Author Archive


Jan

29

OFAC Likely Meets Tough Sell on Iran Sanctions Road Show to the Middle East


Posted by at 6:14 pm on January 29, 2014
Category: Economic SanctionsIran SanctionsOFACSanctions

By Jean-Pierre Bazard Jpbazard (Own work) [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) or CC-BY-SA-3.0-2.5-2.0-1.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ALe_navire_cargo_%E2%80%98%E2%80%99Iran_Sadr%E2%80%98%E2%80%99_(6).jpg

The Treasury Department announced on Monday that Under Secretary David Cohen is traveling to Turkey and the UAE this week to discuss the implementation of the U.S. sanctions relief under the Iranian nuclear pact.  As important as the trip itself, the message to be delivered, according to the Treasury Department, will include a focus on “the limited and temporary sanctions relief provided under the [pact] and continued enforcement of existing international economic sanctions against Iran.”

Both Turkey and the UAE are critical to Iran’s foreign trade.  Turkey is Iran’s third-largest export and import partner, and Iran imports more from the UAE than anywhere else, accounting for approximately a third of Iran’s total imports.  Almost six years ago, we reported on Iran’s reliance on trade with the UAE and, respectively, the UAE’s apparent complicity to trade with Iran in ways that would be in violation of U.S. law.  In fact, Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid al-Maktoum, crown prince of Dubai and prime minister of the UAE, told the BBC earlier this month, that international sanctions against Iran should be lifted.  He added that “Iran is our neighbor and we don’t want any problem” and, if international sanctions are lifted, “everybody will benefit.”  Not exactly on point with U.S. sanctions policy.

As the Treasury Department appropriately describes, the U.S. sanctions relief under the nuclear pact is “limited” and is rather more of a U.S. pledge that sanctions will not be imposed against non-U.S. persons engaging in certain activities vis-à-vis Iran.  The emphasis to Turkey and the UAE, therefore, must be that U.S. sanctions are, in effect, at status quo in order to stem off any impression in the Middle East that U.S. sanctions against Iran are softening.

The challenge remains as it always has been: getting Turkish, UAE and other Middle Eastern buy-in to U.S. sanctions policy against Iran.  While Under Secretary Cohen may present some carrots on his trip, the stick to wield was announced along with his trip in highlighting “continued enforcement of existing international sanctions.”  The message, of course, would be that U.S. sanctions enforcement of Iran-related activities taking place in Turkey and the UAE will be bad for business in both countries.

Our advice to exporters remains the same as it was almost six years ago: know your customers especially well in Turkey and the UAE to ensure as best as possible that your business does not involve dealings with Iran.

Permalink Comments Off on OFAC Likely Meets Tough Sell on Iran Sanctions Road Show to the Middle East

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Jan

21

Wide World of (North Korean) Sports: Piste Off Edition


Posted by at 7:23 pm on January 21, 2014
Category: ChinaEconomic SanctionsEUForeign Export ControlsNorth Korea Sanctions

By Mark Scott Johnson from Sydney, Australia (IMG_7688) [CC-BY-2.0] (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AMount_Paektu7.jpgDennis Rodman and his coterie of NBA All-Stars recently returned to the United States from North Korea after Rodman’s birthday basketball bash for his “friend for life” Kim Jong Un.  While Rodman’s zealous zaniness has grabbed global media headlines, another sports-related development in North Korea, is more significant to sanctions and export control issues: the grand opening this month of the Masik Pass luxury ski and hotel resort.

Pictures taken of the resort show the 120-room hotel, indoor swimming pool and 11 ski runs.  Other pictures also show, however, Italian snow plows, Canadian snowmobiles and Swedish snow cannons.  Recent news reports began to shed light on the obvious sanctions issue: how did North Korea build a ski resort without someone violating sanctions.  U.N. Security Council Resolution 2094 and others prohibit members from selling “luxury goods” to North Korea and even though “luxury goods” are not defined and are not limited to the specific luxury items delineated in Annex IV of Resolution 2094, it seems hard to deny that snowmobiles, snow cannons and the other accoutrements of a “luxury” resort are not “luxury goods.”

According to SkyNews, the Italian snow plow manufacturer has predictably said, “Snow groomers are sold directly to ski resorts and distributors and it is possible that a used snow groomer is than sold to another final user by ski resorts or distributors themselves. On this kind of business we as a producer do not have any influence, no company can avoid that this happens.”

Western goods flowing into North Korea is not new.  In fact, we reported last year on the curious infiltration of an Apple iMac on Kim Jong Un’s desk and suggested it, like many Western goods in North Korea, came from China.  Plausible deniability about to whom a manufacturer’s customers sell its products becomes, of course, more attenuated when your business is selling “state-of-the-art snow cannons” that retail for 14,000 Euros each.

U.N., U.S., E.U. and Canadian sanctions policies fail if a repressive regime like North Korea’s so-called supreme leadership continues to violate human rights but opens a ski resort to sustain its control.  Like sanctions against Iran, Cuba and other countries, a principal goal is to curtail infrastructure projects that support the sanctioned governments.  While a ski resort is not the largest national infrastructure project, sanctions were designed to prohibit it being built and supported by Western goods and technology.

Even if the sales of the items found at Masik Pass were beyond detection of reasonable know-your-customer requirements, Italian, Canadian and Swedish enforcement authorities would at least have grounds to inquire further, especially company records and communications involving sales to Chinese resellers that may have been possible routes to North Korea.  While any manufacturer or retailer can’t know everything about its customers, knowing more gives a company greater support to conclude that its business does not involve impermissible activities or give law enforcement a reason to examine its business further.

Clif adds: Blame me, not George, for the terrible pun in the post title.

Permalink Comments (1)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Dec

20

Back in the U.S.S.R.? Pleading Guilty to U.S. Export Violations May Get You Home


Posted by at 12:53 am on December 20, 2013
Category: Criminal PenaltiesDDTCGeneralITARUSML

By  Sgt. Scott M. Biscuiti [Public domain], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ADefense.gov_photo_essay_090329-M-7747B-015.jpg

On Tuesday, Russian Roman Kvinikadze pleaded guilty in federal court in Wyoming to charges that he attempted to export thermal imaging weapon sights to Russia without a required license from the U.S. State Department.  Last month, we reported on Kvinikadze’s arrest and the charges brought against him as well as the Russian government’s criticism of the entire matter.  Kvinikadze’s plea is not a surprising development since, as we alluded to last month, an entrapment defense even under the most favorable circumstances is difficult to prove.

What is surprising, however, is how soon Kvinikadze may be leaving U.S. federal prison.  The Associated Press reported on Tuesday that the federal judge in Kvinikadze’s case said “immigration authorities intend to send Kivinikadze back to Russia.”  As we said last month, Kvinikadze’s best defense was not going to be in the courtroom but through diplomatic channels plied with the Russian government’s support.  Unlike a month ago, when the Russian human rights commissioner publicly decried Kvinikadze’s arrest, the Russian government has been quiet since Kvinikadze entered his guilty plea.

If Kvinikadze in fact returns shortly to Russia, the Department of Homeland Security, the agency which conducted the investigation into Kvinikadze, may be reconsidering the effectiveness of operations, like the one used against Kvinikadze, that engage foreign persons online to arrange for unlawful export transactions and entice them into travel to the United States to be arrested.  At a minimum, would-be U.S. export control violators abroad ought to think twice about meeting a potential business partner for the first time in the United States.  But more importantly, foreign governments may begin to join Russia in denouncing such U.S. policing of its laws around the world.  One of the aspects that have made U.S. investigations and law enforcement activities abroad of FCPA violations so successful in recent years is the U.S. cooperation with foreign law enforcement. Without such cooperation, the United States may see more guilty foreign criminals going home.

Permalink Comments (1)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Dec

6

DIY Licensing Results in DDTC Debarrment


Posted by at 5:36 pm on December 6, 2013
Category: CustomsDDTCITAR

By Ncollida1106 (Own work) [CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AMTW_Picture.jpg

The State Department announced last week that it debarred LeAnne Lesmeister, a former export compliance officer for Honeywell International, Inc., from ITAR-related activities because she “used her position to circumvent Honeywell’s export compliance program in the fabrication of various export control documents that Ms. Lesmeister presented as Department of State authorizations.”  Honeywell had voluntarily disclosed Lesmeister’s activity to the State Department.

DDTC’s charging letter to Lesmeister in July of this year provides details of egregious export control violations alleged against her to support the 21 violations with which she was charged.  Just samples from the charging letter are stunning.  In connection with her work as a senior export compliance officer for a Honeywell aerospace facility in Florida, DDTC alleged the following:

  • Licenses Lesmeister “fabricated” used DSP-5 license numbers that, in some cases, had appeared on previously approved licenses to Honeywell for unrelated products or, in other cases, had appeared on previously approved licenses to unrelated applicants where a Honeywell entity sometimes appeared as a party or often not.
  • With respect to an approved technical assistance agreement that Lesmeister “falsified,” she wrote  a Honeywell employee that “we are expecting to see approval within about a week at max, all staffed agencies have responded so it is just a matter of getting the licensing office to finalize.”
  • For a “fabricated” DSP-5 license and an falsely approved technical assistance agreement, Lesmeister wrote to two Honeywell employees, “[t]hey ended up sending it to me – it ain’t pretty but it is official.”
  • In one case, Lesmeister “fabricated” a letter “supposedly issued by the Office of Defense Trade Controls Licensing” that purported to approve a temporary change in end-use to a previously exported item.

In one instance, Honeywell relied on a false DSP-5 license created by Lesmeister and, in turn, attempted to export a product to Argentina and submitted the false license to U.S. Customs.  Customs rejected the transaction because the false license number was not registered in the Automated Export System.

This case is noteworthy not just for its alleged activity, but it was also a first for the State Department.  Lesmeister failed to answer her charging letter.  As a result, and for the first time according to the State Department, it referred an unanswered charging letter alleging ITAR violations to an Administrative Law Judge for default consideration.  The Administrative Law Judge issued a default order against Lesmeister, and DDTC then issued its debarment order last week.

Admist all of this, it is important to note that DDTC charged Lesmeister with violations only between 2008 and 2012 although she had worked in export compliance at Honeywell for 27 years.  With the applicable statute of limitations likely running in connection with Honeywell’s voluntary disclosure, there is nothing in State Department documents made public to date that refer to any alleged violations that occurred prior to 2008.

At the moment, the fact that no penalties, civil or criminal, have been imposed against anyone is stunning.  Honeywell, however, appears to have done several things right.  Honeywell terminated Lesmeister in June 2012 upon discovery of the violations and, sometime thereafter, voluntarily disclosed the matter to the State Department.

On the other hand, Honeywell may not be out of the woods.  The violations as alleged are significant to say the least and appear to have been discovered by Honeywell only in 2012 after Lesmeister had been with the company for over a quarter-century.  The DDTC charging letter also describes Lesmeister’s activities in ways that suggest impermissibility could have been suspected or detected.  For example, her “fabricated” DSP-5 licenses were described in different instances as “low-quality scan[s],” included “page numbers [that] were not sequential” and, perhaps worst, “the country of ultimate destination was inconsistent with the end-users listed.”

There has been no mention of any parallel proceedings being conducted by the Justice Department, or any other U.S. agency like Customs, for alleged activities that violate more than just ITAR.  One has to wonder what else may be happening, however, when the only penalty is a single person’s debarment from ITAR-related activity after that person for years was running a counterfeit government licensing department from her office for one of the largest U.S. companies.

Until more information is made public, the debarment of LeAnne Lesmeister is, at a minimum, an exceptional case for ITAR enforcement.  If there is a preliminary moral to the story, it should be that routine audits of compliance programs do serve a purpose and, if properly calibrated, should detect issues like those in this case.

Clif adds:  One explanation for Ms. Lesmeister’s failure to respond to DDTC is concern over possible criminal prosecution and a desire to avoid providing either incriminatory information admitting the violations or information denying the violations that could serve as a basis for a prosecution for lying to federal agents.   There is no evidence on PACER that Ms. Lesmeister has been indicted yet, but that doesn’t mean there isn’t an on-going parallel criminal investigation

Permalink Comments (2)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Nov

19

What Happens in Panama Stays in Panama (including 200,000 bags of brown sugar)


Posted by at 7:08 pm on November 19, 2013
Category: Cuba SanctionsEconomic SanctionsNorth Korea SanctionsSanctionsU.N. Sanctions

By jonprc (Flickr: north korean ship) [CC-BY-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ANorth_korean_ship.jpg

We reported last July on Panama’s seizure of the North Korean vessel Chong Chon Gang sailing from Cuba to North Korea and carrying, among other things, disassembled Soviet-era MIG jets and missiles hidden in 200,000 bags of brown sugar. Cuba claimed it was sending these items to North Korea “for repair.” As was reported at the time, the North Korean crew tried to fend off Panamanian boarders with sticks while the vessel’s captain initially claimed to have a heart attack and subsequently attempted suicide.  The entire ordeal resulted in the rare Cuba-Panama-North Korea diplomatic tiff.  While we explained in July the UN sanctions against North Korea that were implicated, recent developments also provide telling aspects of U.S. sanctions policy against Cuba.

The United States has remained notably close-lipped and little has developed in almost four months since the seizure until this last week.  On Wednesday, the Panamanian foreign minister was in Washington and was thanked by Secretary Kerry for Panama’s “very important interdiction of a North Korean ship with illicit cargo.”  According to Panamanian media, the Panamanian foreign minister announced on Friday that Panama has granted visas to a North Korean delegation to come to Panama this week to claim the Chong Chon Gang and most of its crew.   The captain, two senior officers, the disassembled weaponry and the brown sugar will not be released.  Finally, Vice President Biden arrived yesterday in Panama to tour expansion sites of the Canal.

The upshot of the entire incident is that the United States got the best promotion of sanctions against Cuba it could have asked for.  Panama was the one who exposed Cuba engaging in concealed international arms trafficking with North Korea.  The United States, as a result, was not thrust into a position to defend an embargo unsupported by most of  its allies, but rather could let Cuba be scolded by another Latin American country.

The United States, of course, most likely played critical behind-the-scenes intelligence and direction related to the seizure, and the recent diplomatic visits between the two countries are reminders that Panama relies heavily on U.S. support and, therefore, would be willing to comply with the occasional Soviet-era arms seizure at the behest of the United States.  Perhaps not coincidentally, the North Korean crew have been detained at Fort Sherman, a former U.S. military base on the Atlantic side of the Canal.

While Iran takes current front page news on U.S. sanctions policy, the activities onboard the Chong Chon Gang is a singular example of why the United States is not inclined to ease sanctions meaningfully against Cuba soon and will use this episode as support that sanctions should remain as is.

Permalink Comments (1)

Bookmark and Share


Copyright © 2013 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)