Archive for the ‘BIS’ Category


Jun

22

Sales Manager Fined $500,000 by BIS for One Export


Posted by at 9:26 pm on June 22, 2011
Category: BIS

Chasma Nuclear Power PlantThe Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) just released settlement documents pursuant to which a regional sales manager at PPG agreed to a $500,000 penalty arising out of one unlicensed export of EAR99 epoxy paint. The paint, valued at $25,0000, was allegedly for use by a Chinese company constructing a nuclear power facility for the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission. This export required a license because PAEC is on the BIS Entity List. It may also have required a license under the end-use policy in section 744.2 of the Export Administration Regulations depending on the nature of the facility and whether it was subject to IAEA inspections or not. The settlement documents suspended all but $15,000 of the penalty, which are required to be paid with an initial payment of $5,000 and then four quarterly payments of $2,500.

BIS managed to parlay one export into two violations by charging the sales manager both with conspiring to violate the regulations and with aiding and abetting a violation of the regulations. The documents allege that the sales manager conspired with another sales employee, a distributor and a freight forwarder and that he aided and abetted the export by his employer. By recharacterizing one export as two violations and by imposing the maximum penalty for each, the agency was able to ring up a $500,000 penalty. I suppose that the agency figured they were giving the sales manager a break by not charging him with solicitation, acting with knowledge and misrepresentation in connection with the one export to run the tally up $1.25 million.

Do you remember when BIS said that with the new and improved $250,000 penalty authority, the days of piling on offenses to run up the penalty amount were over? Well, that didn’t last long did it? I suspect we are about to here a plea from BIS for authority to impose $1,000,000 for each violation.

Of course, with the $485,000 hanging over him, woe betide the sales manager if he is a day late or a dollar short in any of his installment payments. BIS will own his house, and he and his family will be living in a refrigerator box under a freeway overpass.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jun

16

Another BIS Rule That Does Not Mean What It Says It Means


Posted by at 9:51 pm on June 16, 2011
Category: BISExport Reform

Export ReformToday the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) published a final rule, effective immediately,* implementing the new license exception Strategic Trade Authorization (STA). Under this new license exception, licenses will not be required for exports to 36 countries, including Canada, France, German, Japan and the United Kingdom, of items classified under all but about 30 ECCNs. Exporters relying on license exception STA will be required, among other things, to get certain written assurances from the party receiving the export.

Of course, the new rule follows a long tradition of badly drafted rules in the EAR. The crucial part of the rule reads as follows:

Exports, reexports, and in country transfers in which the only applicable reason(s) for control is (are) national security (NS); chemical or biological weapons (CB);nuclear nonproliferation (NP); regional stability (RS); crime control (CC), and/ or significant items (SI) are authorized for destinations in or nationals of Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, or the United Kingdom.

But wait a minute. With the exception of items subject to control of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and a handful of Crime Control items, virtually all of the other ECCNs have anti-terrorism (AT) as a reason for control. By not mentioning AT in the list of control reasons eligible for the new exception, the rule, literally and exactly read, means that STA cannot be used for almost every ECCN on the Commerce Control List.

To make things worse, BIS admits that this would be the result if the rule is interpreted to mean what it says but then says that the rule doesn’t mean what it says. Seriously.

Although most ECCNs include antiterrorism as a reason for control, that reason for control currently imposes a license requirement for only five destinations, none of which is eligible for STA. Although the absence of a reference to antiterrorism controls in License Exception STA might cause some readers to conclude erroneously that items controlled for antiterrorism reasons may not be shipped under license exception STA, adding such a reference might cause some readers to conclude erroneously that exports, reexports, and in country transfers to which antiterrorism controls do apply may be consummated under License Exception STA. The latter error has greater potential for harm than the former. Therefore, BIS does not believe that a change to the regulatory text on this point is desirable.

Except this latter “error” — that a reference to AT in the rule would make people think that they could use the AT exception to send things to, say, Cuba — is easily avoided because none of the AT countries are included as permissible destinations for the license exception. So, don’t read the rule literally but read it as if AT was listed as one of the controls eligible for the STA exception even though that’s not what the rule says.

This is why export lawyers will never be lacking for work.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jun

14

BIS Charges Company $2 Million For Late Payment


Posted by at 8:15 pm on June 14, 2011
Category: BIS

Don't Mess With BISTalk about late fees. The Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) responded to a payment under a Settlement Agreement that was nine days late by reimposing $2 million dollars of the penalty that had been originally suspended and by accelerating the remaining $5.2 million due under the Settlement Agreement.

The exporter Balli Aviation had agreed to a $15 million penalty in February 2010 in connection with its role in the export of three Boeing 747s to Iran. Under the agreement, the penalty was to be paid in five installments of $2.6 million with payments due on March 1, 2010; September 1, 2010; March 1, 2011; September 1, 2011; and March 1, 2012. The remaining $2 million was suspended for a period of five years upon condition that Balli commit no further export violations during that period and upon “full and timely payment” of the civil penalty.

Balli had made the first two payments on time and in full, but the third payment was made nine whole days late. According to a letter from Balli’s counsel, the late payment was occasioned by cash flow difficulties resulting from late payment to Balli of certain accounts receivable that it was expecting. BIS dismissed these arguments by noting that shortly before the March 1 due date, Balli received a $3 million payment which it applied to an obligation it owed to another creditor. BIS did not argue any prejudice to the agency caused by the late payment other than, apparently, that its feelings were hurt.

BIS ordered that the suspended penalty and the remaining two payments be paid within fifteen days of its order. Nothing in the Settlement Agreement supports the extremely short time period for payment dictated by BIS. Nor does anything part Part 764 of the Export Administration Regulations provide any basis for this time period. If Balli doesn’t come up with the money in the time period, a suspended five-year denial order may, under the agreement, come into effect.

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Jun

7

Live and Let Spy


Posted by at 6:31 pm on June 7, 2011
Category: BIS

Spy VanThe Fayetteville Observer provides details of an ongoing investigation of Raleigh-based Law Enforcement Associates, Inc. by the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) with respect to alleged unlicensed exports of surveillance equipment to Morocco, Egypt, the Netherlands, and Great Britain. The investigation started with the seizure of a van outfitted with covert listening gear that was destined for Morocco.

Alert readers will probably immediately wonder about BIS’s “no see through” rule, which looks at the proper classification of an item independently of its component parts. That rule is found as Interpretation 2 in section 770.2 of the Export Administration Regulations.

There are two requirements for the “no see through” rule to apply. First, the part must be physically integrated into the unit to be exported. Second, the parts must be:

normal and usual components of the machine or equipment being exported [and] the physical incorporation is not used as a device to evade the requirement for a license

The issue here is whether the “normal and usual component” requirement is met. The answer to that requires the answer to a more-or-less metaphysical question. If the item being exported is seen as a van, then arguably surreptitious listening devices are not normal and usual components (unless there is some dealer option I’ve missed). But, if the exported item is seen as a “surveillance van,” the listening devices are almost certainly normal and usual components. So to answer that question you’ll need to dig out your copy of Aristotle’s Metaphysics and reflect upon the difference between accident (συμβεβεκός) and essence (το τι ην ειναι). Good luck, as Plato used to say.

An alternate theory is that maybe BIS thinks that the van is itself the listening device covered by ECCN 5A980. That theory founders because that ECCN only covers items that are “primarily useful” for “surreptitious interception of wire, oral, or electronic communications.” My guess is that — without recourse to Aristotle — it is pretty easy to determine that the van is primarily useful for driving and, if sufficiently tricked out, for sleeping, not for surreptitious listening.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

May

5

U.S. Citizen Indicted For Laptop Transshipments through UAE to Iran


Posted by at 1:34 am on May 5, 2011
Category: BISCriminal Penalties

Iran LaptopNew-York based electronics wholesaler Sunrise Technologies and Trading Company (“ST&TC”) and its president Jeng “Jay” Shih have been indicted in federal court in the District of Columbia for exporting laptops to Iran by transshipping them through the UAE. The criminal complaint filed in the case provides details of the investigation leading up to the indictment of Shih and his company.

According to the criminal complaint, in April 2010, Customs seized several shipments from ST&TC destined to a freight forwarder and to a purchasing company in the UAE. Review of emails from the purchasing companies to the freight forwarders revealed that those emails were sent through an Internet service provider in Iran. An investigation of one of the freight forwarders in UAE revealed that the company regularly shipped items to Iran. In an unrelated investigation, federal investigators arrested an Iranian in the UAE involved in the transshipment of items from the U.S. to Iran. The Iranian became a cooperating witness and wore a wire in various meetings with Shih. Conversations between Shih and the cooperating witness allegedly substantiate that Shih knew the end users for his shipments were in Iran.

In order to convict Shih and ST&TC, the government will need to prove that they knew that their UAE shipments were illegal. The criminal complaint suggests that the evidence in this regard will be a 2006 “outreach visit” by the Bureau of Industry and Security’s Office of Export Enforcement to Shih and his company where the OEE special agents informed Shih that it was illegal to export items to Iran. In addition, the criminal complaint cites statements allegedly made by the cooperating witness that Shih knew that the end users were in Iran. Significantly, the criminal complaint also cites statements that suggest that Shih labored under the common misconception that the U.S. embargo on Iran did not apply to shipments to other countries even if they were destined to Iran

Finally, in the context of discussing his efforts to contest the continued detention of the shipments, SHIH stated that he would never admit to agents of the United States Government that he was sending goods to Iran even though Sunrise was supplying computers from the United States to end-users in Iran, saying in sum and substance:

So no matter what, legal procedure, whatever, you have to fight that and say I never do that . . . even if you are doing this, you are not going to admit it, right?

Which I am legally, I’m not doing directly with Iran.

(emphasis added.)

This is a problem that recurs frequently in these transshipment cases. Proving that the defendant knew that the items were ultimately destined to Iran is not proof that the defendant knew that the export to the intermediary country was illegal. If OEE is going to engage in outreach visits, it ought to make clear that these transshipment scenarios are as illegal as direct shipments to embargoed countries.

Given the frequency with which these OEE “outreach visits” are later used by the government to shore up its case of criminal intent, it might be wise, if OEE shows up for an unannounced “outreach visit,” to tell the OEE agents that you are too busy to meet. If they insist on a subsequent meeting, you might want to have your lawyer there.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)