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Apr

30

U.S. Long Arm Stretches But Likely Won’t Reach Its Chinese Target


Posted by at 6:12 pm on April 30, 2014
Category: ChinaDoJEconomic SanctionsExtraditionIran SanctionsSDN List

FBI Wanted Poster [Public Domain]

The U.S. Department of Justice announced yesterday that it charged Li Fangwei, a Chinese national, with violating U.S. sanctions against Iran as well as with federal fraud violations.  Li, also known by a panoply of aliases including Karl Lee, Sunny Bai and Patric, is accused by the Justice Department of using a number of Chinese companies he controls to sell “metallurgical goods” and other items to Iran that are prohibited from sale to Iran under U.S., UN and other sanctions around the world because of their potential use in nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles. Li himself was added to the SDN List in 2009 and his Chinese companies have been added to the SDN since 2006.  In fact, OFAC added eight Li companies to the SDN List yesterday.

With respect to U.S. sanctions, Li is alleged to have used front companies to engage in funds transfers through U.S. banks in order to conduct his business with Iran.  In a related matter, the Justice Department announced yesterday that the U.S. Government has already seized almost $7 million in funds attributable to Li’s companies that were held in U.S. correspondent accounts of foreign banks used by the Chinese companies.

The seizures are, of course, a success for U.S. sanctions enforcement.  It raises, however, the question of whether a criminal prosecution of Li is fruitful or may be even necessary in an effort to curtail his dealings with Iran.  In announcing the indictment, Assistant Attorney General John Carlin described the criminal prosecution as “part of the ‘all tools’ approach our government is taking against Li Fangwei.”  Indeed, other tools like those used by OFAC, in cooperation with the FBI and the Marshals Service, have so far seized millions attributable to Li front companies on the SDN List.  If OFAC can designate entities to the SDN List and funds in the United States attributable to them can be seized, what more can U.S. sanctions be expected to accomplish under the circumstances.

On that score, Li was part of a post here over five years ago when Robert Morgenthau, as then New York County District Attorney, announced a 118-count indictment against Li and one of his companies, LIMMT, alleging Li and LIMMT falsified business records in violation of New York law in transferring funds through New York banks in connection with transactions with Iran.  Back then, we questioned the legitimacy and efficacy of New York trying, in effect, to enforce U.S. sanctions and wondered whether OFAC wanted any assistance (or ultimately the distraction) from New York in its attempt to enforce U.S. sanctions policy.

History has a funny way of repeating itself.   Although the Justice Department actually has the authority to prosecute a U.S. sanctions violation, the same question of efficacy lingers.  Under a fair assumption that Li is in China now and the Chinese government knows Li’s exact whereabouts, there is almost no reason to think China will extradite him or even possibly curtail his activities with Iran.  Perhaps the Department is hoping that the $5 million bounty the FBI placed on Li’s head might prompt someone in China to nab Li, tie him up, put a bag over his head, put him in a container and ship him to the U.S. in order to claim the reward.

The case of Li Fangwei, therefore, should not be sidetracked to the U.S. justice system.  This is in OFAC’s bailiwick and OFAC should lead the charge, in cooperation with other U.S. agencies, to seize blocked property in the United States and liaise with Canadian, EU, Swiss and other foreign sanctions enforcement authorities to convince them that similar seizures should take place around the world and intelligence should be shared with each other on what new companies Li, and possibly others, are using to do impermissible business with Iran.

In the words of the Justice Department, Li Fangwei is a “fugitive.”  That could not be more of a misnomer.  The case of Li Fangwei simply does not fit the parlance used by U.S. prosecutors.  The Justice Department is right, however, that the United States is afforded a lot of tools in sanctions enforcement.  Sometimes, there are tools best left in the toolbox.

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Apr

15

Justin Timberlake Shows the U.S. Is Not NSYNC With Its Sanctions Songbook


Posted by at 6:30 pm on April 15, 2014
Category: Economic SanctionsOFACRussia SanctionsSDN List

By Mandy Coombes [CC-BY-SA-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AJustin_Timberlake_-_Justified_World_Tour_-_Earls_Court_-_2.jpg

Armed with over 30 million Twitter followers and a shelf-full of Grammy and Emmy awards, Justin Timberlake may be staring down U.S. sanctions better than Putin himself.  Reuters reported last week that JT’s sold-out show next month at Helsinki’s Hartwall Arena will go on despite the fact that the largest indoor venue in the country is owned by Gennady Timchenko, Arkady Rotenberg and Boris Rotenberg.  All three Russians are on the SDN List because they are, in OFAC’s words, members of the Putin “Inner Circle.”  Perhaps equally as important to Finnish music fans, Miley Cyrus, Aerosmith and Nine Inch Nails are also scheduled to perform at the Hartwall Arena between now and June 1st.

Because U.S. company Live Nation is the concert promoter for these U.S. musicians, there is an understandable concern that dealings with Hartwall Arena may be impermissible under U.S. sanctions law because the 15,000-seat venue is entirely owned by a troika of billionaires on the SDN List.  But no one will have to stop the music as Live Nation announced that “U.S. officials had indicated at the weekend that the sanctions would not prevent the concerts going ahead.”

Some have speculated the shows would go on because Live Nation may have already paid in full Arena Events Oy, the entity owned by Timchenko and the Rotenbergs which owns the Hartwall Arena, prior to the three Russians being added to the SDN List.  But that logic doesn’t hold up because, if paying Arena Events Oy would be a violation, so would, according to the relevant executive order, providing services “for the benefit of” Arena Events Oy.  If Live Nation could not pay for the concert, Justin and Miley could not perform their services.

The most likely response that OFAC may have given Live Nation has been a recent focus of ours: the so-called 50 percent rule.  We reported a few weeks ago that Visa and Mastercard resumed transactions with banks owned by the Rotenbergs because, as we understand it, no one Rotenberg owns 50 percent or more of the banks.  Presumably, then, Timchenko and the Rotenberg Brothers do not individually hold more than 50 percent.  Of course, an entity owned entirely by three Russian SDNs is a good candidate for designation at any time.  You have to imagine that OFAC may have made some assurances to Live Nation else Live Nation would be ill-advised to fly its pricey talent in private jets to Finland only to have the Arena designated moments before the stars arrive.

These concerts are, however, a hallmark of how out of tune sanctions enforcement appears to be in relation to the zeal of the President’s executive orders authorizing the sanctions in the first place.  What better opportunity for OFAC to elucidate the 50 percent rule in order to explain how U.S. sanctions will permit four American musical acts, who are each listened to by millions around the world, to perform before tens of thousands of people about a two-hour drive from the Russian border in an arena owned solely by three Russian individuals on the SDN List.

Enforcing sanctions against entities owned or controlled by someone already targeted by sanctions is an important arrow in any country’s sanctions quiver.  How such an enforcement policy is defined and articulated publicly is critically important to its effectiveness.

As it stands now, U.S. sanctions would permit Miley Cyrus to sing her hit song “Party in the U.S.A.” to a concert with Putin in attendance.  For a whole host of reasons, we don’t want to see that.

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Apr

8

The Best Question on Burma Sanctions Is Still Unanswered


Posted by at 6:28 pm on April 8, 2014
Category: Burma SanctionsCompliance Programs and ProceduresEconomic SanctionsGeneralOFACSDN ListZimbabwe Sanctions

By Bild von Stefan Grünig, CH-3752 Wimmis (de:Benutzer:Sgruenig)Sgruenig at de.wikipedia [GFDL (http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/fdl.html) or CC-BY-SA-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/)], from Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ABurma06.jpg

OFAC announced last week that it issued additional Frequently Asked Questions and respective answers relating to what remain of U.S. sanctions against Burma.  None of the additional questions or answers is surprising or resolves an issue that is not otherwise answered by other OFAC guidance or applicable general licenses.

The questions and answers are, for the most part, a helpful recitation of the current landscape of sanctions involving Burma that summarize in one place the state of sanctions based on an assortment of scattered statutes, executive orders, regulations and licenses.  But one question stands out along with its non-responsive answer, in part, as follows:

What are the plans to update the SDN List for Burma?

Listings and any potential delistings under our Burma authorities will be pursued as appropriate to meet changing conditions in Burma.

The question itself has a colloquial quality to it as if the frequently asked question really put to OFAC has been along the lines of “What’s going on here?”

As other questions and answers describe, a number of banks remain on the SDN List but General License 19 authorizes U.S. persons to conduct most transactions with the banks.  In a similar situation about a year ago dealing with Zimbabwean banks, we posted about OFAC’s decision to keep those banks on the SDN List but, through a general license, to authorize almost all transactions with them.  At that time, I termed both the Burmese and Zimbabwean banks as SDN-lite designations and warned of the potential compliance difficulties such situations presented.

Keeping an entity on the SDN List would have the effect of blacklisting it from possible business with U.S. persons who rely solely on software to screen names on the SDN List to decide with whom to do business.  The results, of course, would create false positives because most transactions with these Burmese and Zimbabwean entities are permissible under U.S. law.  In fact, running these banks through OFAC’s SDN Search tool produces hits with no mention of any general license permitting dealings with them.

Delisting would, of course, be one option to correct the problem, but that would unblock any currently blocked assets, something OFAC might not wish to do.  Failing that, OFAC should at least put some annotation on the SDN List to denote that these very few entities are to be treated very differently than the thousands of others on the SDN List with whom U.S. persons may have no dealings.  At the moment, the question is back to OFAC, “What are the plans to update the SDN List?”

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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Feb

26

O, Canada! The Harper Government Solidifies Position as a Sanctions Hawk


Posted by at 6:17 pm on February 26, 2014
Category: General

By Jamie McCaffrey from Ottawa, Canada (RCMP Sunset Ceremony 2012) [CC-BY-2.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0)], via Wikimedia Commons http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3ARoyal_Canadian_Mounted_Police_(RCMP)_Sunset_Ceremony_2012.jpg

Canadian Citizenship and Immigration Minister Chris Alexander suggested this week on Canadian television that Canadian sanctions against Russia were a possibility if Russia was to support violent strife in Ukraine.  Although Alexander has since declined to comment on specific sanctions against Russia and other “hypothetical scenarios,” the idea that Canada would sanction Russia in some form should not come as a surprise.

Canada has quietly developed an economic sanctions regime that may be the world’s most aggressive outside the United States.  Case in point is Iran.  While the United States and the EU are at the negotiation table with Iran, Canada has stood steadfastly by its sanctions, which now include a comprehensive trade embargo as of last May.

Some in the Canadian press have pointed out that Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s alliance with Israel and its Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who called Harper a “great friend,” is the reason for increasing sanctions against Iran.  But Canadian sanctions remain aggressive in other parts of the world as well.  Canada, unlike the EU, has a comprehensive trade embargo against North Korea.  Canada also has strong sanctions remaining against Burma as well as some of the strongest global sanctions against Syria.

The glaring omission is, of course, sanctions against Cuba, which Canada does not have.  In fact, Canada is Cuba’s largest export destination. Canada’s Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, moreover, has long created a transnational dilemma because it prohibits any business in Canada from complying with U.S. sanctions against Cuba.  Businesses subject to both U.S. and Canadian laws will violate someone’s law in deciding whether or not to do business with Cuba.  As aggressive as Canada is in imposing sanctions against some countries, it is also aggressive in countering sanctions which it does not support.

But why shouldn’t Canada have a leading role in developing global sanctions policy?  Canada is the second-largest country in the world and one of the few countries with over a trillion dollars in GDP.  Eastern Canada’s traditional ties to Europe and western Canada’s increasing ties to China, Japan and the rest of the Pacific Rim make Canada one of the most globally connected countries.

For exporters with business in the United States, EU and Canada that presume that U.S. sanctions set the bar for your global compliance efforts, you may increasingly need to think again with respect to Canada.  Remember the Canadians can beat us at our own game: the Blue Jays won the World Series (twice)!

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)

Feb

11

With All Eyes on Sochi, Russian Ears Are on Ukraine


Posted by at 8:49 pm on February 11, 2014
Category: BISCCLExport ReformSurreptitious Listening Devices

Kremlin.ru [CC-BY-3.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0)], via Wikimedia Commonshttp://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File%3AVladimir_Putin_at_the_Millennium_Summit_6-8_September_2000-19.jpg

The continuing violence and political instability in Ukraine have raised concerns around the world, especially within the United States and the EU.  Whether some form of sanctions against current officials in the Ukrainian government should be imposed has been debated over the past several weeks, including reports that the Obama administration began preparing financial sanctions against current Ukrainian government officials last month.

Sanctions against Ukrainian officials are, of course, a delicate diplomatic endeavor for EU countries that not only trade extensively with Ukraine but also recognize the effects to EU-Russian relations with any rancor that develops by proxy in former Soviet states.  Such targeted EU or U.S. sanctions, moreover, amount to blocking funds that are unlikely to be found in large amounts in Western banks and a travel ban on individuals who were not likely to travel to the West in the near future in any event.

The telephone conversation posted to YouTube late last week between U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland and Geoffrey Pyatt, U.S. ambassador to Ukraine, however, exposed just how heated a resolution in Ukraine is becoming between the United States and the EU.  In discussing how officials from the United Nations may assist in reaching a resolution between the current Ukrainian government and opposition leaders, Nuland has now infamously said, “f**k the EU,” presumably an expression of her view that EU involvement thus far to address the situation in Ukraine has been inadequate.  As if that were not enough for diplomatic missteps, it has also been reported that Nuland and Pyatt each used unencrypted cell phones during the conversation.

While the fallout of Nuland’s comments and the Obama Administration’s finger-pointing at Russia for its involvement in hacking the phone call will garner the headlines, the issue also presents an interesting juncture for a shadowy subject of U.S. export controls: surreptitious listening devices.

As we first reported over seven years ago, BIS has not always been sufficiently clear on its standards for classifying surreptitious listening devices that are subject to the EAR’s control under section 742.13.  In Export Control Reform materials presented by BIS last year, BIS articulated five questions to assist exporters in answering the ultimate question, “Is my item subject to the 742.13 Communications Interception policy?”  Those questions, however, don’t help advance the ball much in improving a U.S. exporter’s ability in classifiying surreptitious listening devices short of seeking clarification or a license from BIS.

The United States may never determine what devices were involved in intercepting the Nuland-Pyatt conversation.  Moreover, the “tradecraft,” as Nuland described the interception, may very well continue to develop in ways that outpace any technical specifications that BIS affixes to surreptitious listening devices.  Without further clarity, however, U.S. exporters will still be mostly in the dark about what items require a U.S. export license at the same time that BIS will likely crank up the breadth of its controls over exports of surreptitious listening devices.  But if clarity is a hallmark of Export Control Reform, a little more with respect to surreptitious listening devices would go a long way.

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Copyright © 2014 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
(No republication, syndication or use permitted without my consent.)