Archive for the ‘Criminal Penalties’ Category


May

30

PRC Citizen Arrested For Manometer Exports


Posted by at 7:12 pm on May 30, 2012
Category: BISChinaCriminal Penalties

MKS ManometerQiang Hu, a Chinese national who was sales manager at MKS Instruments Shanghai Ltd. was arrested while he visited the Shanghai company’s U.S. parent, MKS Instruments, Inc. in Andover, Massachusetts. He was arrested on charges that he illegally exported manometers, classified as ECCN 2B230, without the required licenses from the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”).

What is interesting about this case is that the items were exported to the PRC pursuant to licenses, but the licenses were allegedly for persons who were not the ultimate end-users of the exported items. According to the affidavit supporting the criminal complaint, Hu used licenses for existing customers of MKS where those licenses had remaining quantities available for exports. Additionally, Hu is alleged to have applied for new licenses for front companies and then used those to export manometers that were then diverted to a number of other end-users in the PRC. One of the alleged front companies was Shanghai Racy System Integration Co., Ltd., surely one of the best front company names ever. The affidavit alleges that “thousands” of items were exported improperly by Hu, with items worth $4.5 million going to Shanghai Racy alone.

The affidavit does not allege, with one rather odd exception, that Hu would have been unable to obtain licenses for the ultimate end users. Instead, the affidavit cites emails from Hu to his customers and co-conspirators in the PRC which suggested that he used existing licenses to service end-users in the PRC who only needed small quantities of the items on the grounds that the export process was too cumbersome and expensive for the small quantities involved.

As I noted above, there is one instance in which the affidavit tries to suggest that the end-user was problematic. This involved an export to “Parr Lab Technical Solutions” in Hong Kong which the affidavit noted was on BIS’s Unverified List. That is presumably a reference to Parrlab Technical Solutions, Ltd., which is on that list. However, licenses are not necessarily denied to parties on the unverified list. When an end-user is on that list, the exporter is simply required to engage in heightened due diligence to assure that the exported item will not be diverted to a prohibited end-use or end-user.

The DOJ press release on this case indicates that the parent company, MKS Instruments, Inc., is not a target of any investigation in this matter.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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May

17

Traveling to the United States Can Be Dangerous


Posted by at 6:15 pm on May 17, 2012
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Ulrich Davis Mugshot
ABOVE: Ulrich Davis Mugshot

On May 15, Ulrich Davis, a citizen and resident of the Netherlands, was sentenced to six months in prison and a $2,000 fine. He was charged with violating a Temporary Denial Order issued by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”).

The TDO in question was issued on October 1, 2007, against Aviation Services International, B.V., in the Netherlands, as well as affiliated and related individuals and entities in the Netherlands. Cyprus, and the UAE, and arose out of allegations that the parties subject to the TDO had shipped U.S. origin items to Iran. According to the Criminal Information, which served as the basis for Davis’s plea, Davis provided freight forwarding services involved in the export of acrylic adhesives and spray-paint coatings” from a company in the United States to an unspecified company listed on the TDO. All actions charged in the Criminal Information were undertaken by Davis entirely within the Netherlands and outside the United States.

The reason that Davis wound up being hauled in front of a U.S. federal district court and charged with violating U.S. criminal laws is that he traveled to the United States and was arrested at Newark Liberty Airport on his way back to the Netherlands from the United States. The U.S. takes the position that it has criminal jurisdiction over all persons, regardless of location and citizenship, for crimes arising out of their dealings with U.S. origin goods. This is not a position recognized by many other foreign countries, meaning that it would be unlikely that Davis could have been extradited from the Netherlands based on the actions alleged in this case, which all took place in the Netherlands and which did not violate Dutch law. But once he was in the United States — and voluntarily at that — whether he was extraditable under Dutch law was, at best, a moot point.

Moral of the story: if you live outside the United States and sell U.S. goods to Iran, postpone indefinitely any plans to visit Disneyland. (There is no indication of why Davis was in the United States. The reference to Disneyland is for illustrative purposes only.)

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

May

14

eBay Busts Soldier in Iraq for Illegal Exports


Posted by at 5:24 pm on May 14, 2012
Category: Criminal Penalties

Atilla-200A recently filed criminal complaint accuses a former U.S. soldier of using eBay to export military items he obtained while serving in Iraq. Specifically, the defendant is accused of the unlicensed export of an Atilla-200 laser aiming device to Japan. The complaint details communications between eBay and the defendant which suggests that eBay tipped off federal investigators as to the export of the Atilla-200. As is often the case with criminal export prosecutions, the central issue in the case is whether the defendant had criminal intent since there seems to be little doubt that the export occurred and that no license was obtained.

The criminal complaint details three interviews between law enforcement and the defendant. In the first interview, conducted when the defendant was entering the United States through the Miami airport, the defendant allegedly admitted that he had stolen the item in question while serving in Iraq, but denied any knowledge of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”) or its restrictions on the export of defense articles. In a second interview, conducted ten days later at the defendant’s home, he again admitted taking the item while on duty in Iraq. When asked why he had described the item in shipping documents as “used camera lens (optic),” he said that he did that as a result of instructions from the buyer and not because he was aware of ITAR restrictions on exporting the item.

Subsequently, the agents were given emails from the defendant’s Gmail account. One of these read as follows:

Sir,

Sorry late, I alrady [sic] payment.
Please check your paypal account
This
is ITAR itme[sic],If you ship,Please do not write AN PVS-14/7B or ATILLA-200
If you write invoice ex.car engine parts or car electronic parts ($100-$120)

In a third interview, conducted by telephone, the agent pointed out that the email quoted above mentioned that the ATILLA-200 was an ITAR item and instructed him to falsify the shipping documents. The defendant, according to the criminal complaint, continued to deny “that he knew what ITAR meant” and said that he had been truthful in prior interviews.

One semi-literate email from the Japanese purchaser seems a narrow thread on which to hang the required element of scienter, namely, that the defendant knew that the export was illegal. Certainly the defendant would have had a motivation to alter the shipping documents since he clearly knew that he had come into possession of the item illegally. But whether the email’s single reference to “ITAR itme” should have sent the defendant off to Wikipedia prior to shipping the item seems doubtful at best. It is equally reasonable to suppose that the defendant believed that ITAR was a garbled misspelling for some other word or was a Japanese term or any of a number of other possibilities. Indeed, if the defendant was dumb enough to list the item on eBay, it is not hard to imagine that he had no clue what the ITAR was or that the items required an export license.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

13

Does Anything Exported to the UAE Ever Stay There?


Posted by at 10:24 pm on March 13, 2012
Category: BISCriminal PenaltiesSyria

Afton, WyomingAn Afton, Wyoming man, Matt Kallgren, was sentenced, on January 23, 2012, to three years probation with the first four months in home confinement on charges that he exported EAR99 diesel truck parts to Syria. Of course, since criminal penalties weren’t enough in this case, the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) piled civil charges on top of the criminal prosecution. Now BIS has announced a settlement of the civil charges pursuant to which Kallgren agreed to a $75,000 penalty and a three-year denial order, both of which were suspended for three years provided that he commits no further export violations and complies with the terms of his criminal sentence.

According to the charging papers, Kallgren was contacted by a Syrian company in 2006 which was seeking to purchase civilian diesel engine parts. When Kallgren attempted to ship the parts, his “normal freight forwarder” (which according to this local newspaper account was UPS) told him that items couldn’t be shipped to Syria. He then used a freight forwarder recommended by the Syrian buyer to ship the parts to Syria by transshipping them through the UAE.

Miraculously Kallgren was subsequently the, er, beneficiary of an “Outreach” visit from Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agents who, allegedly, advised him on the U.S. laws prohibiting exports to embargoed destinations. (Another case which shows that the appropriate response to an “Outreach” visit is to call your lawyer.) Kallgren shipped a second order of parts via the UAE to Syria which, in a similarly miraculous fashion, were seized by Customs on their way out of the country. Allegedly, Kallgren doubled down and told Customs that the parts really were destined for the UAE. Really. I promise. Pay no attention to those commercial invoices.

Kallgren’s company Powerline Components, which shares Kallgren’s home address, also agreed to settle separate charges relating to these shipments. Under that settlement, Powerline agreed to a $60,000 fine and a three-year denial order. The denial order, but not the fine, was suspended.

Finally, in what appears to be a related case, R.I.M. Logistics agreed to a $50,000 fine to settle charges that it aided and abetted an export of EAR99 diesel parts to Syria via the UAE. Although that settlement does not mention Kallgren or Powerline, the timing and subject matter strongly suggests that these were the same exports that got Kallgren and Powerline in trouble. Interestingly, there is not a single allegation in the charging letter that it had any knowledge that the export to the UAE was ultimately destined to a customer in Syria. One might suspect that R.I.M. was the freight forwarder recommended by the Syrian customer, in which case R.I.M. might have had knowledge of the ultimate destination of the export. But without making that assumption, and based on the face of the charging documents, R.I.M. was held to be absolutely liable for its customer’s misdeeds whether or not it had any knowledge of them.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Feb

28

The iPhone Cometh


Posted by at 7:33 pm on February 28, 2012
Category: BISCriminal Penalties

Online Micro HQ
ABOVE: Online Micro HQ

Last week the Bureau of Industry and Security released Settlement Agreements it entered into with Massoud Habibion, Mohsen Motamedian, and Online Micro LLC in connection with computers exported to Iran through an intermediary in the UAE. Online Micro and Habibion agreed to suspended ten-year export denial orders with no fine. Motamedian agreed to a $50,000 fine with no denial order.

The charging papers for Mr. Habibion once again reveal the real reason for the so-called outreach visits by BIS personnel when it noted that Habibion “knew” that the exports required a license because

BIS Special Agents conducted an outreach visit to Habibion in January 2010, during which the Special Agents informed Habibion that unlicensed exports of computers to the UAE with knowledge that the ultimate destination of the items was Iran constituted a violation of the Regulations.

As I’ve said before, don’t permit BIS agents to conduct an “outreach” visit at your company without your lawyer being present because if something ever happens down the road they are going to say that they informed you it was illegal during an outreach visit. You also can politely decline outreach visits.

Of course, there’s more to this story than the BIS civil charges which were simply piled on top of criminal charges here. According to a DOJ press release, Messrs. Habibion and Motamedian pleaded guilty to criminal charges related to the export of the computers to Iran. One interesting detail sticks out in the press release. Apparently, the computers that were sent to Iran were Dell computers. When people in Iran started calling Dell on service issues, the company conducted an investigation which led back to Online Micro and its principals. Moral of this part of the story: if you’re going to sell stuff illegally to Iran, sell stuff that doesn’t break down.

But wait! There’s even more and it involves a nasty divorce, a wife seeking revenge and an iPhone. Some of the government’s evidence consisted of allegedly incriminating entries on Mr. Habibion’s iPhone. According to an unintentionally, but irresistably, amusing pleading filed by Mr. Habibion’s lawyers, the phone was grabbed from Habibion’s wife at a school function for their daughter. She told him that she had “thrown it down a canyon” so that rather than changing the password on the phone he just got a new one. Habibion’s wife then turned it over to ICE after it had been downloading Mr. Habibion’s emails while connected to WiFi. The defense also claimed that Habibion’s wife added false information that would incriminate him in the prosecution. For good measure they also claimed that the notes in the iPhone which allegedly revealed sexual philandering by Habibion with both males and females were forged by Habibion’s wife for benefit of the divorce proceedings. Second moral of this story: make sure you have a happy home life before shipping a boatload of computers to Iran.

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Copyright © 2012 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)