ABOVE: Berkut 360 kit plane

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The Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) released a final order today denying export privileges to Ali Asghar Manzarpour for twenty years. The denial order is premised on allegations by BIS that Manzarpour attempted to export a single-engine aircraft to Iran on April 28, 2004, by exporting it to the U.K. and then ordering a freight forwarding company to re-export it to Iran.

Manzarpour never responded to BIS’s Charging Letter, and so a default order was entered by the BIS Administrative Law Judge. Most of the ALJ’s decision dealt with which one of the various attempts by BIS to serve the charging letter was sufficient to support a default order. Ultimately the ALJ relied on a registered letter sent to an alternate address for Manzarpour in Brighton, England, that was returned as “refused.”

The BIS documents don’t tell much about the considerably more interesting story of Mr. Manzapour’s export of the single-engine aircraft, but at least part of that story can be found in other sources, including a BBC radio interview with Mr. Manzarpour. The saga began when Polish authorities detained Mr. Manzarpour on February 17, 2005, based on the export of the aircraft from the U.S and at the request of Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Mr. Manzarpour was immediately placed in Polish custody pending an extradition motion from the U.S. On February 24, 2005, a grand jury in the District of Columbia indicted Manzarpour for violating the U.S. sanctions imposed on Iran.

According to the BBC interview with Manzarpour, the aircraft involved was a Berkut 360 kit plane — i.e., a small aircraft sold unassembled to aviation enthusiasts. (The U.S. asserts that these planes can be easily converted to military unmanned aircraft). Manzarpour also says that he obtained a license from the U.K. Export Control Organisation authorizing the export.

In all events, after Mr. Manzapour spent 22 months in a Polish prison, the Polish appeals court denied the U.S. request for extradition, apparently on the basis that the export of the Berkut 360 wasn’t a crime under Polish law. As a result, Mr. Manzarpour was, in December 2006, returned to the U.K.

Thereafter, in July 2007, after the U.S failed in its effort to bring Manzarpour to the U.S. for criminal prosecution, BIS issued the charging letter that led to the denial of Manzarpour’s export privileges. That’s what should have been done in the first place rather than wasting U.S. resources in a futile attempt to prosecute a foreign national for violation of unilateral U.S. sanctions on foreign soil.

The Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) released today an order changing the address of Mohammad Fazeli on the Denied Persons List. Mr. Fazeli had been convicted of an attempt to export pressure sensors to Iran and was sentenced to one year and a day in jail. He was released in July 2007

Normally such an order wouldn’t merit a blog post, but something about it caught my attention. One of the addresses being corrected was this: “1439 Saltair Fazeli Ave., Los Angeles.” Hmmm. That’s cool. Mr. Fazeli was living on a street in Los Angeles that bore his surname. What a lucky guy. Or not.

If you put that address into Google Maps, you’ll find it doesn’t exist. There is a 1439 South Saltair Ave., but that’s as close as it gets. So, when the BIS order says that the 1439 Saltair Fazeli Avenue address is “no longer correct,” that’s a bit of a stretch. It was never correct.

So where in the world is Mohammad Fazeli now? According to the order he’s at 545 South Atlantic Blvd, #C, Los Angeles. Of course, since the “Saltair Fazeli” address was wrong, I couldn’t help but go back to Google Maps and check out 545 South Atlantic Boulevard. And what did we find? This:

Yep, a used car dealership called Bingo Motors. Is apartment # C perhaps one of the cars on the lot? Or maybe Mr. Fazeli is living in St. Alphonsus Catholic Church directly across the street at 532 South Atlantic Boulevard.

I suspect we’ll see Mr. Fazeli staying one step ahead of BIS, even after the next address correction for him. And, as a compliance note, be very careful if you’re doing business with anyone named Mohammad Fazeli at any address in Los Angeles or elsewhere.

UPDATE: Not surprisingly, this post (like any other post critical of something BIS has done) attracted our resident BIS troll. He stopped by to fuss about the practice on this blog of referring to “BIS ALJs.” He seems somewhat fixated on this, due apparently to an idiosyncratic notion that because these ALJs are not paid by BIS (but rather by the Coast Guard), they can’t be BIS ALJs, even though they are assigned to BIS cases. It’s rather like complaining about calling someone Joe Smith’s attorney when Mr. Smith is court appointed and paid by the Court and not by Smith. Oh well.

Needless to say, the troll stomps his foot loudly and spews lots of smoke and exclamation points when his comments don’t make it through moderation. Well, here’s an offer to our cowardly troll: leave a real work email address in the comment form (as opposed to your ususal “[email protected]”) and your comments will sail through moderation in a heartbeat. Then you can complain about my referring to “BIS ALJs” to your heart’s content. I’m not holding my breath.

UPDATE 2: The troll took the bait left in the first update and returned to continue his/her rant about “BIS ALJs.” But, as predicted, the troll is still too much of a coward to identify himself/herself, so, sadly, I won’t be able to share with you the troll’s further gems of wisdom on this issue.

A recent story in the New York Times reveals that the Bureau of Industry and Security is drafting new rules relative to exports of crime control equipment to China. The revision has been prompted by the desire of U.S. companies to sell face-recognition software and hardware to China as anti-terrorism measures in advance of the Olympics in Beijing.

E. Richard Mills, speaking for BIS, said it was unclear whether the regulations would have the overall effect of tightening or loosening export controls. He noted that BIS’s review of the relevant export regulations reflected a general effort at the agency to make sure that all export controls were up to date. Finally he noted that the agency would take into account availability of similar crime control products from non-U.S. sources.

As aficionados of crime control items will no doubt already know, the Commodity Control List includes under the crime control category, and regulates the export of, such whimsical items as straight-jackets, thumbscrews, thumb-cuffs, cattle prods and mind-reading, er, polygraph devices. Needless to say all such items are readily available from many sources outside the United States, leading one to wonder whether perhaps they will be dropped from the CCL in this round of revisions.