. But prior to those messages the hotmail account was logged into from an IP address associated with Ms. Li’s husband’s Internet account. Then an intercept on Ms. Li’s phone line revealed a telephone call to a number in Beijing, and thereafter a response was sent from the Beijing IP Address. The criminal complaint speculates that Ms. Li would log into the account and if she saw an email from the undercover agent, she would call her associate in China and discuss the message with him. The associate would then send an email to the undercover agent.

The issue at trial will no doubt revolve around the significance of this IP Address and telephone intercept evidence. And the ultimate significance of that evidence seems far from clear.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)