Sep

17

Turkish Citizen Indicted For Foreign Downloads of Submarine Drawings


Posted by at 7:11 pm on September 17, 2014
Category: Arms ExportCriminal PenaltiesDDTCITARUSML

By U.S. Navy via http://www.navy.mil/view_image.asp?id=16778 [Public Domain]Alper Calik — a Turkish citizen and co-owner of Clifton, New Jersey based Clifmax LLC — has been arrested based on a criminal complaint, dated September 12, charging him, among other things, with violating the Arms Export Control Act by exporting without a license certain drawings relating to the NSSN (Virginia) class submarine. (And, no, I am not reporting this case simply because the company is named Clifmax, although that is, leaving the alleged criminal conduct aside, an awesome name for a company.)

At the heart of the allegations are two drawings that Calik downloaded from a DoD database after signing the Military Critical Technical Data Agreement which must be signed in order to gain access to the DoD drawing database at issue. The criminal complaint alleges that Calik downloaded these images while in Turkey and attempts to assert that Calik knew doing this was illegal because he had signed the Military Critical Technical Data Agreement.

However, the Military Critical Technical Data Agreement is hardly specific about what is or is not permitted with respect to the drawings, saying only this:

[The undersigned] acknowledge[s] all responsibilities under applicable U.S. export control laws and regulations (including the obligation, under certain circumstances, to obtain an export license from the U.S. Government prior to the release of militarily critical technical data within the United States) or applicable Canadian export control laws and regulations, and (2) agree[s] not to disseminate militarily critical technical data in a manner that would violate applicable U.S. or Canadian export control laws and regulations.

Suffice it to say that this certification is poorly drafted and confusing, mentioning an export license only in the context of releasing the data “within the United States.” Nor does the certification that he would not “disseminate” the data clearly prohibit him from downloading the information for his own personal review in a foreign country. Obviously, such downloads do in fact violate U.S. exports if the downloads include ITAR-controlled technical data, but this certification neither makes that clear nor establishes that Calik had the necessary criminal intent when he downloaded the documents

The complaint alleges that there were legends restricting export on the drawings involved, but does not quote those legends. Whether these legends are enough of a predicate to support the criminal intent necessary for conviction on the export charges depends on what those legends said and that remains to be seen.

UPDATE:  Two commenters make an excellent point about using the legends on the drawings as indicia of criminal intent: Calik would have only seen the legends after he downloaded the drawings in Turkey.  The significance of this point is magnified even further when you consider this statement from the criminal complaint:

Beginning in or around 2009 to the present time, ALPER CALIK downloaded approximately one hundred thousand drawings. some of which were subject to U.S. export control regulations without obtaining export licenses from the U.S. Department of State. ALPER CALIK was not in the United States when the majority of the drawings were downloaded.

At issue are only two of these one hundred thousand downloaded drawings, which would have revealed the legends only after being downloaded.  The overwhelming portion of the remainder of the drawings not having any indication that the downloading of these or other drawings might be problematic.

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7 Comments:


is this not a bit of a chicken and egg situation. you need to get the drawing onto your screen in turkey to be able to see the legend on the drawing?

I would have thought that if this had been a company that had this issue they would be facing all sorts of compliance offences and requirements to install front end access control software to ensure that all users could demonstrate that they were approved to receive the documents wherever they were accessing from.

Comment by Hamish on September 17th, 2014 @ 9:31 pm

And presumably, he would not have been able to see the legends on the drawings until after he downloaded them?

Comment by Joan on September 17th, 2014 @ 10:56 pm

Putting aside the excellent question of whether a warning that you can’t see until after downloading a document does any good, I would note that the warning itself might not mean much. Per DoD Instruction 5230.24, the standard label for unclassified export-controlled information is:

* * *

WARNING – This document contains technical data whose export is restricted by the Arms Export Control Act (Title 22, U.S.C., Sec 2751, et seq.) or the Export Administration Act of 1979 (Title 50, U.S.C., App. 2401 et seq.), as amended. Violations of these export laws are subject to severe criminal penalties. Disseminate in accordance with provisions of DoD Directive 5230.25.

* * *

I have never liked that language. The information is EITHER subject to the AECA OR the EAA?? That’s a pretty important distinction to elide. (Never mind that the EAA has been dead longer than my sixth-grader has been alive.) For instance, downloading EAR-controlled information while in Turkey can be entirely lawful, depending on the ECCN, applicability of any exceptions, and other factors.

To be sure, we don’t know exactly how the ITAR-controlled drawings were labeled in this case. Also, the other charges against Calik are pretty serious, so I don’t want to give the impression that I feel this prosecution is meritless. But I agree that the alleged facts supporting the count involving the drawings aren’t at all clear-cut.

Comment by Pat on September 18th, 2014 @ 10:32 am

    Good points, Pat. And yes, the other charges that he tried to pass off Turkish parts as U.S. parts, if true, are serious.

    Comment by Clif Burns on September 18th, 2014 @ 12:54 pm

Sorry – had to look up who Clifmax even was & what they did:

Clifmax Llc is a contractor in the Ball and Roller Bearing Manufacturing industry. Last year, they did not win any contracts. Since 2000, the contractor has performed 74 contracts with a total obligation amount of $2.05 Million, which means Clifmax Llc has completed contracts worth relatively the same amount as the median for all government contractors. The average obligation amount for their contracts is $27,744.

Comment by Publius on September 18th, 2014 @ 2:19 pm

Don’t you have to be a US citizen to get access to ITAR data in the first place? If I remember correctly, ITAR, unlike EAR, consider a foreign citizen, even if he/she is a US permanent resident, to be ineligible to access tech data without a license. In other words, shouldn’t his downloads of tech drawings while in the US be conseidered a deemed export?

Comment by Dmitry on September 18th, 2014 @ 4:04 pm