Archive for the ‘BIS’ Category


Oct

19

Unguided Missile Attacks


Posted by at 3:04 pm on October 19, 2009
Category: BISDDTCMTCR

Bill Gertz's ScreamA headline in last Thursday’s Washington Times portentously warned: “EXCLUSIVE: Obama loosens missile technology controls to China.” The sub-head was “Fulfill Your Final Wishes. Nuclear Apocalypse Expected Tomorrow!!” Well, not really, that wasn’t the actual subhead, but it could have been, given the stern warnings in the article about the supposed dangers of the White House’s actions.

The reason for the doomsday tone was likely that the Washington Times reporter Bill Gertz wrote a story about something that he didn’t really know anything about. Indeed, he probably would have had a better chance of writing an accurate story if he had reported instead on, say, aspectual features of the verb and the relative position of the locatives in Mandarin Chinese.

Let’s roll the tape:

President Obama recently shifted authority for approving sales to China of missile and space technology from the White House to the Commerce Department — a move critics say will loosen export controls and potentially benefit Chinese missile development.

About the only thing in that sentence that is true is the phrase “critics say,” the rest being sadly misinformed. Items on the Missile Technology Control Regime (“MTCR”) are, depending upon whether the MTCR item is on the United States Munitions List (“USML”) or the Commerce Control List (“CCL”), licensed either by the Department of State’s Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) or the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”). Items on the USML are licensed by DDTC and are subject to the embargo in section 126.1 of the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (“ITAR”), meaning, of course, that none of these items will be approved for export to the PRC. Items on the CCL are licensed by BIS and those license are considered on a case-by-case basis by BIS. Nothing in the bemoaned action by the Obama administration changed any of that or shifted any licensing authority over MTCR items from State to Commerce

The action that the Washington Times is referring to is a Presidential Determination made on September 29 that delegated to the Commerce Department the President’s obligation to certify to Congress under section 1512 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1999, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 note, that exports to China of missile and space technology won’t be detrimental to the U.S. space industry or measurably improve the missile or space launch capabilities of the PRC. This is a certification that is made after DDTC or BIS has already approved the export, so the White House action here didn’t shift the authority to approve at all.

Nor did the White House’s action shift, as a practical matter, the obligation over section 1512 certifications from State to Commerce. Given the embargo on shipping USML items to China, the only MTCR items being exported now are items that have already received an export license from BIS. As a result, any section 1512 certifications made by the White House on those exports were undoubtedly made in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and, no doubt, highly influenced by the findings by BIS and the Secretary of Commerce made in order to justify the export of the MTCR items to China. The White House delegation is really nothing more than a formal delegation of what already had been effectively delegated to Commerce prior to the September 29 Presidential Determination. Suggestions that this change is effective to handing over U.S. nuclear missile technology to Beijing are, simply put, crazy talk, more likely informed by the Washington Times‘s political agenda than by any actual understanding of export law.

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Copyright © 2009 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Oct

1

Can Locke Unlock the Grip of U.S. Export Controls?


Posted by at 8:33 pm on October 1, 2009
Category: BISWassenaar

Commerce Secretary Gary LockeAt today’s Update Conference in Washington, D.C., Commerce Secretary Gary Locke announced a sweeping vision for reform of U.S. export laws:

First, we should consider eliminating certain dual-use export license requirements for allies and partner nations — consistent with statutory and international obligations.

Of course, the rub here is what is meant by “consistent with . . . international obligations”? Obviously, this is a reference to the Wassenaar Arrangement, under which the United States has agreed to impose export controls on items on the “Lists of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies” made a part of that arrangement. But, as made clear in the 2006 “Best Practices Guidelines for the Licensing of Items on the Basic List and Sensitive List of Dual-Use Goods and Technologies,” members of the Arrangement are free to establish general licenses or license exceptions which permit the unlimited export of specified goods on the lists to specified destinations. The Guidelines, however, state that the member state should still require companies exporting under those general licenses or license exceptions to keep sufficient records of these exports to permit verification that any terms and conditions of the general licenses or license exceptions have been complied with.

Second, I’ve asked BIS to explore implementing a fast-track process for the review of dual-use export licenses for other key countries that do not pose a significant threat and have a strong history of export control compliance.

This is a laudable goal in theory that may be difficult to achieve in practice. Often the imposition of tighter deadlines for licensing decisions results in more applications being returned without action for minor errors — errors that would previously have been ignored — just so that the licensing officer can stay within the required time frame. That certainly seems to have been the result of the shortened processing guidelines for commodity jurisdiction requests filed with the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls.

And, of course we will continue to scour the Export Administration Regulations and de-list those items and technologies that no longer pose a threat to national security.

Here the Wassenaar Arrangement may prove to be somewhat more of an obstacle. Under the Arrangement, the United States is obligated to control the export of items on the Wassenaar Lists and the overwhelming number of commodities on the Commerce Control List (“CCL”) are also on the Wassenaar Lists. The United States can only really remove those common items from the CCL if it convinces other Wassenaar members to remove the same items from the Wassenaar lists at one of the plenary sessions held under the Arrangement.

Of course, there are all those items in Category 0 of the CCL that aren’t on the Wassenaar Lists, so we can look forward, perhaps, to the immediate removal of “horses by sea” (ECCN 0A980) and “plastic handcuffs” (ECCN 0A982), otherwise known as plastic cable ties, from the CCL.

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Copyright © 2009 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Sep

24

The Firefox in the Win House?


Posted by at 7:55 pm on September 24, 2009
Category: BISIran SanctionsOFAC

firefox_iranLast week an obviously confused reporter at internetnews.com reported what he thought were the details of a letter from the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) received by Mozilla, the open-source project responsible for Firefox, Thunderbird and other Internet applications, relating to downloads of the program by computer users in Iran. The article seemed to suggest that Mozilla had filed a voluntary disclosure with BIS that it had allowed downloads of its open-source encryption source code by Iranians. The article seemed to suggest further that Mozilla had received a letter from BIS stating that this was not a violation.

But that’s not what happened. BIS released yesterday an Advisory Opinion that, although identifying details have been removed, clearly addresses the situation described in the internetnews.com article. And, significantly, the advisory opinion doesn’t address exports of source code but instead addresses export of compiled source code and, specifically, compiled source code including mass market encryption software. Under section 746.7(a)(1) of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) exports of compiled mass market encryption software (or any other compiled encryption software) to Iran would require a BIS license. The Advisory Opinion held that as long as the IP address of the party downloading the software in Iran (or other sanctioned country) was logged by Mozilla’s server but not otherwise used by Mozilla (say, for example, to serve to the user a web page in Farsi), the company did not have sufficient knowledge of an export of encryption software to Iran to be liable under the regulations.

Even though I don’t believe that, as a matter of policy, downloads of web browsers with encryption features ought to be subject to export controls, the reasoning of the Advisory Opinion is, to say the least, a bit odd. It seems fairly well-established that knowledge is not a required to establish a violation of the EAR. Specifically, section 764.2(a), which defines violations of the EAR, doesn’t contain a knowledge requirement, nor does General Prohibition No. 1 which would be the predicate to a violation of section 764.2(a). Perhaps this signals a retreat by BIS from its traditional concept of strict liability for violations of the EAR.

Even so, the final sentence of the Advisory Opinion may nullify, as a practical matter, any significance the opinion may have with respect to software downloads in sanctioned countries:

Please note that this advisory opinion is confined to interpretation of the EAR, and does not address the sanctions regulations implemented by the Office of Foreign Assets Control [“OFAC”]

And, as we all know, other major software companies, such as Google and Microsoft, have prohibited downloads in sanctioned countries due to fears of OFAC penalties.

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Copyright © 2009 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Sep

17

BIS Fines U.S. Firm For Having Foreign Subsidiaries


Posted by at 7:26 am on September 17, 2009
Category: BIS

Thermon ManufacturingTwo weeks ago, we reported on a $14,613.24 fine imposed by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) on Thermon Manufacturing after Thermon voluntarily disclosed to the agency that it had shipped heat-tracing equipment to Sudan in violation of the U.S. embargo on that country. That was not the end of the story, however, but rather merely the foreword to a more disturbing story.

Yesterday, BIS posted a press release on its website describing the rest of the tale. According to that press release, BIS fined five foreign subsidiaries of Thermon $176,000 because those subsidiaries had also exported heat-tracing equipment to “Iran, Syria, Libya and listed entities in India.” This violations had also been voluntarily disclosed by the parent company in Texas.

What makes this fine problematic is the following statement in the press release:

The Thermon subsidiaries did not inform Thermon Manufacturing of the ultimate destinations for the items and had been informed by Thermon Manufacturing in February 2005 that “products manufactured by Thermon US may not be sold to countries on the US trade sanctions list,” including specifically Iran, Syria and Libya. BIS alleged that the affiliates acted with knowledge of those violations involving shipments to sanctioned countries that occurred after this warning.

First, one has to wonder what else Thermon was supposed to do. Thermon had instructed its subsidiaries not to violate U.S. export laws, and specifically that they could not sell equipment to countries subject to U.S. economic sanctions. It also appears from the press release that the subsidiaries pulled the wool over the parent company’s eyes and placed orders for the equipment at issue without telling the U.S. parent that the equipment was destined for sanctioned countries. And although the fines were imposed on the subsidiaries rather than the parent, this is just an accounting nicety. Thermon ultimately pays this fine.

In essence, this fine is nothing more than a penalty imposed on U.S. companies for having foreign subsidiaries unless and until BIS provides industry some guidance as to how to avoid such fines other than simply shutting down foreign subsidiaries. Was the problem here that the instructions by the parent to the subsidiaries about exports to sanctioned countries weren’t frequent enough? Or was it that the parent didn’t threaten to guillotine any employees of the foreign subsidiaries who violated these rules? Perhaps BIS thought that these instructions should have been bilingual. Your guess is as good as mine at this point.

Second, and this is an even bigger irony of the case, the parent’s instructions to the subsidiaries appear to have made things worse for the parent. It was because of those instruction that BIS elevated the penalty through charging that these were “acting with knowledge” violations under section 764.2(e) of the Export Administration Regulations. Damned if you do, damned if you don’t, as they say.

The charging documents haven’t been released by BIS yet. Perhaps they will shed more light on this sorry situation.

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Copyright © 2009 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Sep

14

New BIS Rules Stretch U.S. Jurisdiction To The Breaking Point


Posted by at 7:15 pm on September 14, 2009
Category: BIS

Do What I Say!In an ambitious display of extraterritorial overreach, the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) last week amended the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”) to expand the scope of the regulations to cover in-country transfers to companies and individuals on the agency’s Entity List.

Most readers should be familiar with that list, but for those that may not be, the Entity List is a list of several hundred, well, entities in foreign countries. The companies and individuals have been placed on the list because of the U.S. government’s concern about their activities in nuclear proliferation, missile technology, chemical warfare agent development or other areas of foreign policy concern. The result of an Entity List designation is to require licenses for the export or re-export of specified items to the designated entity. In most cases the list indicates that the items which require licensing are “all items subject to the EAR,” which is BIS-ese for items with specified amounts of U.S. content. These need not be sensitive dual-use items listed on the Commerce Control List but include, for example, a U.S. flag (assuming it wasn’t made in China). And in most cases the Entity List indicates that there is a presumption of denial for license requests.

Under the new rules, a license would be required not only for exports of an item from the United States to the designated “entity” or exports of the item from a foreign country to the entity (“re-exports”) but also for in-country transfers to the designated entity. To understand the impact of the amendment, consider this example. The first entity on the list is one Ali Bakshien, a resident of Toronto, Canada. Ali’s mother goes to the American Apparel Store on College Street in Toronto and buys some trendy, and American-made, shirts, underwear and socks as a birthday gift for Ali. Unless she asks BIS for permission to give these shirts, socks and briefs to Ali, she becomes subject to a civil penalty of $250,000 under U.S. law when gives Ali his birthday present. And, if she knew that Ali was on the Entity List and knew that prohibited the unlicensed birthday present to Ali, did she commit a felony in giving him the items?

So what is BIS going to do? Send Ali’s mother a charging letter? If BIS thinks Ali’s mom knew about the Entity List designation and the in-country transfer restrictions, is it going to have the Department of Justice request extradition? (You don’t have to have a very vivid imagination to figure out what Canada’s likely response would be to an extradition petition in this situation, particularly if you picture a pounding hammer and a box of sand.) Will they arrest her at JFK if she takes a trip to catch a few Broadway shows?

Needless to say, I don’t believe the U.S. has jurisdiction, either under international or U.S. law, over this conduct simply because it involved a t-shirt made in LA shipped by the manufacturer to Canada where it was then bought and given to another Canadian. But U.S. export agencies — DDTC included — have continued to insist that jurisdiction can be hung on such a weak thread. And this recent amendment of the entity list rules continues down this misguided path.

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Copyright © 2009 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)