According to an article on the website of London broadsheet The Daily Telegraph, some U.K. banks may be walking back, at least slightly, from a hard and fast policy of not processing Cuban payments for fear of OFAC reprisal. Interestingly, the article notes that part of the banks’ hesitance arises from “US attempts to extradite British executives it claims have breached sanctions” and “the failure of the British Government to provide protection against extradition.” This is presumably a reference to the pending extradition request against Christopher Tappin for his involvement in an attempted export of batteries from the United States to Iran.

The Telegraph article suggests that British authorities have been in contact with Lloyds and other banks after receiving a number of complaints from customers that could not clear Cuba checks. One case involved a customer whose account was closed by Bank of Scotland when the customer would not provide assurances that it would not receive Cuban payments in its account.

Now, presumably as a result of these official contacts, even Lloyds may be softening its hard line on Cuba transactions. The Telegraph reporter Roland Gribben signals this change in the following fractured sentence that suggests he may not have a very clear grasp of export law himself.

If the Cuban bank does not infringe OFAC regulations or has dealings with Specially Designated Individuals who can be either individuals, entities or banks, then Lloyds may be willing to process a payment from Cuba provided it was in sterling.

Probably what Lloyds was saying before Mr. Gribben garbled their statement was that Lloyds would process checks in pounds provided that parties on OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons were not involved in the transaction.

Once bitten, twice shy, it would seem. Last year, Lloyds agreed to pay $217 million in penalties and to adopt certain compliance procedures arising from allegations by the U.S. Treasury Department’s allegations that Lloyd deleted information about Libya, Sudan and Iran in wire transfer instructions in order to clear dollar transactions through its correspondent banks in the U.S. Specifically, Lloyds agreed to third party audits “to determine whether any payments subject to OFAC regulations were processed through, or on behalf of, any U.S. individual or entity.”

Twice shy here means that Lloyds is backing away from transactions that it would appear aren’t even subject to OFAC’s regulatory jurisdiction and which don’t involve transactions to be processed through a U.S. bank or on behalf of any U.S. entity. It was a check payable to a U.K. company in pounds sterling. So maybe its thrice shy or twenty times shy.

The problem here, of course, is E.U. Council Regulation No. 2271/96 which makes it illegal for Lloyds to cooperate with the U.S. sanctions on Cuba. This point was not lost on Fertecon, or its lawyers, who have traipsed off to U.K. and E.U. authorities to complain. Lloyds case with the E.U. is not terribly enhanced by the fact that U.S. law wouldn’t appear to prohibit Lloyds from negotiating a Cuban check in pounds sterling for a U.K. customer. Lloyds must have made a careful calculation, given the lack of any significant enforcement of Regulation 2271/96, that it would be happy to be bitten by a toothless, mangy dog in its own backyard if it would curry favor with a neighbor’s angry pit bull that thinks it owns the entire neighborhood.

Although the ISIS report isn’t clear on this, it appears that Vanaki must have been charged under section 19 of the German law. Although the law prohibits exporting or brokering of “war weapons,” it is likely that the high-speed cameras were considered a dual-use item rather than a war weapon. In that case, section 19 would prohibit the brokering of the item to Iran if, and only if, Iran has a nuclear weapons program.

This lead to an unusual step by Vanaki’s defense which introduced the United States’ 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (“NIE”) on Iran which, the defense claimed, concluded that Iran had abandoned its nuclear program in 2003 and had not resumed it by 2007 when the high-speed cameras at issue were sold to Iran. The German trial court agreed and acquitted the defendant.

The prosecution appealed, and the appeals court sent the case back to the trial court for another trial. In reaching its decision, the appeals court pointed out that the trial court put too much reliance on the 2007 NIE. The NIE’s conclusion that it was “moderately confident” that Tehran had not resumed its nuclear weapons program was far from proof that it had, in fact, not resumed that program. The appeals court also relied on a supplemental report from the Bundesnachrichtendienst (“BND”), Germany’s foreign intelligence service, which discussed the development by Iran of a missile launcher as well as similarities in procurement practices by Iran and countries known to have nuclear weapons programs, such as Pakistan and North Korea. Based on this report, the appeals court found that it was now likely that Vanaki would be convicted on a retrial and sent the case back to the trial court.

Two things bear noting here. First, Germany’s export laws in this case, and in other cases that involve dual-use items, impose an intolerably heavy burden of proof in export prosecutions. In effect, the state has to prove that the country in question has a nuclear program, an element of proof that would be difficult and almost necessarily speculative in the case of many countries which are believed to be developing nuclear weapons but have not yet admitted that fact. Second, it appears that the BND assessment must provide some fairly certain intelligence demonstrating the existence and scope of Iran’s nuclear program. This may explain why Germany, unlike some other EU countries, has recently seemed more interested in restricting certain exports to Iran.

National authorities will be in charge of granting such license, which may include not only “individual” transaction-specific licenses but also global licenses and general licenses. Global licenses are given to one exporter and authorize the export of one category of items to multiple end-users and/or countries. General licenses are essentially license exemptions for certain products and certain destinations or end-users. The regulation also includes a “Community General Export Authorization” covering items listed in Annex II and which may exported to Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the U.S.

Of particular interest are the brokering provisions. These provisions control the brokering of dual-use items which is a more expansive control than imposed by the United States which does not have laws or regulations relating to the brokerage of dual-use items. U.S. brokering regulations apply only to defense articles and services. The regulation’s definition of brokerage is also broader than the definition of brokering in the the International Traffic in Arms Regulations adopted by the U.S. Under the EU definition brokering is simply the purchase and sale, or the negotiation for the purchase and sale, of dual use items from one third country to another. It does not exclude, as does the U.S. definition, activities performed by employees or other parties not acting as agents. The EU regulation also covers uncompensated activity whereas the U.S. regulations require that the agent be compensated in order to fall within the definition.