Archive for the ‘Criminal Penalties’ Category


May

21

House Committee Passes Export Reform Proposal


Posted by at 8:08 pm on May 21, 2009
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesExport Control Proposals

Howard Berman
ABOVE: Howard Berman
Chair, House Foreign Affairs


Yesterday, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved legislation that would, among other things, amend parts of the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”). The Bill, H.R. 2410, is titled the ‘‘Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2010 and 2011’’ and was sponsored by Rep. Howard Berman, chair of the committee.

Like many of its predecessors, the bill would set processing time goals for licenses and commodity jurisdiction requests, each to be no more than 60 days. And commodity jurisdiction determinations would be required to be posted by the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) on its website. The processing times are just “goals” so, even if the legislation passes, I wont be holding my breath waiting for CJ requests to blast out the door in 60 days. But I think we can all give some polite golf claps, and maybe even a louder hooray or two, to the requirement that CJs be posted on the website.

Section 826 of the bill permits the President to remove “satellites and related components” from the United States Munitions List, but it is poorly drafted and has a confusing China exception which reads:

(b) Exception- The authority of subsection (a) may not be exercised with respect to any satellite or related component that may, directly or indirectly, be transferred to, or launched into outer space by, the People’s Republic of China.

Come again? Does this mean that satellites and parts that might be transferred to China stay on the USML and, like all other items, require a license to all destinations? Or does it mean that DDTC can decide that the satellite-related items in Category XV can be exported to every destination but China without a license? And where does the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) fit into this? Can it require BIS licenses for satellites and parts removed from the USML? Your guess is as good as mine.

A third provision of interest in the proposed legislation might be referred to as the Full Prisons Act. Section 831 increases the maximum criminal penalty from 10 years imprisonment to 20 years imprisonment. For whatever reason, Congress seems unable to enact any reform with increasing prison sentences, even though this appears to be an effort to conform the criminal penalties under the AECA to the increased penalties provide under the International Emergency Economic Powers Enhancement Act (“IEEPEA”) for violations of other export laws. Look for life imprisonment to be a penalty for false AES entries in the not-so-distant future.

Section 831 also attempts to conform civil penalties under the AECA to those enacted under IEEPEA by providing for a penalty equal to the greater of $250,000 per violation or twice the value of the export involved. But Representative Berman’s legislation doesn’t quite manage to get this right either. First, it fails to amend section 38(e), 22 U.S.C. § 2778(e) of the Arms Export Control Act which sets the maximum civil penalty at $500,000. Does this mean that a transaction valued at $1 million, and thus eligible for a $2 million penalty under the amended 38(c), is limited to a penalty of $500,000?

Worse the language of the bill, unlike the language in IEEPEA, makes the penalty payable “upon conviction.” Does that mean that the civil penalty is only available after a criminal conviction? Again, this is probably a drafting oversight, but with all the newly unemployed lawyers in town, can’t the committee hire somebody to clean up its bills?

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Copyright © 2009 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Apr

20

Canada Prosecutes Export Violation; Sun Sets in East


Posted by at 5:29 pm on April 20, 2009
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Royal Canadian MountyThe lede in the Globe and Mail story says it all:

MILTON, ONT., TORONTO — In a case that police say is without precedent, an Iranian-Canadian has been charged with trying to export technology that could have helped Tehran get the nuclear bomb it so desperately seeks.

Yes, even the Mounties admit that it is rare from them to catch someone violating the export laws and even rarer for them to prosecute them.

A 35-year-old Canadian man in Toronto, Mahmoud Yadegari, was accused of attempting to ship 10 pressure transducers to Iran. These devices are claimed to be useful in the enrichment of uranium.

The Mounties were tipped off by Setra Systems, the Massachusetts-based manufacturer of the device, after Setra received Yadegari’s order. They told the Mounties that this was an unusual purchase from an unknown purchaser in Canada. (Of course, instead of shipping the goods and calling the cops, Setra arguably should have never shipped the goods under these circumstances.)

George Webb, a Canadian counter-proliferation official, explained to the Globe and Mail why export prosecutions are so rare in Canada, and the explanation is definitely not pretty:

[Webb said] that 25 similar seizures were made in Canada last year – but these cases were never made public, as no one was ever arrested.

Canada has recently intercepted “isolation chambers, isotope splitters – everything from soup to nuts,” said Mr. Webb …. But no one could peer past the webs of domestic front companies and foreign intrigues to find the perpetrators.

[Webb said] the new case is unique, as it is the first time his officials have managed to hand over such an investigation to the Mounties for prosecution. And the perpetrators behind last year’s 25 seized shipments, the ones that didn’t result in publicity or arrests? “We don’t even know who they are,” Mr. Webb said.

This only makes sense if Canadian shippers take international packages from unknown shippers who pay cash, something that seems, well, unlikely. Otherwise, you’d think that a Mounty or two could get off their ponies long enough to figure out who in fact was shipping nuclear technology out of Canada rather than just wringing their hands about domestic front-companies and foreign intrigues.

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Apr

10

Email: A Prosecutor’s Best Friend


Posted by at 7:32 am on April 10, 2009
Category: BISChinaCriminal Penalties

Everjet
ABOVE: Everjet HQ, allegedly

According to a Department of Justice press release, a federal grand jury indicted a California man and two of his companies — Fushine Technology, Inc., a California corporation, and Everjet Science and Technology Company, which is based in the PRC — for unlicensed exports of controlled microwave equipment to China.

Export prosecutions require proof that the defendant understood that the exports in question were illegal. Since there is often little dispute as to whether the exported item required a license or that a license was not obtained, this makes this scienter element the most important and interesting element of each case. Here the press release contains allegations that, if true, might go a long way towards showing the scienter element:

The indictment further alleges that the defendants knew about the licensing restrictions and specifically sought to circumvent them. The indictment quotes from an internal company e-mail in which an Everjet employee told a Fushine employee, “Since these products are a little bit sensitive, in case the maker ask you where the location of the end user is, please do not mention it is in China.” The indictment also quotes from another e-mail in which Lu advises a subordinate to pretend that the intended end-user for an item is in Singapore rather than China.

It seems to me that recent press releases, instead of merely focusing on the allegedly grave impact of the particular export on national security, have begun to provide much more information revealing the prosecution’s case for its claims that the exporter knew the export was illegal. And often the case revolves around emails sent to and from the exporter. Back in the days when exporters and their foreign customers communicated mostly by telex finding such proof was no doubt more difficult. But now the evidence may come, as allegedly it did in this case, wrapped up in a little gift package with a nice decorative bow on top and a subject line reading “Don’t tell anybody this chip is going to China.”

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Apr

7

The Biggest Publicity Stunt Since Elvis Joined the Army


Posted by at 7:57 pm on April 7, 2009
Category: Criminal PenaltiesOFACSanctions

Robert MorgenthauNonagenarian New York prosecutor, Robert Morgenthau, still keeps trying to grab the spotlight after all these years, even if it means wasting immense amounts of New York state funds on a criminal prosecution he can’t win and which should have been brought, if at all, by federal prosecutors. I’m talking about his 118-count indictment released today against a Chinese citizen Li Fang Wei and a Chinese company LIMMT Economic and Trade Company, Ltd., both safely ensconced in China.

Notwithstanding the 59 pages of the indictment, it can all be boiled down to a few sentences. LIMMT was added to the Department of Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals (“SDN”) list in 2006. This meant that any funds destined to LIMMT which passed through the U.S. banking system would be blocked. In order to avoid this outcome, LIMMT, and its manager Li Fang Wei, told its customers, all foreign, to send U.S. dollar payments to other accounts held by LIMMT under other names or by related companies at various Chinese banks. Some of these transactions transited New York banks 118 times. The indictment claims that each of these 118 transactions constituted the falsification of business records which is a criminal offense under New York Penal Law § 175.10. And there you have, in under two minutes, all 59 pages and all 118 counts.

I think that even if your legal training consists solely in watching Law and Order marathons on cable, you can probably see a glaring flaw in the theory of the indictment. In order for a crime to have been committed, the entries that each bank made when wiring funds at the request of LIMMT’s foreign customers had to be false. But these were all the real names of real accounts held at real Chinese banks, and the indictment does not try to claim otherwise. It’s not clear, then, what was falsified, particularly in the context of a statute that appears principally directed at cooking the books — i.e., entering a wrong dollar amount in the ledger and pocketing the difference.

Beyond that, there is of course the question of the jurisdiction of New York state courts over Chinese citizens for acts that occurred in China, that were legal in China, and, even to the extent that they fostered trade with Iran, didn’t have concrete effects in the United States. Even if there were a credible theory of prescriptive jurisdiction here, hell will freeze over before China will allow the U.S. to extradite Li Fang Wei under these charges.

Finally, of course, there is the legitimate question as to why a state prosecutor, even a New York state prosecutor, is mucking around in matters of U.S. foreign policy that are more properly in the purview of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) which designated LIMMT in the first place. After all, OFAC had been blocking these attempts by LIMMT to alter its corporate identity by amending the SDN listing for LIMMT to include the aliases that are the subject of the New York state indictment. That was an appropriate response by OFAC to LIMMT’s shenanigans. I think it’s safe to say that OFAC doesn’t need, and probably doesn’t want, the efforts of a state DA and inveterate publicity hound to handle the foreign policy issues created by LIMMT’s trading activities.

What next? Is Morgenthau going to indict Syria’s Bashar al-Assad for supporting designated terrorist groups?

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Mar

26

Thursday Export Law Grab Bag


Posted by at 6:44 pm on March 26, 2009
Category: Arms ExportCriminal Penalties

Grab BagNo big news today, so it’s time for another Export Law Blog grab bag:

  • A Swiss court convicted an un-named Czech man for exporting missile-related electronic components to Iran. The man claimed he thought the components were harmless. The court really threw the book at him and fined him 5,000 Swiss francs ($4,440) and ordered 26,500 Swiss francs in profits seized. Apparently export violations in Switzerland are only slightly more serious than speeding tickets.
  • A woman that was convicted in October of exporting mobile phone equipment to Iraq right before the U.S. invasion was sentenced yesterday to 6 years in prison and order to pay a $1.1 million dollar forfeiture. The prosecution had asked for a sentence at the low end of federal sentencing guidelines, which they calculated to be around 20 years in prison. Even though the judge gave a much lower sentence, I’m sure she still wished she had been tried in Switzerland.
  • Russia earns the good citizen award for passing a law lowering the number of weapons subject to export control. The new law removes export controls from revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, submachine guns, automatic rifles, light machine guns, anti-aircraft machine guns, anti-tank guns, and mortars with a caliber of less than 100 mm.
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Copyright © 2009 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)