Archive for the ‘BIS’ Category


Aug

2

What One Hand Giveth, the Other Taketh Away


Posted by at 9:51 pm on August 2, 2010
Category: BISExport Reform

Kevin Wolf
ABOVE: Kevin Wolf

Today’s edition of the Washington Tariff & Trade Letter has an article (paid subscription required) reporting on the July 27 meeting of the Sensors and Instrumentation Technical Advisory Committee of the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”). At that meeting, Assistant Secretary of BIS, Kevin Wolf had this to say to the committee members:

To the extent that something today, tomorrow or after the reforms no longer requires authorization for export when it did previously, that will come with a price associated with it

That price, according to Wolf, could be “reexport controls or notification.” Obviously BIS has legitimate concerns about diversion of a product from a country on its “nice” list to a country on the agency’s “naughty” list.

However, the ability of the agency to exercise control over U.S.-origin items that can be legally exported without a license is open to some question. Certainly a foreign court would raise those jurisdictional questions in any effort to extradite a defendant accused of an unlicensed re-export that was in full compliance with local laws. And whether a U.S. court would be inclined to exercise criminal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant in such a case is also an open question. The whole notion that the United States has what amounts to universal jurisdiction over U.S. origin products and the people who touch them, wherever located, is built on a shaky foundation that more or less crumbles when the U.S. permits unlicensed exports of those products.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jul

20

BIS Adopts Final Rule on Crime Control Devices


Posted by at 10:04 pm on July 20, 2010
Category: BIS

Electric ChairLast week the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) adopted, with a few minor revisions, a rule that it had proposed in August 2009 imposing new controls on execution equipment, torture devices, law enforcement restraint devices and law enforcement striking weapons. This blog reported on the proposed rules here.

One of the most significant changes between the proposed rule and the final rule is its treatment of shock sleeves, stun cuffs, and shock belts. The proposed rule would have added shock sleeves to ECCN 0A983, which covers torture implements, stun cuffs to ECCN 0A985, which covers discharge devices, and did not address shock belts at all. In the final rule, all three devices are classified as ECCN 0A982, which covers law enforcement restraint devices. BIS apparently decided that shock sleeves have some legitimate law enforcement use and therefore should be classified under ECCN 0A982, which under EAR § 742.7, has a licensing policy under which license applications are “generally … considered favorably on a case-by-case basis unless there is civil disorder in the country.” Torture implements under ECCN 0A983, on the other hand, are subject to a general policy of denial under EAR § 742.11.

The final rule also added a clarifying note to ECCN 0A982 which covers law enforcement restraint devices. The note points out that the ECCN doesn’t cover child automobile safety seats or seat belts. Although an unobjectionable clarification, somebody was really thinking outside the box when thinking that child seats might be seen as law enforcement restraint devices. Frankly, at least if 4-year-olds are to be believed, those seats would be more adequately classified as specially designed implements of torture.

One commenter on the proposed rule stated that ECCN 0A981, which covers equipment designed for the execution of human beings, should also cover parts for such equipment. BIS wisely decided to reject this suggestion stating,

Identifying parts that may be appropriate for an export license requirement without imposing an export license requirement on general parts that, although usable in equipment
designed for the execution of human beings, have many other uses as well would require both research by BIS and public comment.

That seems just a long way of saying that BIS isn’t interested in getting involved in licensing the export of ropes.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jul

7

Mr. Gaillard Not So Gaillard Now


Posted by at 10:19 pm on July 7, 2010
Category: BISCriminal PenaltiesCuba SanctionsIran Sanctions

Oyster Bay Pump Works
ABOVE: Oyster Bay Pump Works

Patrick Gaillard, president of Oyster Bay Pump Works, a producer of automated liquid dispensing laboratory equipment, recently signed a consent agreement with the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) under which he agreed to a three-year denial order and a $300,000 fine, $275,000 of which was suspended for one year provided that he commits no further export violations. According to the charging documents, Gaillard shipped laboratory equipment made by his company to Cuba and Iran by transshipping the equipment through Germany and the U.A.E.

Back in 2007. Gaillard pleaded guilty to criminal charges arising out of one of these exports and was sentenced to 30 days in prison, a $25,000 criminal fine, three years of probation, and a $300 special assessment. And, apparently, as Mr. Gaillard walked out of prison after serving his time, there were his friends from BIS, who participated no doubt in the criminal investigation, waiting at the prison gate for a second bite at Mr. Gaillard’s apple. BIS is free to waive about the Supreme Court’s decision in Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93 (1997), which held that subsequent administrative fines almost never violate the Double Jeopardy Clause, but that doesn’t make the double whammy fair or decent, particularly where BIS is knee deep in the criminal trial.

The charging documents also accuse Gaillard of “acting with knowledge,” but the facts supporting these charges don’t seem altogether consistent with that.

Gaillard had knowledge that violations of the regulations were occurring or were about and intended to occur because Gaillard knew of the U.S. embargo of Iran and that the items could not be exported to Iran without U.S. Government authorization. In or around November 2005, a sales representative from an Iranian company approached Gaillard for the sale and export of the items described above to Iran. When Gaillard declined, citing the U.S. embargo of exports to Iran, the sales representative arranged with Gaillard to have the items exported to the Iranian company’s trading arm in the U.A.E., from where the items would be transshipped to Iran.

This suggests that Gaillard may have held the common, but incorrect, belief that the Iran sanctions would not block an export to a country other than Iran. Once the item is in the foreign country, so the belief goes, it is the law of that foreign country which governs whether or not the item can be exported to Iran. If that is what Gaillard believed, it is hard to assert that Gaillard acted with knowledge that his actions were illegal even if his belief were incorrect.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jun

23

Export Issues Arise in Shot Show FCPA Prosecution


Posted by at 7:55 pm on June 23, 2010
Category: BISCriminal Penalties

Richard Bistrong
ABOVE: Richard Bistrong

Well, it now seems that some export issues may be arising in the much-publicized “Shot Show” Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) prosecution. In that case, law enforcement officials perp-marched owners and officials of gun and law enforcement supply businesses from the Las Vegas Shot Show and then charged them with violating the FCPA.

This is the first and only FCPA prosecution that has arisen from a sting operation. The prosecution alleges that the defendants had agreed to make kickbacks to African officials in connection with the potential award by those officials of a $15 million contract. The transactions were fictional and cooked up by investigators. The African officials were imposters played by FBI agents with thespian inclinations.

The chief cooperating witness, who undertook a major role in setting up the sting, is Richard Bistrong, a former official of a body armor company who is himself now charged with paying actual bribes to actual officials in actual transactions. Specifically, Bistrong is the subject of a criminal information filed in a federal district court charging Bistrong with bribing UN officials to rig bids which resulted in awards of large body armor contracts to his company. In the Shot Show prosecutions, Mr. Bistrong pretended to be the broker in the phony African transactions and introduced the defendants to the FBI undercover agents who were playing various roles in the sting.

The defendants have argued that they were entrapped by the FBI through Bistrong’s inducement and that they had no predisposition to commit the crimes charged. In effect, Bistrong dangled $15 million contracts in front of the defendants, many or some of whom were store-front businesses and had never had such large contracts offered to them before. Key to the defense in this case is to discredit Bistrong above and beyond the issues raised by his own FCPA prosecution. According to this recent post at the blawg Main Justice, the defendants have asked for copies of Mr. Bistrong’s tax returns, alleging that they will reveal tax violations by Bistrong. The judge hearing the trial has indicated that if the government doesn’t turn over the tax returns voluntarily, then he will grant an order forcing them to do so.

The defense has also asked for “any export licenses [Bistrong] had been given by the federal government.” (And you thought I would never get to the export angle, didn’t you?). This request did not just come out of the blue. The criminal information filed against Bistrong alleges export violations in addition to the FCPA violations. Specifically it alleges that Bistrong shipped vests and helmets with level IIIa ballistic protection to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq without the required licenses from the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”). It looks like the defendants here are gathering impeaching evidence to support the government’s charges against Bistrong, evidence which the government certainly won’t introduce on its own in the Shot Show FCPA prosecution.

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Jun

10

Crime and Even More Punishment


Posted by at 8:34 pm on June 10, 2010
Category: BISCriminal Penalties

PunishmentThe last four items posted by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) — and which are linked here, here, here, and here) on its list of reported export violations — all involved impositions of export denial orders on individuals already convicted of crimes. Two of the four are currently languishing in federal correctional institutions and one served a two-year sentence of incarceration.

Needless to say, there is nothing (other than, of course, the lapse of the Export Administration Act) prohibiting BIS from piling more punishments on these individuals, even though arguably incarceration, as the harshest penalty short of execution, really should be seen as sufficient punishment. (By the way, I am not suggesting to the export hawks on the hill, who seem to increase penalties every time they get a chance, that the death penalty might be a proper punishment for exporting a teflon-lined valve without a BIS license.) But I think that these add-on, johnny-come-lately penalties ought to be put in proper context by noting that unconscionable breadth of the standard denial order as currently drafted.

For example, after the individual subject to the denial order is released from prison, it is fair to say that employment opportunities are already restricted because of his or her incarceration or conviction. But the denial order, which prohibits the individual from “directly or indirectly” “benefiting in any way from any transaction involving any item exported or to be exported from the United States” further limits those employment possibilities. Taking a job with any company that is involved in any exports would seem to violate the denial order even if the job was a menial job with no connection to the company’s export activities. And what company doesn’t export? Well, I suppose the individual subject to the order could always work for a shoe shine stand or iron shirts in a laundry.

Additionally, the Denial Order effectively prohibits the subject individual from travelling abroad. Travel abroad would result in an export of the individual’s baggage and personal effects (unless, of course, the individual travels in, er, a state of nature). The standard denial order even explicitly denies the subject individual the ability to use the BAG license exception which ordinarily covers personal effects carried with a traveler oversea. The prohibition on using an item that has been exported from the United States arguably prohibits the subject individual from using airplanes, boats and automobiles even for domestic travel if they’ve ever left the United States. Of course, since the person subject to the denial order is working for a shoe shine stand or a shirt laundry, travel of any kind won’t really fit in his or her budget

The standard denial order doesn’t incorporate any of the routine export exemptions, such as those for informational materials. Sending a birthday card to a relative abroad could wind up costing about $250,000 more than the cost of the card or the postage. Arguably the Berman Amendment applies even if the standard denial order doesn’t say so, but by not explicitly exempting informational materials, the order at a very minimum deters the individual from trading information with relatives and friends abroad.

Finally, a person subject to a denial order might wind up with a BIS charging letter as thanks for his or her contributions to U.S. charities sending food, aid, medicine, medical supplies and relief to Haiti or other scenes of catastrophic natural disaster.

Export denial orders may well have a legitimate administrative purpose (assuming that they are subsequently permitted by authorizing legislation), but current export reform efforts provide an opportunity to rewrite the standard denial order to eliminate its excessively broad scope. It also provides an opportunity to consider whether anything is really gained by routinely and automatically imposing a denial order on parties already subjected to substantial criminal penalties.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)