Oct

8

Silicon Valley Firm Settles Export Charges


Posted by at 8:08 pm on October 8, 2008
Category: General

Maxim HeadquartersMaxim Integrated Products, a publicly-traded designer and manufacturer of semiconductor circuits and other analog and digital electronics, agreed on October 3 to pay the Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) a civil penalty of $192,000 to settle 34 counts of alleged export violations charged by the agency. Of particular interest is the count relating to a release of controlled technology to an Iranian national in the United States. (Such releases are called, in Export Geek Speak, “deemed exports.”)

The deemed export in question, and the resulting charges, should serve as a reminder to companies not to forget about the broad swath of technology covered under Export Control Classification Numbers (ECCNs) in the E99 series, that is, ECCNs in the form xE99x, such as 5E992. It was exactly that ECCN that was involved in the Maxim settlement and it covers any “technology relating to any telecommunications equipment and other information security and containing encryption.” Unlike other ECCNs in this category, ECCN 5E992 is not dependent upon the strength of the encryption, the algorithm used, whether it’s asymmetrical or not, or the use of the encryption. It covers all technology for encryption for telecommunications or information security, with the only exceptions being the public domain and fundamental research exceptions found in section 734.3 of the Export Administration Regulations (“EAR”).

Because the scope of the technology controlled under ECCN 5E992 and under other E99 series ECCNS is quite broad, the controls imposed under those ECCNs only limit exports to those few countries subject to Anti-Terrorism (“AT”) controls, i.e., Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Sudan and Syria. So Myriad could have shared whatever they shared with their Iranian employees with foreign employees from most other countries. My suspicion is that many companies don’t focus on series E99 controls with respect to their deemed exports, but, as this case shows, they should.

One other point: under section 734.2(b)(2)(ii) of the EAR, the deemed export rules do not apply to foreign nationals who have been granted permanent residence or protected status. My guess is that the Iranian involved here was in the country on a family-related visa, which would allow a work authorization, but not the receipt of any controlled technology.

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Copyright © 2008 Clif Burns. All Rights Reserved.
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3 Comments:


Of interest to the readers, I believe, would be some insight regarding how this violation came to BIS’ attention and how Maxim handled it.

Comment by John Liebman on October 9th, 2008 @ 3:08 pm

The settlement docs don’t provide any information on how the violation came to BIS’s attention or how Maxim handled it, other than it is clear that there wasn’t a voluntary disclosure by Maxim to BIS.

Usually BIS learns of these things from disgruntled employees, freight forwarders who notice a violation or customs inspections of outbound goods. Here it looks like something else might have triggered the investigation. Counts 1 and 2 deal with a deemed export to a PRC national. The PRC national was hired on June 10 but the license application wasn’t made until June 15. I suspect that the date discrepancy appeared in the application in such a way as to suggest that the disclosures started on June 10 and that caused BIS to launch an investigation.

This is just a speculation, of course, but not an unreasonable one given the description of this incident in the charging and settlement docs.

Comment by Clif Burns on October 9th, 2008 @ 3:30 pm

Could the Iranian national have been here on an F-1 or H1B visa?

Comment by MO on October 9th, 2008 @ 7:07 pm