Prosecutions for violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”) might kindly be thought of as press ops for prosecutors and catnip for reporters. And the recent indictment of Maria Butina certainly fits that description: Spies! Sex! Twitter exchanges! Red Sparrow! A duped “boyfriend”!!! Sell me the movie rights now.
On the other hand, economic sanctions prosecutions are boring. Specially Designated Nationals . . . yawn. The International Emergency Economic Powers Act . . . big yawn.
But the, ahem, sex appeal of a FARA case as opposed to an IEEPA case may well be a possible explanation for why Butina was indicted under FARA rather than under IEEPA for having performed services in the United States on behalf of a Russian SDN. It seems to me that the FARA case has some significant difficulties whereas the IEEPA case approaches being a slam dunk.
To simplify matters somewhat, to prosecute Butina for failing to register as a foreign agent, the government needs to prove that she engaged in political activities on behalf of a foreign person in the United States.  The Act defines “political activities” as
any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.
But the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint against Butina, which provides the most detailed statement of the government’s case, summarizes Butina’s activities in the United States as follows:
BUTINA’s efforts in the United States to promote the political interests of the Russian Federation were diverse and multifaceted, including BUTINA’s efforts to organize a series of”friendship and dialogue” dinners, some of which are believed to have taken place in the District of Columbia, as well as BUTINA’s attendance at two National Prayer Breakfasts in the District of Columbia.
It certainly seems to me that going to two prayer breakfasts and arranging dinners probably don’t constitute “political activities.” But perhaps the government thinks that if it can put a Russian in the dock and yell “Spy!” enough times, the jury won’t be bothered with such legal niceties as the proper outlines of “political activities” under the law.
On the other hand, the criminal complaint provides detailed information on Butina’s interactions with her handler in Moscow, who was not named, but is almost certainly Alexander Torshin. Torshin was placed on OFAC’s SDN List on April 6, 2018. To prove a violation of the Ukraine sanctions, it would only be necessary to show that Butina provided  “funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of” Torshin. The definition of providing services is, of course, significantly broader than the definition of “political activities” in FARA.
Now although the actions in the criminal complaint pre-date Torshin’s designation in April 2018, there is no reason to believe that Butina was not continuing to act on Torshin’s behalf after his designation.  The complaint details actions by Butina in cooperation with Torshin as late February 8, 2017. Of course, there is a chance that government has no evidence after the designation or has reasons not to reveal such evidence, but I still think that a sanctions case, if there were services performed after April 6, 2018, would be a much easier case to win.