Sep
6
Scramjet Conference Conundrum
Posted by Clif Burns at 10:17 pm on September 6, 2007
Category: DDTC • Deemed Exports • Iran Sanctions
An alert reader pointed out this interesting article in Aviation Week which raises the issue, which we last talked about in relation to the Chi Mak prosecution, of deemed exports at scientific conferences. The conference in question was an American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics conference in July on propulsion technologies, including scramjet and related technologies.
The Cincinnati meeting differed from a traditional U.S. industry gathering, because nearly a dozen engineers from Iran also submitted papers on Iranian solid and liquid rocket technologies. The Iranian engineers are based at the Sharif University of Technology and the KNT Technical University, both in Tehran. They apparently did not deliver the papers in person. However, as participants, the Iranians have access to all of the highly detailed U.S. aircraft and rocket propulsion presentations made at the conference.
Of course, the non-attendance of the Iranians isn’t surprising, since the probably didn’t apply for visas and even if they had those visas would likely have been denied. And the sanctions against Iran would not forbid access to presentations from the conference under the informational exception.
But, of course, if the information at the conference went beyond public domain information or fundamental research under section 120.11 of the ITAR, then companies and individuals at the conference may have committed export violations, not only because of any access to that information by Iranians nationals but also because of access to that information by any other foreign nationals. And it would appear that all the papers presented at the conference can be purchased from the AIAA website.
So, was any such information available? Consider this:
[O]ne [of] the more interesting historical papers presented at the forum was a detailed description of how the U.S. Air Force and Lockheed combined top-secret ramjet propulsion technologies with segmented solid rocket boosters for the Mach 3 D-21B reconnaissance drones that were launched by modified SR-71s and B-52Hs in the late 1960s. … This was the first time details on the segmented rocket booster portion of the D-21B program have been presented publicly, says Robert Geisler of Geisler Industries, who led the analysis with retired Pratt & Whitney and ATK Tactical Propulsion engineers.
Yikes. If I were the one who presented that paper, I might be a little nervous right now.
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5 Comments:
This coincides with the problems that, potentially, many universities around the US face. One S.Cal university, attending an SIA meeting, described the situation at the school as being non-compliant. The school had been exporting technology to foreign nationals without first obtaining the proper BIS or DDTC export license(s). However, the school continues to err on the side of the foreign national’s rights to obtain the same degree and level of education as anyone else. So they continue to break the law. Just like Clif indicated, ” I might be a little nervous…” if I were the professor who transfered the technology.
Transferring technologies to foreign nationals without first knowing what can be transfered is much like Russian Roulette. You never know when enforcement authorities will come knocking on your door. And when you personally will face fines and jail time.
Good luck to Robert!
I’ve been researching this issue since last discussed at ExportLawBlog quite extensively – stumbling upon several DoD Directives touching upon the issue.
The most concise argument I’ve been able to find collecting hard resources advocating a US Government position that release to the public domain of most ITAR-controlled technical data must be authorized prior to public release was assembled by the US Department of Agriculture at the following link:
http://www.usda.gov/da/pdsd/Security%20Guide/S2unclas/Techdata.htm
Quote: “The rationale for this restriction is that public release may constitute an export.”
Admittedly, gray area abounds in this arena, but sensible export control professionals will advise a conservative approach to public release of ITAR-controlled information. The liberal post-USSR exuberance prompting a textually insignificant change to the ITAR in the early eighties is likely to be quickly rendered moot by current protectionist tendencies brought about by the GWOT. It is only a matter of time before someone is hit with a substantial penalty, and my best guess is that it will likely come in the form of a debarment or substantial suspension of a medium College’s or University’s ability to participate in USG projects/contracting – thereby allowing DDTC to kill a few birds with a single stone.
A professor of electronic engineering at the University of Tennessee, who also happens to be an honarary prof at a Chinese university, has been having problems since July of last year when ICE and OEE seized his laptop upon return from China and then executed a search warrant upon his office and home. It seems that the professor had also hired a Chinese graduate student to work on a contract for the Air Force; however, the professor was the inventor and patentee of the technology that the Air Force wanted to use, so its arguably his technology, not the Air Farce’s. No indictment has been issued yet, but its been an uncomfortable and expensive year.
Participants to this meeting gain no special access to the papers. The paper are all publically avaliable from AIAA. The papers are cleared throguh appropriate Goverment review for public release before the submission is accepted.
Robert, I suspected that this was the case notwithstanding the suggestions otherwise by the Aviation Week article.
