Archive for the ‘Criminal Penalties’ Category


Sep

24

Gun Smuggler Gets 51 Month Library Fine for Overdue Guns


Posted by at 6:18 pm on September 24, 2018
Category: Arms ExportCriminal Penalties

title=So, if you and I went to the Haskell Free Library and Opera House, half of which is in Derby Line, Vermont, and the other half of which is in Stanstead, Québec, we would think of it as a clever gimmick designed to attract tourists to boring little towns with little else to offer. But, were you and I genius criminals, we would see it as a venue for the perfect crime.

Here’s why. If you’re from Canada, you park in Canada, and you can walk to the only entrance on the U.S. side without clearing Canadian or U.S customs. And it’s the same thing on the way out if you go straight back to your car in the parking lot in Canada. So, this brilliant criminal gang cooked up the plan to buy guns in the United States and then leave them in a backpack in the library’s bathroom. Then the Canadian gang member would later retrieve the guns and take them back to Canada without ever having to worry about U.S. or Canadian Customs. Brilliant! Foolproof! Genius!

Of course, never underestimate cops in funny hats and red coats who ride around on horses. They’re much smarter than they appear. A joint operation nabbed the Canadian charged with retrieving the gun-filled backpack from the library’s men’s room. That Canadian, Alex Vlachos, was just sentenced to 51 months in U.S. prison for his role in the transnational library smuggling scheme. He will be given credit for the 43 months he spent in U.S. prison after being extradited to the United States. Do you think he spent much time in the prison library?

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Jul

25

Tinker, Tailor, Dinner Planner, Spy


Posted by at 3:44 pm on July 25, 2018
Category: Criminal PenaltiesFARAOFACRussia DesignationsRussia Sanctions

Vladimir Putin via http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/27394 [Fair Use]Prosecutions for violations of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”) might kindly be thought of as press ops for prosecutors and catnip for reporters.  And the recent indictment of Maria Butina certainly fits that description:  Spies!  Sex!  Twitter exchanges!  Red Sparrow!  A duped “boyfriend”!!!  Sell me the movie rights now.

On the other hand, economic sanctions prosecutions are boring.  Specially Designated Nationals . . . yawn.  The International Emergency Economic Powers Act . . . big yawn.

But the, ahem, sex appeal of a FARA case as opposed to an IEEPA case may well be a possible explanation for why Butina was indicted under FARA rather than under IEEPA for having performed services in the United States on behalf of a Russian SDN.  It seems to me that the FARA case has some significant difficulties whereas the IEEPA case approaches being a slam dunk.

To simplify matters somewhat, to prosecute Butina for failing to register as a foreign agent, the government needs to prove that she engaged in political activities on behalf of a foreign person in the United States.   The Act defines “political activities” as

any activity that the person engaging in believes will, or that the person intends to, in any way influence any agency or official of the Government of the United States or any section of the public within the United States with reference to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party.

But the affidavit in support of the criminal complaint against Butina, which provides the most detailed statement of the government’s case, summarizes Butina’s activities in the United States as follows:

BUTINA’s efforts in the United States to promote the political interests of the Russian Federation were diverse and multifaceted, including BUTINA’s efforts to organize a series of”friendship and dialogue” dinners, some of which are believed to have taken place in the District of Columbia, as well as BUTINA’s attendance at two National Prayer Breakfasts in the District of Columbia.

It certainly seems to me that going to two prayer breakfasts and arranging dinners probably don’t constitute “political activities.”  But perhaps the government thinks that if it can put a Russian in the dock and yell “Spy!” enough times, the jury won’t be bothered with such legal niceties as the proper outlines of “political activities” under the law.

On the other hand, the criminal complaint provides detailed information on Butina’s interactions with her handler in Moscow, who was not named, but is almost certainly Alexander Torshin.  Torshin was placed on OFAC’s SDN List on April 6, 2018.  To prove a violation of the Ukraine sanctions, it would only be necessary to show that Butina provided  “funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of” Torshin.  The definition of providing services is, of course, significantly broader than the definition of “political activities” in FARA.

Now although the actions in the criminal complaint pre-date Torshin’s designation in April 2018, there is no reason to believe that Butina was not continuing to act on Torshin’s behalf after his designation.   The complaint details actions by Butina in cooperation with Torshin as late February 8, 2017. Of course, there is a chance that government has no evidence after the designation or has reasons not to reveal such evidence, but I still think that a sanctions case, if there were services performed after April 6, 2018, would be a much easier case to win.

 

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Apr

11

Cuba Export Indictment Mangles U.S. Export Laws


Posted by at 6:27 pm on April 11, 2018
Category: BISCriminal PenaltiesCuba Sanctions

Image via https://pixabay.com/p-1202440/?no_redirect [Public Domain]Last week Bryan Singer, a Texas resident, was indicted for attempting to export to Cuba certain items that U.S. Customs found on his boat in a harbor in the Florida keys. The items are involved are Ubiquiti Nanostation M2 modems classified as 5A002, TP Link modems classified as 5A992 and cable box circuit boards classified as EAR99. The brief indictment states that Singer did not obtain a license from “DOC or OFAC” to export these items to Cuba. It also notes that he failed to file an Electronic Export Information covering the export of these items.

There is supposed to be an adult at the Export Enforcement Coordination Center who reviews these export indictments, but that would appear not to be the case. To begin with, two of the items mentioned in the indictment, the TP Link Modems and the cable box circuit boards, were eligible for license exceptions and would not have needed licenses. The TP Link modems are a no brainer and are clearly covered by BIS License Exception CCD. The EAR99 cable circuit boards if they went to private companies or private individuals probably were eligible for export under License Exception SCP. Mr. Singer says in press reports that he was relying on that exemption, and nothing in the indictment alleges that the intended export did not qualify for License Exception SCP.

So that leaves the 5A002 Ubiquiti modems, which would not have been eligible under either License Exception CCD or License Exception SCP. Of course, when the government itself does not understand the export laws (witness including the TP Link modem in the indictment), it is hard for it to establish that Singer had criminal intent when he apparently thought, albeit incorrectly, that he could send the Ubiquiti modem to private individuals in Cuba.

The indictment’s efforts to cobble together a violation due to the failure to file an EEI are equally unavailing. No allegation is made, or proof offered, that items with the same Schedule B number in the shipment had a total value of $2500 or more. Under section 30.37(a) of the Foreign Trade Regulations no EEI was required if that were not the case. And it seems clear that these values weren’t met. The Ubiquiti and TP Link modems share the same schedule B number (8517.62), but given that the Ubiquiti modem retails for 50 bucks and the TP Modems were probably close to that, we would be talking about 50 or more of them needed before an EEI was required. And it’s hard to imagine that the cable circuit boards, which would have a different Schedule B number, were worth more than $2500. So, once again, if the AUSA who signed this indictment can’t figure out the law, how can he criminally prosecute Mr. Singer for not understanding it?

UPDATE: A reader notes in the comments below:

On the EEI issue, section 30.37(a) has no bearing on shipments to Cuba, as it’s in Country Group E:2. The only exceptions that apply are those in section 30.37(y). If none of those apply, then an EEI filing is required under section 30.16(d).

The FTR is poorly drafted here, so I’m not sure I agree. Section 30.7(a) does not say anything like “except as otherwise provided in 30.7(y).” Nor does section 30.7(y), which sets forth certain conditions where exports to E:2 countries do not require an EEI filing, state that these are the only situations where an EEI filing is not required, notwithstanding other exceptions set forth in section 30.7. I admit that the reader’s interpretation is one possible interpretation, but certainly give the plain language of 30.7(a) which does not limit its application creates too much ambiguity to support a criminal prosecution. Additionally, if the CCD-eligible items qualified under License Exception GFT, which is possible here, even 30.7(y) by its own terms would not be relevant.

The EAR, in section 758.1 is clearer about the $2500 threshhold not applying to Cuba, although that provision is not cited by the indictment, which only cites 30.37 of the FTR.  But that section doesn’t alter the availability of an EEI exemption for exports to Cuba of CCD items made under the GFT exception.

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Mar

27

Indictment of Iranian over Housing Project in Venezuela Raises Questions


Posted by at 9:49 am on March 27, 2018
Category: Criminal PenaltiesIran SanctionsOFAC

Ali Sadr Hasheminejad via http://www.prweb.com/releases/2017/07/prweb14531762.htm [Fair Use]
ABOVE: Ali Sadr Hasheminejad

Last week, Iranian national Ali Sadr Hasheminejad was arrested at Dulles Airport outside Washington DC in connection with a Venezuelan housing construction project undertaken by his family’s business in Iran. According to the indictment, the governments of Venezuela and Iran in 2005 agreed that Iran would cooperate in the building of new housing in Venezuela. Under the agreement, the parties would sign “commercial contracts” to complete the project. Thereafter, the Stratus Group, a private Iranian conglomerate, assumed the construction project.

Stratus incorporated Iranian International Housing Corporation (“IIHC”), an Iranian company which was responsible for carrying out and completing the housing project in Venezuela. IIHC then entered into an agreement with a Venezuelan company to construct the housing for $475,000,000 dollars. Mr. Hasheminejad, the defendant, was a member of the family that controlled the Stratus Group and its subsidiary IIHC.  He was responsible for overseeing the projects finances. Pursuant to Mr. Hasheminejad’s direction, the Venezuelan company transferred funds to IIHC to pay for the project. These funds, because they were to be in US Dollars, transited various unnamed banks in New York. As a result, the indictment alleges that Mr. Hasheminejad caused these banks to export financial services from the United States to Iran in violation of the Iran Transactions and Sanctions Regulations.

For reasons that are not entirely clear, the indictment does not provide any information as to where those wire funds ended up. As IIHC was engaged in a construction project in Venezuela it seems likely, indeed almost certain, that it had accounts in Venezuela and the funds in question were wired to that Venezuelan account so that materials and labor costs for the housing project could be met. There is no reason to believe that the Venezuelan company wired funds to Iran for the Venezuelan project and the indictment never even alleges that this happened.

The destination of the funds is a crucial piece of information. The Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (“ITSR”) prohibit exporting financial services (e.g. transferring funds) from the United States “to Iran or the Government of Iran.” The wire transactions at issue allegedly caused the U.S. banks to provide financial services, according to the indictment, “to Iran.” But, as those familiar with the ITSR know, the transfer to funds to an Iranian company or individual outside Iran is not a transfer of those funds “to Iran” and is not a violation of those rules. If the funds at issue went ultimately, as it seems they must have, to an IIHC account in Venezuela there would be no violation. Yet the indictment, in tracing the funds transfers, stops at bank accounts in the British Virgin Islands with the exception of some funds that went to the United States to buy property in California.

Perhaps the prosecution does have evidence that some of this money wound up in Iran but, if it does, it oddly chose to leave it out and instead wound up presenting an indictment that does not adequately allege a violation of law.

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Feb

21

Oxycodone, Testosterone, Night Vision and eBay Do Not Mix


Posted by at 5:17 pm on February 21, 2018
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDDTCNight Vision

SkeetIR Micro Mono Sight via https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/product/oasys-thermal-imaging-and-aiming#ske[Fair Use]Last week a criminal indictment against Arkansas resident Scott Douglas Browning was unsealed after he was arrested on a number of charges including receiving property stolen from Fort Bragg, possessing testosterone and oxycodone, and exporting image intensification tubes and a thermal imaging monocular (pictured at left) to the Netherlands without a license.  According to the indictment, Browning listed the items on eBay and sold them to a buyer or buyers in the Netherlands. The items were all allegedly listed on the USML and would have required a license from DDTC.

I’ve said so many times that it almost goes without saying, but the Government, in order to convict Browning on the export charges, must prove that he knew that the export of these items required prior authorization and were illegal without such an authorization. We’ll leave aside what someone tweaked out on testosterone and whacked out on oxycodone would know about the legality of his exports. Still, it seems likely, at least to me, that this is going to an uphill battle for the prosecution. It’s not like the guys who stole the stuff from Fort Bragg gave it to him with a warning that the items were export controlled. And it’s not like the guy was trying to sell this stuff in secret. He listed the items on eBay after all. Last time I checked, that wasn’t exactly a dark web site. And although the indictment is sparse on details, there is nothing to suggest that any of the normal indicia of a guilty conscience — false description of the item on shipping documents, confessions of guilt to undercover agents, etc. — are present here.  Of course, the export charges may be the least of his worries here.

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Copyright © 2018 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)