Archive for the ‘Criminal Penalties’ Category


Nov

5

Be Careful What You Say on LinkedIn


Posted by at 6:08 pm on November 5, 2013
Category: BISCriminal PenaltiesIran Sanctions

Nicholas Kaiga http://www.linkedin.com/in/nkaiga [Fair Use]
ABOVE: Nicholas Kaiga


According to a recently unsealed criminal complaint, a Belgian citizen, Nicholas Kaiga, has been charged with attempted unlicensed exports of export controlled aluminum tubing to Malaysia. The story recounted by the complaint begins with an order placed with a U.S. company for 7075 aluminum to be exported to a company in the UAE. Because 7075 aluminum is covered by ECCN 1C202, an export license application was filed with the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”). When BIS sent an employee to the company address in the UAE, it discovered that the address actually belonged to a different company. Worse, it belonged to a different Iranian company, so BIS denied the license.

Undeterred, the UAE company instructed that the aluminum be shipped to Belgium instead given that a license is not required to send 7075 aluminum to Belgium. Enter Mr. Kaiga and his company Industrial Metals and Commodities, which he apparently was running from his house in a residential area of Brussels. Mr. Kaiga went so far as to fill out a BIS Form 711 stating that the aluminum was destined to be resold in Belgium In cahoots with federal investigators, the U.S. company then shipped what purported to be 7075 aluminum (but was in fact a lower grade EAR99 aluminum)  to Kaiga, who then promptly shipped it to a company in Malaysia related to the Iranian company that ordered the 7075 aluminum in the first place. The shipment would have required a license both for export to Malaysia and, obviously, Iran, neither of which had been obtained.

Some time later, Mr. Kaiga made an improvident trip to New York and met with an undercover agent, whom he allegedly told that the aluminum was always intended to go to Malaysia. For good measure, Kaiga allegedly bragged to the agent about his ability to get around export controls. Then they arrested him.

An interesting footnote to all this is Mr. Kaiga’s expansive LinkedIn biography where he explains:

My overall experiences have taught me to become very flexible and adaptable to different manners of … working.

Maybe flexibility is not always such a good thing.  He also claims that one of his “specialties” is “managing high risk operations.” Not so much given the outcome of his trip to New York. He might want to change that when he gets access to a computer again in several years.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Oct

31

Lessons in Spycraft: Don’t Try This at Home


Posted by at 6:50 pm on October 31, 2013
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesDDTC

Source http://www.defenseimagery.mil/imagery.html#a=search&s=f-15&chk=6cff0&t=0&p=2&guid=76a6c050743c287abd63255e111c2a6e7a281d91 [Public Domaiin; work of federal employee]A New Jersey woman, Hannah Robert, was arraigned on Monday on charges that she exported ITAR-controlled technical drawings without a DDTC license in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. The drawings allegedly involved parts for the F-15, the Chinook helicopter and other military aircraft as well as nuclear submarines.

According to the DOJ press release, Ms. Robert used an unusual method of exporting the technical drawings to her overseas contact:

Starting in October 2010, Robert transmitted the military drawings for these parts to India by posting the technical data to the password-protected website of a Camden County, N.J., church where she was a volunteer web administrator. This was done without the knowledge of the church staff. Robert e-mailed R.P. the username and password to the church website so that R.P. could download the files from India. Through the course of the scheme, Robert uploaded thousands of technical drawings to the church website for R.P. to download in India.

A key element in any export prosecution is scienter, that is, proof that the defendant knew that his or her conduct was illegal. If these allegations are true, the prosecution is not going to have a hard time in establishing that Ms. Robert knew that she should not have sent these drawings out of the country without a license.

For espionage aficionados, this technique is known as a dead drop and in the Internet era dead drops have been done on such places as draft folders of shared Gmail accounts (viz., the love letters of General Petraeus and Paula Broadwell). It’s probably safe to say that churches, whether brick and mortar or their virtual locations, are not the best location for a dead drop. The DOJ press release doesn’t reveal how Ms. Robert got nabbed but I have a pretty clear picture of some shocked vicar stumbling on these drawings late one night and calling the feds.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Oct

7

An Iranian Skyscraper in NYC Shows a Juicy Side of Sanctions Enforcement


Posted by at 5:08 pm on October 7, 2013
Category: Criminal PenaltiesEconomic SanctionsIran SanctionsOFAC

Source http://650Fifth.com [Fair Use]

In an 82-page opinion issued last month, U.S. District Judge Katherine Forrest granted forfeiture of 650 Fifth Avenue, a 36-story building in midtown Manhattan which houses, among other posh tenants, the flagship store for Juicy Couture. The impending problems for 650 Fifth started when the former Iranian Shah Pahlavi formed a U.S. non-profit, which borrowed $42 million from Bank Melli in 1975 to retire a loan on the property at 650 Fifth and construct the building itself. (Bank Melli is wholly owned and controlled by the Iranian government.) What followed in 1979, of course, was the Iranian Revolution and, over the next decade, the Iranian government developed an ownership structure of the property and building at 650 Fifth, which resulted in, among other things, creation of U.S. entities controlled by the Iranian government to transfer rental income from 650 Fifth to Bank Melli.

The case is without question one-of-a-kind and, as such, grabbed news headlines when forfeiture was granted. It should be noted, however, that the issue of whether 650 Fifth was ever blocked property was not brought before the court even though Bank Melli’s property or interests in property in the United States were blocked beginning in 2007. Instead, the United States commenced a forfeiture action in 2008. 650 Fifth became, in effect, a blocked property via forfeiture on the grounds that, as Judge Forrest explained under U.S. forfeiture law, 650 Fifth Avenue is property that “bear[s] a substantial connection” to violations of IEEPA, namely violations of Iranian sanctions in which U.S. entities controlled by the Iranian government provided services to the Iranian government by way of the entities’ ownership and management of 650 Fifth, including collecting rental income from the building and remitting it to the Iranian government via Bank Melli.

In the case of 650 Fifth, forfeiture is quite a costly penalty with the building itself reportedly valued between $500 and $700 million, and the opinion stating that at least $75 million had been reinvested in the building by the Iranian government. Forfeiture of the building itself makes it one of the largest U.S. sanctions penalties ever.

The upshot of this decision for other circumstances that don’t include a Manhattan skyscraper owned and controlled by the Iranian government is a reminder that any violation of IEEPA-based sanctions carries with it a potentially hefty penalty in the form of forfeiture that won’t be found in OFAC’s regulations except their reference that sanctions violations “may also be subject to … other applicable law.” When considering what is at stake in a sanctions violation, property connected to the violation has to be part of the calculus, especially in circumstances where the government pursues a criminal violation and seeks a monetary penalty that requires forfeiture of such property to meet it. In an egregious case like 650 Fifth, the building itself fit the bill.

Clif adds: It is important to understand that the defendants in the case were found by the judge to have concealed the interest of Bank Melli and to have concealed the payment of the rent collected by the U.S. owners to Bank Melli.  This is why Juicy Couture, or the other tenants in the building, are unlikely to receive nastygrams from OFAC alleging that they violated the Iran sanctions through payment of their rent.   Also, because Bank Melli was not the owner of the building, but was simply receiving income from the building, the building itself would not be blocked.  Hence, forfeiture was the more viable option for the U.S. Government.  Plus, of course, the USG now owns the building and receives the rental income.  If it had been blocked, the current owners would still “own” the building while all rental income would sit in blocked accounts.

 

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Sep

12

I’m Going to Disney World!


Posted by at 11:46 pm on September 12, 2013
Category: Arms ExportCriminal Penalties

You may think of “I’m Going to Disney World!” as an iconic slogan from a Superbowl ad, but in many cases they are instead the famous last words of foreign export defendants. Consider Sergei Baltutski, a Belarusian, who said this last April before taking his family on a trip to Disney World. Problem is, Mr. Baltutski had been having fellow Belarusians in the United States ship to him in Belarus military night vision purchased from eBay, and he got nabbed at the airport on his way to see Mickey and friends. Worst. Vacation. Ever.

Baltutski pleaded guilty, and his sentencing hearing took place recently in Philadelphia. According to his lawyer, the items, approximately $700,000 worth of night vision, were simply used by Belarusian hunters to bag wild boar which, apparently, mostly run at night. Who knew there were that many wild boar, and that many hunters, in Belarus? The sentencing hearing has been deferred a few weeks to permit Baltutski’s lawyers to prepare their boar argument to counter the prosecution’s request for higher sentences based on the potential harm to national security posed by Baltutski’s exports.

One interesting detail, provided in this news report, is that Baltutski’s accomplices sent some of the night vision to him through the Belarusian diplomatic pouch. Say what? The Belarusians are permitting illegal exports of defense articles via their diplomatic pouch? It seems to me that if the government is serious about the threat of these exports, somebody needs to have a long talk with the folks at the Belarusian Embassy. The Vienna Convention probably prohibits prosecuting anyone in the Embassy, but it doesn’t prevent putting the folks involved on a plane back to Belarus

Baltutski’s case is missing from Pacer, but here’s the indictment of his co-conspirators.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Sep

5

Let Them Eat (Yellow)cake: The Effect of Stretching U.S. Sanctions Too Thin


Posted by at 10:59 pm on September 5, 2013
Category: Criminal PenaltiesEconomic SanctionsICEIran SanctionsSanctions

Yellowcake Uranium source:http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Uranium_conversion_1.jpg [Public Domain]On August 22nd, Patrick Campbell of Sierra Leone was arrested by ICE agents at JFK Airport and charged with violating the Iranian Transactions Regulations. Campbell’s arrest made global headlines because he concealed raw uranium inside shoes in his luggage. According to an affidavit attached to the criminal complaint against Campbell, he had communicated for over a year prior to his arrest with an undercover ICE agent about selling Uranium 308 (or yellowcake) from Sierra Leone to Iran. In 2013, apparently without any assistance from ICE, Campbell was able to obtain on his own a U.S. travel visa in order to meet with the agent in the United States about the sale of uranium. He was arrested after clearing U.S. Customs.

It would appear that Campbell could be charged with any number of crimes under U.S. law because of his possession of uranium and, as the AP reported last week, his travelling on a fake passport. The only offense alleged in the criminal complaint, however, is “[b]rokering the supply of goods which the defendant knew were destined and intended for supply to Iran.” The affidavit alleges that Campbell impermissibly furthered the brokering by “flying into JFK” to finalize the sale and “bringing with him a sample of Uranium [and] a contract for the sale.”

Prosecuting Campbell for violating U.S. sanctions is a case of compelling facts making shaky law. It does not appear that Campbell met, spoke or even texted with the undercover ICE agent once he entered the United States. Had he done so, a federal prosecutor would be in a much better position to show Campbell attempted to “act as broker” in the United States as required under the Regulations.

U.S. sanctions’ severe penalties are obviously enticing for law enforcement to use wherever a case could be made. But what if a foreign person is attempting to fly out of the United States to conduct business relating to Iran and has on his laptop contract documents evidencing such business? Under the logic of the Campbell complaint, the foreign person could be arrested for his attempt to leave the United States in order to conduct eventual business relating to Iran. While prosecution under such circumstances alone is unlikely, it would not seem so unlikely after the Campbell case for the government to prosecute someone under such circumstances if the foreign person faced other charges and sanctions violations carried the largest penalty.

The United States has been recently expanding its reach over foreign persons’ dealings with Iran, most notably foreign subsidiaries of U.S. parent companies. As the stretch of sanctions includes more foreign individuals and their subsequent imprisonment, the United States may find itself retreating from expanding prosecution after a successful defense or even international criticism that U.S. sanctions as so applied are too attenuated for a reasonable interpretation of the sanctions’ purpose or the laws themselves.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)