Apr

14

Iran Continues to Play the Name Game


Posted by at 5:43 pm on April 14, 2010
Category: Iran Sanctions

Fifth Ocean RenamedBack in March 2009, this blog reported that Iran was skirting sanctions imposed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) on Iran’s state shipping line, the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (“IRISL”). OFAC had sanctioned all 123 of the IRISL’s vessels, and Iran almost immediately thereafter got busy changing the names of each of its vessels. As of March 2009 the names of 45 ships had been changed.

According to this report from the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control released on April 9, Iran continued to change the names of IRISL vessels as fast as it could paint them over, and by March of this year IRISL had changed the names of 35 more vessels, making a total of 80 re-christened, so to speak, vessels. In addition, the IRISL has been changing nominal ownership of these ships to shell companies in Malta, Germany and Hong Kong. And to further distance itself from these ships, a new management company — Soroush Sarzamin Asatir SSA — now manages the ships in IRISL’s stead.

Of course, the OFAC designation listed the unique identifiers assigned to these boats by the International Maritime Organization, and these identifying numbers can’t be changed. Still, the Wisconsin Project report frets that it may be difficult for U.S. exporters to comply now with the sanctions because the IMO number isn’t always listed in the cargo documents, the letters of credit or other associated shipping documents. Apparently, the folks at the Wisconsin Project aren’t terribly familiar with this new-fangled thing called the Internet, because a quick Google search brought me to the sight of Vesseltracker.com, where entry of one of the new names, like “Decker” for example, quickly brings up the correct IMO number, which then can be searched against OFAC’s list.

The money line from the IRISL report, however, was this:

Iran has made more of an effort to circumvent the sanctions imposed on IRISL than the United States has made to enforce them.

Ouch.

The next day, in a Wall Street Journal article on the Wisconsin Project’s report, Adam Szubin, the director of OFAC, tried to ease the sting of the Wisconsin Project’s allegations with this not very convincing response:

Szubin said his agency “deliberates carefully about the timing of its public designations,” adding, “We may choose to delay a public identification to allow for additional surveillance or to secure cooperation with foreign allies.”

Mr. Szubin also said the Iranian company’s actions signaled the sanctions were having an effect. “Since its designation [by the Treasury], IRISL has taken a number of steps to mask its commercial activities and disguise the ownership of its ships. IRISL’s attempts to deceive third parties are consistent with its past practices, and a measure of the impact that U.S. sanctions have had.”

I don’t see how additional time for surveillance comes into play here since the name changes are a matter of public record. Less convincing still is the spin that the IRISL’s evasion of the sanctions is some kind of proof of their effectiveness. It’s rather like saying that when a criminal goes fugitive it is proof that law enforcement is doing its job. But irrespective of when and how quickly OFAC gets around to getting the correct names on its list, exporters should determine and search the IMO numbers for each vessel they use to export their goods.

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Copyright © 2010 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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5 Comments:


Clif,

As amusing as it may be to poke fun at the folks of the Wisconsin Project, the IRISL report itself comes from IranWatch (http://www.iranwatch.org/enforcementnotebook/irislreport.htm), and at the bottom of the report is this note
“This table was compiled using data drawn from several sources, including the Germanischer Lloyd and Det Norske Veritas vessel registers. It is believed to be accurate as of 3/17/2010, but is highly likely to change thereafter.”

Comment by Scott K. on April 15th, 2010 @ 6:31 am

IranWatch is a publication of the Wisconsin Project and bears a Wisconsin Project copyright notice at the bottom. The only thing I’m really poking fun of is the notion that it is hard for exporters to find the IMO numbers and that comes from the text of the report itself. The table itself is, I think, an extremely useful service from the WP folks because it is yet another source exporters can use to avoid IRISL ships.

Comment by Clif Burns on April 15th, 2010 @ 8:10 am

Ah, my mistake, I interpreted you differently. Sorry.

Comment by Scott K. on April 15th, 2010 @ 11:37 am

The Wisconsin Project has never met a sanction or an export control that it didn’t like. Its founder has build a safe academic/Betway sinecure for himself at the expense of American jobs by lobbying for unilateral sanctions that do nothing but depress American exports without hurting the target states. It is a cynical, self-serving, jaded throwback to the days of Midwest isolationalism. Why journalists at WSJ, NPR and elsewhere accept whatever the Wisconsin Project asserts without challenge or objective skepticism is a mystery.

Comment by Hillbilly on April 20th, 2010 @ 10:13 am

Strange- no mention of North Korea and Burma doing the same thing.

You know, a lot of this is allowed to occur so as to give western intelligence agencies a snapshot of how far along a country is in building such and such dual-use, turn-key facilities. It’s called, “Watch and Observe,” or, “Look, but don’t Touch.” This is why WMDs were never ‘discovered’ in Iraq. We knew they had them, but to give that away would mean exposing the fact we conducted numerous ‘dangle operations’ to get the proof. Doing so often involves the participation of neutral countries and arms manufacturers who would rather remain anonymous.

Comment by Roger Clemmens on June 9th, 2010 @ 2:55 pm