Archive for the ‘Criminal Penalties’ Category


Jul

24

Weatherford under Investigation for Operations in Iran


Posted by at 6:44 pm on July 24, 2007
Category: BISCriminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

DeniedHouston-based oil-drilling and oilfield services company Weatherford announced yesterday in its 8-K filing with the SEC that the company has

been notified that the Bureau of Industry & Security and the U.S. Department of Justice are investigating allegations of improper sales of products and services by us in sanctioned countries. We are cooperating fully with this investigation. In cooperation with the government, we have retained legal counsel, reporting to our audit committee, to investigate this matter. The investigation is in its preliminary stages.

It’s probably not to hard to guess what sanctioned country is involved. A map of Weatherford offices published in the September 2005 edition of W magazine, a Weatherford publication, tells the story:

Map of Weatherford locations

Looks like three locations in Iran to me.

Of course, a foreign subsidiary of a U.S. company can do business in Iran provided that the foreign subsidiary has business in other countries (in other words, is not a device to evade the sanctions) and provided its operations in Iran are not controlled by the parent. Complying with the second condition — i.e. isolating the Iranian operation from control by the U.S. parent — is what normally creates a problem. Even something as innocent as U.S. approval of a travel and expense voucher in Iran from the foreign subsidiary can raise questions — particularly in an environment where U.S. officials are making louder and more frequent noises about swatting companies doing business in Iran.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jun

7

Prosecutors “Clarify” Misstatements Made during Alavi Bail Hearing


Posted by at 10:05 pm on June 7, 2007
Category: Criminal PenaltiesSanctions

Ouch!It seems that the story that the prosecutors told to keep Mohammed Alavi in jail pending his trial on charges that he violated the Iranian Sanctions Regulations was just that — a story. On May 31, the trial court issued an order reversing its previous decision that Alavi should be held without bail pending trial, citing a “Clarification” filed by the prosecution. That “Clarification” backed off two significant claims made by the prosecution that the court relied on to deny bail to Alavi.

As we reported earlier, Alavi was accused of having downloaded, while in Iran, simulation software used for training employees at various power facilities, including nuclear generation plants. The prosecution also alleged that Alavi took to Iran detailed schematics of the Palo Verde nuclear plant.

Neither of these key allegations turns out to have been true. The trial court judge noted that the prosecution contended that Alavi had taken “the blueprints of Palo Verde to Tehran.” The court then noted:

The Government has now advised the Court, “Although the program contains schematics and other detailed information relating to Palo Verde’s reactor control room and other systems, those schematics and other details do not amount to architectural blue prints or designs of the physical layout of the Palo Verde site.”

Nor did Alavi download the simulation software while in Iran as alleged by the Government. According to the court, the prosecutors have now admitted:

Alavi would not have downloaded the 3 Key Master program from the Western Services website. He would have only obtained the registration key to make the program operational.

This last admission is crucial to the viability of the Government’s case against Alavi. Downloading a program would almost certainly violate the Iranian Transaction Regulations. Carrying a program to Iran on a laptop for personal use, however, would arguably qualify under the baggage exception set forth in section 560.507. And downloading a key to make that program function is arguably permitted under the information and informational materials exception in section 560.315 of the Iranian Transactions Regulations.

Thanks to reader and commenter Mike Deal for sending me a copy of the court’s order.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

May

9

Internet Download From Iran Leads to Criminal Prosecution in U.S.


Posted by at 9:50 pm on May 9, 2007
Category: Criminal PenaltiesSanctions

3KeyMaster Screen ShotReader Mike Deal forwarded to me some of the documents filed in the prosecution of Mohammad Alavi, who has been charged with exporting copies of simulation software to Iran in violation of the Iranian Transaction Regulations. The affidavit filed in support of the arrest warrant provides some interesting background to the Alavi case.

According to that affidavit, Alavi was a naturalized U.S. citizen who was born in Tehran. He had worked at the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station since 1989 as a software engineer. In the summer of 2006, Alavi requested, and was granted, access to the site of Western Services Corporation in order to obtain a registration key to use Western Services Corporation’s software 3KeyMaster. That software is used, among other things, to simulate operations of power plants, including nuclear plants, fossil fuel plants and co-generation facilities. It is not used to control the actual operation of any power facilities.

Alavi resigned his position at Palo Verde in July 2006. Shortly after Alavi’s last day at Palo Verde, he traveled with his wife to Iran. In October 2006, while Alavi was in Iran, Alavi’s user name and password was used to log onto the Western Services site and download another registration key. The IP Address of the computer that logged on to the Western Services, 84.47.215.172, traced back to an Internet service provider located in Tehran, Iran. Alavi was arrested on his return to the United States on April 9.

The circumstantial case against Alavi, at least as set forth in the affidavit, seems strong. Each computer on which the 3KeyMaster software is downloaded needs a separate registration key for the software to operate. The registration key is generated by the Western Services website based on the serial number of the computer’s hard drive. The only reason for Alavi to log on to the Western Services site while in Iran was to obtain a 3KeyMaster registration key for the computer in Iran from which he logged on.

But Alavi may not be the only one who violated the Iran sanctions here. Western Services, after all, supplied the registration key even though the IP Address to which it supplied the key traced back to Iran. Without the registration key, the software would not continue to work. And a simple reverse DNS look-up by Western Services on the IP Address 84.47.215.172 would show that the computer was located in Iran. Click here to see for yourself.

The issue here is whether providers of Internet services should be required to take steps to determine the location of the computer requesting those services. As we previously noted, Google Earth took such steps to prevent download of the Google Earth software to computers located in Sudan. Should this be done by everyone providing services over the Internet? Did Western Services have an obligation to do a reverse DNS look-up before allowing a user to download a registration key? Let me hear your thoughts on this in the comments.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Apr

30

Between an Embargo and a Hard Place


Posted by at 8:48 pm on April 30, 2007
Category: BISCriminal PenaltiesSanctions

LogicaLogicaCMG, Inc., the U.S. subsidiary of U.K.-based LogicaCMG plc, pleaded guilty last Wednesday to violating the U.S. embargo on Cuba. According to a Department of Justice press release, the violation occurred in 2001 when New Hampshire based CMG, which was merged into LogicaCMG on December 30, 2002, configured and shipped a telecommunications server to Cuba through Panama. The server was designed to permit text messaging on the Cuban wireless telephone network. LogicaCMG agreed to pay a $50,000 fine. The company also entered into a settlement agreements with the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).

The conundrum for LogicaCMG is that its parent company, which almost surely approved the guilty plea, is subject to European Union Council Regulation 2271/96, which forbids LogicaCMG “whether directly or through a subsidiary” from complying with the U.S. embargo on Cuba. The Settlement Agreement with BIS, although not yet posted on the BIS website, almost certainly involves further representations from LogicaCMG that it will not further violate the Cuba embargo, normally enforced by conditioning a suspension of a denial of export privileges or suspension of all or part of a monetary fine on future compliance with U.S. export laws.

LogicaCMG is no doubt taking a calculated risk that the E.U. is unlikely to enforce Regulation 2271/96. To the best of my knowledge, the blocking regulation has only rarely been enforced if at all. Still, this is hardly a comfortable position for the company.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Apr

9

Close Enough for Government Work


Posted by at 3:03 pm on April 9, 2007
Category: BISCriminal PenaltiesDDTC

Intel i960 MicroprocessorThey say that close only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades. It also, however, counts in indictments, and the recent Sudarshan indictment, which we reported last week, is a case in point. That indictment is only half right, but that would be enough, if a jury buys it, to send Mr. Sudarshan to jail.

The half of the indictment that appears right is pretty straightforward. The indictment alleges that Mr. Sudarshan, through Singapore-based Cirrus Electronics took orders for electronic components from the Vikram Sarabhai Space Centre (“VSSC”) and Bharat Dynamics, Ltd (“BDL”) both Indian-government related companies on the Entity List. Sudarshan would then use a U.S. subsidiary of Cirrus to source these parts from U.S. vendors. The U.S. subsidiary would then ship the components to Cirrus in Singapore which would then ship the components to VSSC and BDL without obtaining the licenses required by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) for exports to parties on the Entity List.

When the U.S. vendors requested end-use statements for the parts being sold to Cirrus, Sudarshan would lie to them and claim that the parts were destined for the Navy Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory in Kochi, India. If the allegations are proven, Mr. Sudarshan, who was arrested two weeks ago in South Carolina, may have to delay his return trip to Singapore for a good deal longer than he expected.

The second half of the indictment alleges that Sudarshan exported defense articles without the necessary license from the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”), and it’s here that the indictment appears to start getting things wrong. The indictment alleges that Sudarshan obtained and exported without DDTC authorization Intel i960 microprocessors, which the indictment alleges is an item on the United States Munitions List. Additionally, the indictment singles out exports by Sudarshan of M39014/01-1284, M39014/01-1299, M39014/01-1317, M39014/01-1535, and M39014/01-1553 capacitors, which it also alleges were USML items. Neither seems to be the case.

The Intel i960 processor was popular in the 1990s. Only one flavor of the chip, the i960MX, was specifically designed or configured for military use. The indictment, however, doesn’t allege that the i960MX chip was involved and refers only to the i960. Moreover, the i960MX was apparently no longer even in production during the time frame covered by the indictment.

The i960 chip itself is a microprocessor that can be used in a wide variety of applications and is, according to Intel, “a time-proven and excellent choice for local and wide-area networking, telecom and imaging applications.” It is also used in slot machines, not normally considered a military application.

Sudarshan obtained the i960 chips from a vendor in Newburyport, Massachusetts, which produced these chips under license from Intel. The vendor also apparently did not believe that the i960 chip that it was selling to Sudarshan was USML. According to the indictment:

SUDARSHAN falsely assured representatives of the vendor in Newburyport, Massachusetts, that the i960 microprocessors were going to remain in Singapore for use in a joint Government of India project with Lockheed Martin, when, in fact, Cirrus Singapore was going to re-export the i960 microprocessors to ADE [the Aeronautical Development Establishment] in India for use in the navigation and weapons guidance systems of the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft.

Thus, it was clear to the vendor that the i960 was being exported by Cirrus to ADE and yet it did not insist that Sudarshan obtain a DDTC license for that export.

The capacitors identified by the indictment as exported without the necessary DDTC license are widely available “off-the-shelf” components, as a simple Google search demonstrates. There is no indication that they were specifically designed or configured for military use, making any claim that they are USML more than a little untenable.

It appears that the government’s theory is that these items were USML because they were being shipped to India for use with the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft. That, however, has never been enough to turn a commercially-available, off-the-shelf item into a defense item on the USML.

Perhaps DDTC should start doing export training for Assistant U.S. Attorneys.

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Copyright © 2007 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)