Archive for the ‘DDTC’ Category


Dec

20

Back in the U.S.S.R.? Pleading Guilty to U.S. Export Violations May Get You Home


Posted by at 12:53 am on December 20, 2013
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDDTCGeneralITARUSML

By  Sgt. Scott M. Biscuiti [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ADefense.gov_photo_essay_090329-M-7747B-015.jpg

On Tuesday, Russian Roman Kvinikadze pleaded guilty in federal court in Wyoming to charges that he attempted to export thermal imaging weapon sights to Russia without a required license from the U.S. State Department.  Last month, we reported on Kvinikadze’s arrest and the charges brought against him as well as the Russian government’s criticism of the entire matter.  Kvinikadze’s plea is not a surprising development since, as we alluded to last month, an entrapment defense even under the most favorable circumstances is difficult to prove.

What is surprising, however, is how soon Kvinikadze may be leaving U.S. federal prison.  The Associated Press reported on Tuesday that the federal judge in Kvinikadze’s case said “immigration authorities intend to send Kivinikadze back to Russia.”  As we said last month, Kvinikadze’s best defense was not going to be in the courtroom but through diplomatic channels plied with the Russian government’s support.  Unlike a month ago, when the Russian human rights commissioner publicly decried Kvinikadze’s arrest, the Russian government has been quiet since Kvinikadze entered his guilty plea.

If Kvinikadze in fact returns shortly to Russia, the Department of Homeland Security, the agency which conducted the investigation into Kvinikadze, may be reconsidering the effectiveness of operations, like the one used against Kvinikadze, that engage foreign persons online to arrange for unlawful export transactions and entice them into travel to the United States to be arrested.  At a minimum, would-be U.S. export control violators abroad ought to think twice about meeting a potential business partner for the first time in the United States.  But more importantly, foreign governments may begin to join Russia in denouncing such U.S. policing of its laws around the world.  One of the aspects that have made U.S. investigations and law enforcement activities abroad of FCPA violations so successful in recent years is the U.S. cooperation with foreign law enforcement. Without such cooperation, the United States may see more guilty foreign criminals going home.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Dec

6

DIY Licensing Results in DDTC Debarrment


Posted by at 5:36 pm on December 6, 2013
Category: CustomsDDTCITAR

By Ncollida1106 (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AMTW_Picture.jpg

The State Department announced last week that it debarred LeAnne Lesmeister, a former export compliance officer for Honeywell International, Inc., from ITAR-related activities because she “used her position to circumvent Honeywell’s export compliance program in the fabrication of various export control documents that Ms. Lesmeister presented as Department of State authorizations.”  Honeywell had voluntarily disclosed Lesmeister’s activity to the State Department.

DDTC’s charging letter to Lesmeister in July of this year provides details of egregious export control violations alleged against her to support the 21 violations with which she was charged.  Just samples from the charging letter are stunning.  In connection with her work as a senior export compliance officer for a Honeywell aerospace facility in Florida, DDTC alleged the following:

  • Licenses Lesmeister “fabricated” used DSP-5 license numbers that, in some cases, had appeared on previously approved licenses to Honeywell for unrelated products or, in other cases, had appeared on previously approved licenses to unrelated applicants where a Honeywell entity sometimes appeared as a party or often not.
  • With respect to an approved technical assistance agreement that Lesmeister “falsified,” she wrote  a Honeywell employee that “we are expecting to see approval within about a week at max, all staffed agencies have responded so it is just a matter of getting the licensing office to finalize.”
  • For a “fabricated” DSP-5 license and an falsely approved technical assistance agreement, Lesmeister wrote to two Honeywell employees, “[t]hey ended up sending it to me – it ain’t pretty but it is official.”
  • In one case, Lesmeister “fabricated” a letter “supposedly issued by the Office of Defense Trade Controls Licensing” that purported to approve a temporary change in end-use to a previously exported item.

In one instance, Honeywell relied on a false DSP-5 license created by Lesmeister and, in turn, attempted to export a product to Argentina and submitted the false license to U.S. Customs.  Customs rejected the transaction because the false license number was not registered in the Automated Export System.

This case is noteworthy not just for its alleged activity, but it was also a first for the State Department.  Lesmeister failed to answer her charging letter.  As a result, and for the first time according to the State Department, it referred an unanswered charging letter alleging ITAR violations to an Administrative Law Judge for default consideration.  The Administrative Law Judge issued a default order against Lesmeister, and DDTC then issued its debarment order last week.

Admist all of this, it is important to note that DDTC charged Lesmeister with violations only between 2008 and 2012 although she had worked in export compliance at Honeywell for 27 years.  With the applicable statute of limitations likely running in connection with Honeywell’s voluntary disclosure, there is nothing in State Department documents made public to date that refer to any alleged violations that occurred prior to 2008.

At the moment, the fact that no penalties, civil or criminal, have been imposed against anyone is stunning.  Honeywell, however, appears to have done several things right.  Honeywell terminated Lesmeister in June 2012 upon discovery of the violations and, sometime thereafter, voluntarily disclosed the matter to the State Department.

On the other hand, Honeywell may not be out of the woods.  The violations as alleged are significant to say the least and appear to have been discovered by Honeywell only in 2012 after Lesmeister had been with the company for over a quarter-century.  The DDTC charging letter also describes Lesmeister’s activities in ways that suggest impermissibility could have been suspected or detected.  For example, her “fabricated” DSP-5 licenses were described in different instances as “low-quality scan[s],” included “page numbers [that] were not sequential” and, perhaps worst, “the country of ultimate destination was inconsistent with the end-users listed.”

There has been no mention of any parallel proceedings being conducted by the Justice Department, or any other U.S. agency like Customs, for alleged activities that violate more than just ITAR.  One has to wonder what else may be happening, however, when the only penalty is a single person’s debarment from ITAR-related activity after that person for years was running a counterfeit government licensing department from her office for one of the largest U.S. companies.

Until more information is made public, the debarment of LeAnne Lesmeister is, at a minimum, an exceptional case for ITAR enforcement.  If there is a preliminary moral to the story, it should be that routine audits of compliance programs do serve a purpose and, if properly calibrated, should detect issues like those in this case.

Clif adds:  One explanation for Ms. Lesmeister’s failure to respond to DDTC is concern over possible criminal prosecution and a desire to avoid providing either incriminatory information admitting the violations or information denying the violations that could serve as a basis for a prosecution for lying to federal agents.   There is no evidence on PACER that Ms. Lesmeister has been indicted yet, but that doesn’t mean there isn’t an on-going parallel criminal investigation

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Nov

11

From Russia with … Weapon Sights and a Diplomatic Row?


Posted by at 5:54 pm on November 11, 2013
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesDDTCUSML

By  Sgt. Scott M. Biscuiti [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ADefense.gov_photo_essay_090329-M-7747B-015.jpg

Last week, a federal judge in Wyoming set trial for February of next year for Russian Roman Kvinikadze, who was arrested this August on charges that he attempted to export thermal imaging weapon sights without a required license from the U.S. State Department.

The story of Kvinikadze’s arrest began last year when he contacted an undercover Department of Homeland Security agent on the Chinese e-commerce site, Alibaba.com.  It is unclear from court documents what the DHS agent posted on Alibaba.com to attract Kvinikadze, but it was enough for Kvinikadze to introduce himself as an aspiring hunting store owner that wanted a quote for weapon sights.  According to the criminal complaint, Kvinikadze eventually traveled to a Las Vegas gun show where the DHS agent told him that the sights required a U.S. export license but “there were other ways to ship the weapon sights without a license.”  Kvinikadze apparently expressed continued interest and later went to meet the agent in Wyoming, where he was arrested.

According to Russian media on Friday, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s human rights commissioner described Kvinikadze’s arrest as a “kind of American law enforcement agency approach to Russian citizens [that] is becoming increasingly disrespectful of international law and bilateral agreements, including the 1999 agreement on mutual legal assistance in investigating crimes.”  He also reportedly described Kvinikadze as “being knowingly provoked to violate the law as he was lured into the United States [to be arrested].”

The Russian government appears to be intimating Kvinikadze’s entrapment defense at trial.  Although a successful entrapment defense is difficult and complex, Kvinikadze appears to have a better chance than previous foreign nationals engaging with undercover U.S. agents online.  In September, we discussed the arrest of Patrick Campbell, the foreign national arrested at JFK airport for, among other things, having yellowcake uranium in his luggage.  In that case, again beginning on Alibaba.com, Campbell responded to a DHS agent’s solicitation for yellowcake and informed the agent that he could “handle” any U.S. export restrictions that concerned the agent in shipping uranium to Iran.

In Kvinikadze’s case, critical facts are the reverse: Kvinikadze found the DHS agent purporting to be a seller and the DHS agent was the one who informed Kvinikadze of  a required U.S. export license and “ways” to avoid getting one.  The criminal complaint is, however, peppered with suggestions that Kvinikadze was a sophisticated buyer and was not lured, but rather conspired, to export the sights illegally.

What may be Kvinikadze’s best defense is the Russian government’s support.  The Russian human rights commissioner has reportedly also said that “[Kvinikadze’s] situation is being closely followed by the Russian Foreign Ministry,” and that after Kvinikadze’s arrest, “our consular workers got in touch with him and with the prison authorities in Nebraska where he is being held … We will continue providing consular-legal assistance to our compatriot.”

There are, of course, a host of reasons why U.S. law enforcement looks for foreign threats on foreign websites where activity threatening U.S. security interests is taking place.  However, how such operations are conducted as well as their frequency and targets have, as this case shows, diplomatic ramifications.

Based on the Russian government’s response, one has to wonder how the United States would respond if the weapon sights were looking the other way.  How Russia’s response to Kvinikadze affects U.S. law enforcement strategy remains to be seen.  In the meantime, if sites like Alibaba.com are open for undercover U.S. law enforcement, any U.S. business should be keenly aware that other countries are likely doing the same.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Nov

7

Naming Names


Posted by at 10:09 pm on November 7, 2013
Category: BISDDTCDeemed ExportsExport Reform

By MediaPhoto.Org (mediaphoto.org Own work) [CC-BY-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ARussian_passports.jpgThe Bureau of Industry and Security has released new guidance on deemed re-exports which is intended to deal with issues arising when a U.S. company exports technology to a foreign company that then re-exports that technology to its own employees which are not of the same nationality as the foreign company receiving the technology export. The purpose of the guidance is to address certain issues raised by the current export control reform effort and, specifically, to deal with re-exports of technology relating to the newly created 600 series of items that have been transferred from the United States Munitions List (“USML”) to the Commerce Control List (“CCL”).

As the guidance notes, one of the overarching principles of the export control effort is that military items moved from the USML to the CCL should not thereby be subjected to more stringent controls than were applicable to the item when it was on the USML. Under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (the “ITAR”) “technical data” is subject to certain license exemptions permitting technical data, in certain cases, to be transferred without license by foreign companies to their employees who are not of the same nationality as the foreign company. These employees include “third country nationals” who are nationals of countries other than the nationality of the foreign company involved and “dual nationals” which are nationals of two countries, one of which may, but does not necessarily include, the nationality of the foreign company.

The first of these exceptions, found in section 124.16 of the ITAR,  allows such retransfer from companies in NATO countries, the EU, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland to retransfer technologies to third country nationals who are also from such countries and subject to certain further conditions. And the other exception, found in section 126.18, permits intra-company transfers of technical data from the foreign company to employees without regard to the country restrictions of 124.16 but subject to certain other restrictions such as requiring the third country national employees to sign non-disclosure agreements and requiring the company to assure that the third country national doesn’t have “substantive contacts” with countries subject to arms embargoes under section 126.1 of the ITAR.

Nothing in the Export Administration Regulations (the “EAR”) provides equivalent license exceptions to permit the transfer of technology to nationals of NATO countries, the EU, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Switzerland without a license as permitted by section 124.16 of the ITAR. Accordingly, the new guidance indicates that it is the policy of BIS to permit transfers of technology relating to series 600 items without a license if the conditions of 124.16 are fulfilled. Also to the extent that section 126.18 of the ITAR permits transfers to third country nationals outside of the EU, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland if they sign an NDA and are screened for contacts with embargoed countries, BIS will permit similar transfers of series 600 technology.

The situation with section 126.18 is more complicated because section 126.18 addresses an issue under the ITAR that is not a problem under the EAR, namely the problem of dual nationals born in countries subject to arms embargoes. Section 126.18 was designed to deal with the thorny problem of dual nationals under DDTC which require that a dual national should be treated as a citizen of both countries. Accordingly a naturalized U.K. citizen born in China would still be treated as Chinese, and thus ineligible to receive ITAR-controlled technical data even if he had been awarded the OBE by the Queen because, in DDTC’s eyes, that dual national was irrevocably and permanently tainted with Chinese blood. Although such discrimination would be illegal if applied by DDTC in the United States, DDTC saw no problem with applying this rule in foreign countries even if it would, as it often did, violate the human rights laws of that foreign country to discriminate against someone solely based on place of birth. Under BIS rules, in contrast,
a person is treated as a citizen of the country of his or her most recent nationality. A naturalized UK citizen would be treated simply as a UK citizen without regard to the fact that he or she was born in China and was once Chinese. Thus, strictly speaking, the BIS guidance does not need to implement those parts of 126.18 as they relate to dual nationals.

There is, however, one problem relating to technology re-exports for series 600 items where the transfer from the USML to the EAR will subject the technology to more stringent requirements and which is not addressed by this guidance. Under DDTC’s application procedures, a U.S. exporter seeking authority for a foreign company to transfer technical data to its third country and dual nationals, the U.S. exporter need only list the nationalities of the employees. In other words, the U.S. exporter says, for example, that the technical data will be exported to French, German and Mexican nationals. Under BIS application guidelines, however, the U.S. exporter must give the names, passport numbers and addresses for each employee that will receive the technology re-export. In addition to that, a resume for each individual, showing education, employment history and military service, must be provided for each employee.

Over and above the obvious burden of compiling this information in the first place, the U.S. exporter will be required to obtain amendments or new authorizations each time the foreign transferee hires new employees in the affected program area. Under DDTC’s rules, an amendment is required only if an employee with a nationality not previously approved is hired. Granted this burden can be minimized to some extent through reliance on section 126.18, but this may not be possible where the foreign employer is either unable or unwilling to comply with all of the conditions required by section 126.18, including screening employees for contacts with embargoed countries, maintaining records of this screening, and fulfilling the other requirements of section 126.18.

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Oct

31

Lessons in Spycraft: Don’t Try This at Home


Posted by at 6:50 pm on October 31, 2013
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesDDTC

Source http://www.defenseimagery.mil/imagery.html#a=search&s=f-15&chk=6cff0&t=0&p=2&guid=76a6c050743c287abd63255e111c2a6e7a281d91 [Public Domaiin; work of federal employee]A New Jersey woman, Hannah Robert, was arraigned on Monday on charges that she exported ITAR-controlled technical drawings without a DDTC license in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. The drawings allegedly involved parts for the F-15, the Chinook helicopter and other military aircraft as well as nuclear submarines.

According to the DOJ press release, Ms. Robert used an unusual method of exporting the technical drawings to her overseas contact:

Starting in October 2010, Robert transmitted the military drawings for these parts to India by posting the technical data to the password-protected website of a Camden County, N.J., church where she was a volunteer web administrator. This was done without the knowledge of the church staff. Robert e-mailed R.P. the username and password to the church website so that R.P. could download the files from India. Through the course of the scheme, Robert uploaded thousands of technical drawings to the church website for R.P. to download in India.

A key element in any export prosecution is scienter, that is, proof that the defendant knew that his or her conduct was illegal. If these allegations are true, the prosecution is not going to have a hard time in establishing that Ms. Robert knew that she should not have sent these drawings out of the country without a license.

For espionage aficionados, this technique is known as a dead drop and in the Internet era dead drops have been done on such places as draft folders of shared Gmail accounts (viz., the love letters of General Petraeus and Paula Broadwell). It’s probably safe to say that churches, whether brick and mortar or their virtual locations, are not the best location for a dead drop. The DOJ press release doesn’t reveal how Ms. Robert got nabbed but I have a pretty clear picture of some shocked vicar stumbling on these drawings late one night and calling the feds.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)