Archive for the ‘Criminal Penalties’ Category


Jun

27

Export Defendant Given Probation For Cooperating Against Employer


Posted by at 4:43 pm on June 27, 2011
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Hitachi JU-72According to this Law360 post (subscription required), James Larrison, a former employee of Aegis Electronic Group, was sentenced to probation for his role in the company’s export of an EAR99 Hitachi JU72 video camera junction to Iran. Larrison pleaded guilty to the export violation in December 2009. In April 2011, Aegis entered into a deferred prosecution agreement and agreed to pay a $20,000 fine to the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) in connection with this export.

Aegis and Larrison came under investigation when information relating to them was found on the laptop seized by the government from Amir Ardebili, an Iranian procurement agent. Ardebili was lured by federal agents from Iran into the former Soviet Republic of Georgia where he was arrested, whisked away to the U.S., and thrown into solitary confinement to keep him quiet while agents pursued leads they found on his laptop. This blog wrote about the Ardebili case here, here and here.

Larrison was given probation because he cooperated against his former employer and provided the government prosecutors and investigators information about the complete absence of an export compliance program at Aegis. Readers of this blog may well recall a post from a few months ago where Aegis patted itself on its back, and even gave itself a gold seal, when the company registered with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls under part 122 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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May

25

Belgian Man Arrested for Exports to Iran


Posted by at 1:08 am on May 25, 2011
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Belgium-Iran FriendshiplA superseding indictment was released last week that charged a Belgian citizen and resident with violating U.S. export laws by transshipping items from the United States to Iran through Belgium. This indictment is, in many respects, typical of the increasing prosecutions of foreigners for export activities occurring in those foreign countries. Willy A.E. De Greef is accused of taking orders from Iranian customers for helicopter and aircraft parts, sourcing those parts from U.S. suppliers, shipping the parts to Belgium and then shipping them on to Iran. Several things about the indictment, however, are interesting.

First, the indictment charges Degreef with money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956 based on the wiring of funds from Belgium to the United States to pay for the parts ultimately shipped to Iran. Of course, this doesn’t sound like the traditional notion of money laundering, but even so one part of the money laundering statute appears to cover such wire transfers even though there was no attempt to launder the money to conceal that the money represents the proceeds of a criminal activity. Section 1956(a)(2)(A) prohibits the transmission of money from outside the United States into the United States for purposes of carrying on “specified unlawful activity.” One such activity specified by the statute is violation of the export laws.

Second, the indictment also charges Degreef with wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The wire fraud charges are based on emails allegedly sent by De Greef to the U.S. suppliers in which De Greef claimed the products would not be shipped to Iran.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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May

5

U.S. Citizen Indicted For Laptop Transshipments through UAE to Iran


Posted by at 1:34 am on May 5, 2011
Category: BISCriminal Penalties

Iran LaptopNew-York based electronics wholesaler Sunrise Technologies and Trading Company (“ST&TC”) and its president Jeng “Jay” Shih have been indicted in federal court in the District of Columbia for exporting laptops to Iran by transshipping them through the UAE. The criminal complaint filed in the case provides details of the investigation leading up to the indictment of Shih and his company.

According to the criminal complaint, in April 2010, Customs seized several shipments from ST&TC destined to a freight forwarder and to a purchasing company in the UAE. Review of emails from the purchasing companies to the freight forwarders revealed that those emails were sent through an Internet service provider in Iran. An investigation of one of the freight forwarders in UAE revealed that the company regularly shipped items to Iran. In an unrelated investigation, federal investigators arrested an Iranian in the UAE involved in the transshipment of items from the U.S. to Iran. The Iranian became a cooperating witness and wore a wire in various meetings with Shih. Conversations between Shih and the cooperating witness allegedly substantiate that Shih knew the end users for his shipments were in Iran.

In order to convict Shih and ST&TC, the government will need to prove that they knew that their UAE shipments were illegal. The criminal complaint suggests that the evidence in this regard will be a 2006 “outreach visit” by the Bureau of Industry and Security’s Office of Export Enforcement to Shih and his company where the OEE special agents informed Shih that it was illegal to export items to Iran. In addition, the criminal complaint cites statements allegedly made by the cooperating witness that Shih knew that the end users were in Iran. Significantly, the criminal complaint also cites statements that suggest that Shih labored under the common misconception that the U.S. embargo on Iran did not apply to shipments to other countries even if they were destined to Iran

Finally, in the context of discussing his efforts to contest the continued detention of the shipments, SHIH stated that he would never admit to agents of the United States Government that he was sending goods to Iran even though Sunrise was supplying computers from the United States to end-users in Iran, saying in sum and substance:

So no matter what, legal procedure, whatever, you have to fight that and say I never do that . . . even if you are doing this, you are not going to admit it, right?

Which I am legally, I’m not doing directly with Iran.

(emphasis added.)

This is a problem that recurs frequently in these transshipment cases. Proving that the defendant knew that the items were ultimately destined to Iran is not proof that the defendant knew that the export to the intermediary country was illegal. If OEE is going to engage in outreach visits, it ought to make clear that these transshipment scenarios are as illegal as direct shipments to embargoed countries.

Given the frequency with which these OEE “outreach visits” are later used by the government to shore up its case of criminal intent, it might be wise, if OEE shows up for an unannounced “outreach visit,” to tell the OEE agents that you are too busy to meet. If they insist on a subsequent meeting, you might want to have your lawyer there.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

30

eBay Drone Auction Leads to Sting, Arrest


Posted by at 9:29 pm on March 30, 2011
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesUSMILUSML

Robot Attack!Henderson Chua, a resident of the Philippines who was arrested when he traveled to Los Angeles in February, was indicted on March 10 on charges that he illegally engaged in a temporary import into the United States of parts for an AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven drone without the required State Department license. Mr. Chua had listed the Raven on eBay, which had attracted the attention of undercover federal agents in both California and in Florida. Agents in both states had entered into discussions with Mr. Chua to purchase the parts.

According to the criminal complaint filed in the case, the parts consisted of the nose cone, fuselage, and the horizontal surface of the tail assembly, but not the main wing, the entire tale assembly, the battery or the ground control equipment. (Almost all of the press stories, such as this one, this one, this one, and this one incorrectly reported that the illegal temporary import involved the entire drone.)

It’s important to understand that only parts were involved because a permanent import of these parts is not illegal. Aircraft and drone parts are not listed on the United States Munitions Import List. They are, however, listed in Category VIII(h) of the United States Munitions List, which means they require a State Department license for temporary (as opposed to permanent) imports, i.e., imports which will be followed by an export back out of the United States. As you will see, this distinction between legal permanent imports and illegal temporary imports opens up some major holes in the government’s case.

The narrative in the criminal complaint shows that Mr. Chua initially entered into negotiations with the federal agents to sell them the Raven parts, which apparently he was doing on behalf of a third party who claimed to have bought them in a Philippines government auction. During the negotiations, the agents frequently and incorrectly indicated that the import of these parts into the U.S. would be illegal. At one point, Mr. Chua responds that it should not be a problem because he is only shipping “as a part not a whole unit [and] can be declared as a spare.” (Paragraph 17.) At this point the agents might have realized that a permanent import of the parts would not be illegal, so they told Chua, for the first time and the very next day, that they were buying the parts for someone in Russia and the parts would be immediately exported after they received them. (Paragraph 18.)

After hearing this, Mr. Chua and the owner of the parts wisely consulted lawyers to see if the parts could still be shipped. Based on that consultation, Chua told the undercovers that they would need a State Department license (Paragraph 29.) After repeated statements by the agents that they would not obtain a license, Chua told the agents that he could only sell the parts to them if they would sign an agreement stating:

The Buyer shall not export, re-export, or transfer directly or indirectly either by laws applicalbe in the customer’s own courntry or by laws of the United States of America to countries/companies developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to companies/persons listed under the U.S. Department of Commerce Denied List.”

(Paragraph 39.) The agents did sign such an agreement prior to the export of the parts by Chua to them. (Paragraph 42.)

As this blog has noted again and again, a criminal export violation requires knowledge by the defendant that he or she is violating the law. This is going to be tough in this case. The defendant correctly believed that he could ship the parts to the United States until the agents said that they were going to re-export the items to Russia. At that point, Chua and his seller consulted lawyers and told the undercovers they would need State Department licenses to ship the parts. When the agents declined to get licenses, Chua determined, apparently in consultation with legal counsel, that the items could only be shipped without a license if the agents agreed not to export them from the United States. Granted the advice was a bit flawed because the agreement no to re-export was limited to countries involved in developing WMD or to parties on the Department of Commerce’s Denied Parties List. But there is not a shred of evidence that Mr. Chua didn’t believe that this advice was a correct statement of U.S. law. Chua may be liable for civil penalties under the Arms Export Control Act but criminal penalties can’t be imposed without proving he knew he was relying on bad legal advice.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Mar

24

Software Engineer Caught in Export Sting Pleads Guilty


Posted by at 11:50 pm on March 24, 2011
Category: Arms ExportCriminal Penalties

satelliteNotwithstanding an apparent slip-up by undercover agents in a sting which caught a Seattle-area software engineer in a plan to export ITAR-controlled radiation-hardened semiconductor chips to China, the target of the sting, Lian Yang, pleaded guilty today to charges that he violated the Arms Export Control Act. This blog reported on this case back in December when the criminal complaint filed by the government in the case was unsealed.

The criminal complaint suggested some convincing evidence that Yang knew he was breaking the law with these proposed exports. Apparently he had contemplated effacing the part numbers on the chips. He also proposed shipping them under false invoices that concealed the names of the parts.

However, at one point the undercover agents, who were posing as the suppliers of the parts, told him that there would be a delay in shipping the parts. The delay, they said, “is with the government,” further stating that the “compliance paperwork” was “waiting to be reviewed and signed.” That certainly seems like an implication by the undercover agents that the transaction was legal and was being approved by the government, which would certainly complicate the government’s proof that Yang had the requisite criminal intent to be convicted of the crime. In the end, however, with the defendant’s guilty plea, this slip-up had no impact on the case.

The Seattle Post-Intelligencer also reported on Yang’s plea. Its online report deserves both an award for the most obnoxious online advertisement I’ve ever seen (click the link at your peril) and the worst description of the AECA I’ve ever seen. Here’s the description of the AECA:

In charging information filed Monday in U.S. District Court, federal prosecutors accuse Yang of conspiring to violate the U.S. Arms Export Control Act, which bars the sale of potentially sensitive technologies.

You have to wonder where the reporter came up with that. There is quite the difference between a statute that requires government licenses for the sale of goods and technologies versus one which “bars” the sale of those goods or technologies, not to mention that the AECA involves the sale of military items and technologies, which is not really co-extensive with “potentially sensitive technologies.” The Post-Intelligencer reporter apparently didn’t even take the time to read the Wikipedia entry on the AECA which, at least, accurately describes the act as “control[ling] the import and export of defense articles and defense services.”

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)