Archive for the ‘Arms Export’ Category


Jul

25

U.S. Extradites Russian From Lithuania on Export Charges over Russian Objections


Posted by at 6:01 pm on July 25, 2013
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesExtradition

By Iulius at en.wikipedia (Transferred from en.wikipedia) [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html), CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/) or GFDL (www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html)], from Wikimedia Commons http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4e/Vilnius_view.jpgYesterday the Russian Foreign Ministry pitched a fit over a Lithuanian court decision permitting the United States to extradite a Russian citizen alleged to have broken U.S. export laws. The case involves Dmitry Ustinov, a 46-year-old Russian, who is alleged to have caused the unlicensed export of “hundreds of thousands” of military items from the United States.

Ustinov was nabbed during a trip he made to Vilnius to meet with a buyer interested in purchasing military night vision. Chances are quite good, of course, that the buyer was a U.S. agent. Since the U.S. and Russia do not have an extradition treaty (see, e.g., Edward Snowden), the U.S. would have had to lure Ustinov out of Russia to a friendly state. It doesn’t hurt that Lithuanians generally do not have warm and fuzzy feelings about their former Russian/Soviet overlords.

The Russian Foreign Ministry’s beef was that the U.S. extradition of Ustinov

“brusquely ignores the corresponding legal procedure,” including a 1999 treaty in which Russia and the United States promised to cooperate on criminal cases

That reference to the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty between Russia and the United States is a bit puzzling. Like other MLATs, the treaty provides that the parties shall assist each other in the investigation of criminal activity that constitute crimes in both states. Assuming that the unlicensed night vision exports were crimes in Russia, the type of cooperation envisaged by the treaty involves the production of documents, the seizure of the proceeds of criminal activitiy, the identification and location of persons and things, and the execution of search and seizure requests. Nothing in the treaty, by any stretch of the imagination, requires one party to obtain the consent or cooperation of the other in the extradition of their citizens from third countries.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jul

17

Nork Arms Seized in Panama Canal


Posted by at 9:49 pm on July 17, 2013
Category: Arms ExportNorth Korea SanctionsU.N. Sanctions

Kim Jong Un Official Photo Source: Korean Central News Agency [fair use]You have no doubt read about an inspection of a North Korean vessel by Panama in the Panama Canal that revealed that the ship was transporting missile parts and systems. Apparently among the items seized by Panama were a SNR-75 “Fan Song” fire control radar for the SA-2 family of surface-to-air missiles. These were built by the Soviets in the mid-1950s and are used to guide missiles to their targets. The Cubans assert that they own these items and are sending them to North Korea for repair.

Given that the items were hidden under bags of sugar and that they ship’s captain tried to commit suicide in the course of the Panamanian search, the question as to whether this shipment violates U.N. sanctions seems to be mostly academic. Security Council Resolution 1718, in sections 8(a) and (b), prohibits the “transfer to” the DPRK, or export from the DPRK, the listed arms and materiel. Of course, if these items are indeed going to the Norks for repair and return, this may not be a transfer of the items to the DPRK and they will not yet have been exported by the DPRK. However, section 8(c) prohibits the transfer of services to or from the DPRK related to the use of the listed arms and materiel, which seems to be the provision most arguably implicated by the shipment at issue.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Jul

2

Just What We Need: More Export Controls


Posted by at 6:42 pm on July 2, 2013
Category: Arms ExportCyber WeaponsExport Control Proposals

Hacking in Progress, image by Cristiano Betta (Flickr: Barcamp London 3 @ Google Offices UK) [CC-BY-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AHacking_in_progress_at_BarCampLondon_3.jpgThe Senate Armed Services Committee has favorably reported S. 1197, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014. And, you will be pleased to know (or maybe not), they have slipped into the bill a proposal for new export controls, this time on software that could be characterized as “cyber weapons.”

What got the immensely tech savvy aging Senators all whirled up on cyber weapons was, apparently, testimony they received in hearings on the bill about the Shamoon virus. Shamoon, in addition to being an excellent name for a dog, is also the name of a computer virus that struck Aramco in Saudi Arabia and rewrote or destroyed data on hard drives. No doubt the Senators were particularly vexed that one of the payloads carried by Shamoon was a picture of a burning U.S. flag which was used to overwrite some of the data.

So now section 946 of the proposed Defense Authorization Act requires the President to convene an “interagency process … to control the proliferation of cyber weapons through unilateral and cooperative export controls.” The Senate Report on the proposed legislation acknowledged that there might be some difficulty distinguishing between “cyber weapons” (bad) and “dual-use, lawful intercept, and penetration testing” technologies” (good). But, hey, that’s what an interagency process is for!

Now, the million dollar question, of course, is whether new export controls on cyber weapons would have had any impact on Shamoon. The answer, not surprisingly, is probably not. Kapersky Labs, which dissected the virus, concluded that the virus was riddled with a number of “silly errors” which limited its effectiveness and likely was the work not of sophisticated cyber criminals but was a “quick and dirty” job by “skillful amateurs.” Significantly, it was not something that the hackers acquired in the United States (or anywhere else) and exported but home-grown, error-ridden code. The only people who are going to be bothered by section 946 and its proposed export controls will be legitimate manufacturers of network intercept, analysis and testing software.

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May

10

DDTC Slams Stable Door After The Horses Have Bolted


Posted by at 1:02 am on May 10, 2013
Category: Arms ExportDDTCDeemed Exports

Liberator Hand Gun http://defdist.tumblr.com/ [By Permission of Defense Distributed]Unless you have been vacationing on the dark side of the moon today, you probably have seen that the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) told Defense Distributed to take down the plans that it had posted for producing a crappy plastic handgun using an expensive 3-D printer. You can read the letter by clicking this link.

Not surprisingly, DDTC takes the position that these plans are technical data relating to an article in Category I of the USML and that putting the plans on the Internet is an export of that technical data. Of course, whether these plans are technical data may not be entirely clear given the public domain exception to the definition of technical data. Detailed gun schematics are available in numerous widely available publications and all over the Internet. A Google search, for example, quickly brings up these schematics.

But leaving aside whether or not these plans are controlled technical data that cannot be put on the Internet without a DDTC license, this whole brouhaha seems to be a waste of time by DDTC. Real guns that won’t blow up in your hand, can fire multiple shots before falling apart, and which can be much more cheaply manufactured are readily available outside the United States, so the danger posed by exporting these plans is, well, non-existent. Foreign militaries aren’t very likely to abandon their AK47s now that they can print their own plastic handguns. Worse yet, the plans had apparently been downloaded more than a 100,000 times before the Feds dropped the ban hammer. There is no way that DDTC can now stuff all that toothpaste back in the tube.

Finally, the DDTC letter seems to concede some uncertainty about whether the plans are technical data. Instead of simply demanding the removal of the plans and threatening enforcement action, the letter requests that Defense Distributed file a commodity jurisdiction request to “resolve” the “proper jurisdiction” of the technical data “officially.” So, stay tuned, this affair is far from over.

(The picture of the plastic gun parts from the Defense Distributed site that illustrates this post has been pixelated for your protection.)

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Apr

23

Arms Treaty Foe Cites Export Reform As Reason for Opposition


Posted by at 1:26 pm on April 23, 2013
Category: Arms ExportExport Reform

Baker Spring http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kY9ZTCu2wWc (Fair Use)
ABOVE:Baker Spring

I don’t know who Baker Spring is, other than some flak for a Washington think tank, but he has, for some reason, decided to join Iran, North Korea and Syria in opposing the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty. According to Baker, the treaty will interfere with the export control reform process:

There are many reasons to dislike the ATT, but one of them … it [sic] that it urges signatories to regulate a wide range of arms exports just as the U.S. reform process is trying to build higher walls around fewer items.

For instance, the new rules on aircraft and turbine engines transfer these items from the strict and inflexible Munitions List, maintained by the Department of State, to the more flexible Commodity Control List, maintained by the Department of Commerce. …

The review process has been meticulous, involving the Departments of Defense, State, and Commerce; the White House; Capitol Hill; industry; allied governments; think tanks; and other interested parties. The specialists in the Administration who have worked in this complex area of federal regulation deserve to be commended for achieving this major milestone in the reform effort. Their work should not be frustrated by uncertainties created by the ATT.

Let’s leave aside for the moment the silliness of this argument given that the White House, which is spearheading export reform, also supports the Arms Trade Treaty. The United States did, after all vote for it. (As did everyone else in the world but North Korea, Syria, and Iran.) If the White House thought that the treaty would gum up export control reform, it’s doubtful it would have supported the treaty.

The bigger problem with Baker Spring’s argument is that he apparently has not read the treaty that he is criticizing or, at least, he does not understand it. The treaty simply requires adherents to impose export controls on the items listed in Article 2, which the United States already does and which it will continue to do whether the item is on the USML or the CCL.

Baker Spring also has not read, or, at least he does not understand, the export control reform proposals that were just adopted. Certainly if he did, he wouldn’t have come up with this whopper quoted above:

For instance, the new rules on aircraft and turbine engines transfer these items from the strict and inflexible Munitions List … to the more flexible Commodity Control List …

Er, no, aircraft and turbine engines are not being transferred to the CCL. Some are and some aren’t. Article 2 of the ATT covers “combat aircraft” and it is safe to say that all those aircraft remain on the USML. As to turbine engines, they are not even covered by the Arms Trade Treaty at all. Article 4 covers “parts and components” such as aircraft engines but only “where the export is in a form that provides the capability to assemble the conventional arms covered under Article 2,” in other words, only when the entire aircraft or other article is exported in the form of disassembled parts and components. An export of a turbine engine by itself obviously fails to meet that criterion.

Somehow I suspect that Baker Spring’s objections to the Arms Trade Treaty are the result of considerations other than the flimsy excuses he proffered in the article at hand.

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Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)