Archive for the ‘Arms Export’ Category


Jul

28

High Capacity Magazines Exported from U.S. to Norway Shooter


Posted by at 5:15 pm on July 28, 2011
Category: Arms Export


ABOVE: Ruger Mini-14 30-round
magazines


According to a story that ran today in Politico, Anders Breivik claimed in his “Manifesto” that he obtained by mail order from the United States the 10 30-round magazines for the Ruger Mini-14 rifle that he used in the shootings at the summer camp outside Oslo. The cost of the 10 magazines was said by him to be $550.

Breivik wrote in his manifesto that while he could have purchased the high-capacity magazines in Sweden, they would have been significantly more expensive than ordering them from a U.S. supplier.

Although this revelation has led some politicians and others to wonder why such exports are legal, these exports might well have been illegal. The magazines in question would clearly have been Category I(h) items on the United States Munitions List and would have required a State Department license unless one of the export exemptions in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations was applicable. The only one arguably applicable would be the one found in section 123.17(a) which permits unlicensed exports of certain parts and components, including magazines, of “semi-automatic firearms to caliber .50 inclusive” provided the value does not exceed $100 wholesale in any transaction.

Because of the dollar limitation, the export of these magazines, if done in one transaction, would not have been eligible for the exemption and would have required a license, something that likely was not obtained given the relatively low cost of the transaction. Breivik’s “Manifesto” entry on the purchases also makes it sound like it was one export and ineligible for the $100 exemption:

10 x 30 round magazines – .223 cal at 34 USD per mag. Had to buy through a smaller US supplier (who again ordered from other suppliers) as most suppliers have export limitations.

Of particular note here is that Breivik was looking for a U.S. supplier who was willing to, er, overlook U.S. export requirements. That supplier should be very nervous, because I bet that they’ll find shipping documents in Breivik’s apartment with the supplier’s name.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

30

eBay Drone Auction Leads to Sting, Arrest


Posted by at 9:29 pm on March 30, 2011
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesUSMILUSML

Robot Attack!Henderson Chua, a resident of the Philippines who was arrested when he traveled to Los Angeles in February, was indicted on March 10 on charges that he illegally engaged in a temporary import into the United States of parts for an AeroVironment RQ-11 Raven drone without the required State Department license. Mr. Chua had listed the Raven on eBay, which had attracted the attention of undercover federal agents in both California and in Florida. Agents in both states had entered into discussions with Mr. Chua to purchase the parts.

According to the criminal complaint filed in the case, the parts consisted of the nose cone, fuselage, and the horizontal surface of the tail assembly, but not the main wing, the entire tale assembly, the battery or the ground control equipment. (Almost all of the press stories, such as this one, this one, this one, and this one incorrectly reported that the illegal temporary import involved the entire drone.)

It’s important to understand that only parts were involved because a permanent import of these parts is not illegal. Aircraft and drone parts are not listed on the United States Munitions Import List. They are, however, listed in Category VIII(h) of the United States Munitions List, which means they require a State Department license for temporary (as opposed to permanent) imports, i.e., imports which will be followed by an export back out of the United States. As you will see, this distinction between legal permanent imports and illegal temporary imports opens up some major holes in the government’s case.

The narrative in the criminal complaint shows that Mr. Chua initially entered into negotiations with the federal agents to sell them the Raven parts, which apparently he was doing on behalf of a third party who claimed to have bought them in a Philippines government auction. During the negotiations, the agents frequently and incorrectly indicated that the import of these parts into the U.S. would be illegal. At one point, Mr. Chua responds that it should not be a problem because he is only shipping “as a part not a whole unit [and] can be declared as a spare.” (Paragraph 17.) At this point the agents might have realized that a permanent import of the parts would not be illegal, so they told Chua, for the first time and the very next day, that they were buying the parts for someone in Russia and the parts would be immediately exported after they received them. (Paragraph 18.)

After hearing this, Mr. Chua and the owner of the parts wisely consulted lawyers to see if the parts could still be shipped. Based on that consultation, Chua told the undercovers that they would need a State Department license (Paragraph 29.) After repeated statements by the agents that they would not obtain a license, Chua told the agents that he could only sell the parts to them if they would sign an agreement stating:

The Buyer shall not export, re-export, or transfer directly or indirectly either by laws applicalbe in the customer’s own courntry or by laws of the United States of America to countries/companies developing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and to companies/persons listed under the U.S. Department of Commerce Denied List.”

(Paragraph 39.) The agents did sign such an agreement prior to the export of the parts by Chua to them. (Paragraph 42.)

As this blog has noted again and again, a criminal export violation requires knowledge by the defendant that he or she is violating the law. This is going to be tough in this case. The defendant correctly believed that he could ship the parts to the United States until the agents said that they were going to re-export the items to Russia. At that point, Chua and his seller consulted lawyers and told the undercovers they would need State Department licenses to ship the parts. When the agents declined to get licenses, Chua determined, apparently in consultation with legal counsel, that the items could only be shipped without a license if the agents agreed not to export them from the United States. Granted the advice was a bit flawed because the agreement no to re-export was limited to countries involved in developing WMD or to parties on the Department of Commerce’s Denied Parties List. But there is not a shred of evidence that Mr. Chua didn’t believe that this advice was a correct statement of U.S. law. Chua may be liable for civil penalties under the Arms Export Control Act but criminal penalties can’t be imposed without proving he knew he was relying on bad legal advice.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Mar

24

Software Engineer Caught in Export Sting Pleads Guilty


Posted by at 11:50 pm on March 24, 2011
Category: Arms ExportCriminal Penalties

satelliteNotwithstanding an apparent slip-up by undercover agents in a sting which caught a Seattle-area software engineer in a plan to export ITAR-controlled radiation-hardened semiconductor chips to China, the target of the sting, Lian Yang, pleaded guilty today to charges that he violated the Arms Export Control Act. This blog reported on this case back in December when the criminal complaint filed by the government in the case was unsealed.

The criminal complaint suggested some convincing evidence that Yang knew he was breaking the law with these proposed exports. Apparently he had contemplated effacing the part numbers on the chips. He also proposed shipping them under false invoices that concealed the names of the parts.

However, at one point the undercover agents, who were posing as the suppliers of the parts, told him that there would be a delay in shipping the parts. The delay, they said, “is with the government,” further stating that the “compliance paperwork” was “waiting to be reviewed and signed.” That certainly seems like an implication by the undercover agents that the transaction was legal and was being approved by the government, which would certainly complicate the government’s proof that Yang had the requisite criminal intent to be convicted of the crime. In the end, however, with the defendant’s guilty plea, this slip-up had no impact on the case.

The Seattle Post-Intelligencer also reported on Yang’s plea. Its online report deserves both an award for the most obnoxious online advertisement I’ve ever seen (click the link at your peril) and the worst description of the AECA I’ve ever seen. Here’s the description of the AECA:

In charging information filed Monday in U.S. District Court, federal prosecutors accuse Yang of conspiring to violate the U.S. Arms Export Control Act, which bars the sale of potentially sensitive technologies.

You have to wonder where the reporter came up with that. There is quite the difference between a statute that requires government licenses for the sale of goods and technologies versus one which “bars” the sale of those goods or technologies, not to mention that the AECA involves the sale of military items and technologies, which is not really co-extensive with “potentially sensitive technologies.” The Post-Intelligencer reporter apparently didn’t even take the time to read the Wikipedia entry on the AECA which, at least, accurately describes the act as “control[ling] the import and export of defense articles and defense services.”

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

7

DDTC Poised to Impose Export Ban on BAE


Posted by at 6:46 pm on March 7, 2011
Category: Arms ExportDDTC

BAEAlmost one year ago, on March 4, 2010, this blog reported that the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (“DDTC”) had posted a website notice that all BAE export licenses were on temporary hold. This came several days after BAE had pleaded guilty to charges that it had paid bribes in violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and failed to report them as commissions in violation of the Arms Export Control Act. DDTC said the hold was to allow the agency to consider the impact of BAE’s guilty plea. And then, almost as quickly as the notice appeared — poof! — it was gone.

Well, the DDTC has apparently meditated on the fate of BAE long enough. An article in today’s Financial Times reported that BAE is bracing itself to have DDTC impose additional fines on the company and to suspend BAE’s privilege to export defense articles. Given BAE’s participation in such multilateral defense projects as the Joint Strike Fighter, it seems unlikely that the DDTC will impose a total export ban on BAE, but some version of an export ban is, apparently, both likely and imminent.

According to the Financial Times, the State Department was keeping mum on the matter but a BAE spokesperson had this to say: “Dialogue continues and is progressing with the Department of State in order to address its concerns regarding matters arising from the [Department of Justice] settlement.”

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(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Mar

3

Have Guns, Will Travel


Posted by at 9:29 pm on March 3, 2011
Category: Arms ExportCriminal Penalties

Steven GreenooeUK citizen and former U.S. Marine Steven Greenoe (pictured right) pleaded guilty yesterday to one count of violating the Arms Export Control Act and one count of filing a false ATF form in connection with his unlicensed exports of more than 60 guns from the United States to the United Kingdom. Greenoe packed the weapons in suitcases that he took with him on ten flights from the United States.

The most interesting aspect of the case is how easily Greenoe was able to ship these guns in his luggage. The guns were disassembled and scattered throughout his suitcases. During a trip last May to Atlanta, where Greenoe was catching a connecting flight to Manchester, scanners detected the gun parts when Greenoe checked his luggage in Raleigh-Durham. Somehow or other he convinced TSA agents that he was a firearms salesman and that the parts were non-working “engineering samples.” He was then allowed to board his flight to Atlanta and then to continue on to Manchester with the guns in his luggage.

An investigation into a cache of guns recovered by British police ultimately led British authorities to Greenoe. Greenoe was arrested at the Raleigh airport in July after a tip-off from British police. Greenoe apparently told U.S. investigators that he was a security consultant and that these guns were for his employees working in pirate-infested waters off the coast of Somalia. Even were this colorful explanation true, it would not justify failing to obtain an export license for the guns.

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Copyright © 2011 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)