Apr

2

Aidless in Gaza?


Posted by at 7:46 pm on April 2, 2009
Category: General

Gaza City, Gaza StripYou can rest assured that this will probably be the first, last and only Export Law Blog post with a link to a story in a Norwegian Marxist-Leninist-Maoist newspaper called, in English, “The Class Struggle” ( or “Klassekampen” in Norwegian). And it’s not just because we find the concept of a Norwegian Marxist-Leninist-Maoist to be sort of comic, at least in the same sense of say, a Belarusan Scientologist or a North Korean Tory. There is, trust me, a legitimate didactic purpose here.

The article in question (translated here) argues that sanctions enforced by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) are prohibiting the reconstruction of schools and hospitals destroyed in the January air attacks by Israel on buildings in the Gaza Strip. It’s not at all clear how OFAC sanctions are affecting aid from non-U.S. NGOs. But the article is correct that Hamas’s status as a Specially Designated National (“SDN”) and its control of the government of the Gaza Strip broadly prohibits most transactions, humanitarian or otherwise, by U.S. persons with the Gaza Strip government.

When Hamas gained control of the Palestinian Authority after the January 2006 elections, its status as an SDN led to what I call “constructive sanctions” against the Palestinian Authority — “constructive” in the sense that the Palestinian Authority was not itself listed by OFAC as a sanctioned regime. Thereafter, OFAC issued six general licenses permitting certain humanitarian activities in areas controlled by the Palestinian Authority, provided there were no direct dealings with Hamas. After the takeover of Gaza by Hamas in 2007, the PA, then only in control of the West Bank, formed a new government without Hamas participation, and OFAC permitted all transactions with the West Bank, exclusive of any transactions with any remaining elements of Hamas in the West Bank.

My concern here is with constructive sanctions that require exporters not only to consult OFAC’s lists but also to be aware of complex geopolitical considerations in countries to which they export. Just as an exporter may not know that the CNDD-FDD controls Burundi, it may not know that Hamas controls Gaza. OFAC, of course, knows who’s running Gaza and ought to simply sanction Gaza directly rather than do so indirectly through its sanctions on the controlling political party. It is reasonable to expect exporters to consult a list of sanctioned governments, but not to research the controlling party of a country and then to see whether that party is an SDN or not.

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Copyright © 2009 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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One Comment:


OFAC and BIS like to talk as though such “targeted” sanctions are somehow a great leap forward in export controls. Especially for small exporters, these sanctions, which are in addition to rather than instead of “list-based” export controls, complicate exporting to the point where many small manufacturers of otherwise competive products choose not to accept the risk of exporting. While large corporations may be able to afford “compliance software”, its a reach for small start-ups or new-to-exporting such that many small potential exporters can’t accept either the risk of exporting without the software or the cost of the software. OFAC, as part of the Treasury “culture” which has been and remains intimate with and partial to big banks and financial institutions, just really doesn’t care about small business and wishes they would just let themselves be bought up by OFAC large friends. OFAC, by falsely claiming that its rulemaking is exempt from the APA, also thereby willfully evades the application of the Regulatory Flexibility Act, which requires federal regulatory authorities to consult with and take into consideration the effect of a rulemaking on small business.

Comment by Hillbilly on April 7th, 2009 @ 9:58 am