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	<title>Comments on: Federal Indictment Targets Mayrow Network Exports to Iran</title>
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	<description>Latest News on DDTC, BIS, OFAC, and other export law matters</description>
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		<title>By: RS</title>
		<link>http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/392/comment-page-1#comment-20536</link>
		<dc:creator>RS</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 19 Sep 2008 16:29:38 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>The initial letter designating the firms is available here: http://www.bis.doc.gov/pdf/09182008_entitylistadditions.pdf</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The initial letter designating the firms is available here: <a href="http://www.bis.doc.gov/pdf/09182008_entitylistadditions.pdf" rel="nofollow">http://www.bis.doc.gov/pdf/09182008_entitylistadditions.pdf</a></p>
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		<title>By: hass</title>
		<link>http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/392/comment-page-1#comment-20533</link>
		<dc:creator>hass</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 16:03:56 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>I think you&#039;re missing the intended propaganda effect of this news. According to the Washington Post, the material the Iranians exported were &quot;for bombs&quot; -- in other words they were specifically intended to make IEDs.

However, the BIS says only that these items were &quot;CAPABLE of producing improvised explosive devices  SIMILAR to those being used in Iraq and Afghanistan&quot;

The difference is significant but subtle, so it will be ignored in the media accounts.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>I think you&#8217;re missing the intended propaganda effect of this news. According to the Washington Post, the material the Iranians exported were &#8220;for bombs&#8221; &#8212; in other words they were specifically intended to make IEDs.</p>
<p>However, the BIS says only that these items were &#8220;CAPABLE of producing improvised explosive devices  SIMILAR to those being used in Iraq and Afghanistan&#8221;</p>
<p>The difference is significant but subtle, so it will be ignored in the media accounts.</p>
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		<title>By: Mike Deal</title>
		<link>http://www.exportlawblog.com/archives/392/comment-page-1#comment-20532</link>
		<dc:creator>Mike Deal</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 18 Sep 2008 12:19:50 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description>The boys and girls at the Chinese trade ministry are rejoicing:  Yet another shot in our own feet administered by DoJ and BIS.  The only thing that the indictments and additions to the Enmity List will do is to decrease U.S. exports of hardware and software that Iran can and will acquire from or through other sources, at a time when the U.S. economy is hemorrhaging due to years and years of ever larger trade deficits. Instead of Dells assembled in Round Rock or Lebanon, Gulf traders will stock their shelves with Dells assembled in Malaysia or Lenovos built in Shanghai or Shanxi, and folks in Tehran will be happy to buy them.  In the past, whenever Gulf oil producers enjoyed high prices there was a subsequent increase in U.S. exports to the Gulf; but, this time, the increase is disproportionately lower notwithstanding the huge increase in prices denominated in dollars because the region is turning to non-U.S. suppliers as much as possible in order to avoid unilateral U.S. trade sanctions.  

If they want to cut down on smuggling of F-14 and other military spares, they would be better served by reforming DRMS/DLA.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The boys and girls at the Chinese trade ministry are rejoicing:  Yet another shot in our own feet administered by DoJ and BIS.  The only thing that the indictments and additions to the Enmity List will do is to decrease U.S. exports of hardware and software that Iran can and will acquire from or through other sources, at a time when the U.S. economy is hemorrhaging due to years and years of ever larger trade deficits. Instead of Dells assembled in Round Rock or Lebanon, Gulf traders will stock their shelves with Dells assembled in Malaysia or Lenovos built in Shanghai or Shanxi, and folks in Tehran will be happy to buy them.  In the past, whenever Gulf oil producers enjoyed high prices there was a subsequent increase in U.S. exports to the Gulf; but, this time, the increase is disproportionately lower notwithstanding the huge increase in prices denominated in dollars because the region is turning to non-U.S. suppliers as much as possible in order to avoid unilateral U.S. trade sanctions.  </p>
<p>If they want to cut down on smuggling of F-14 and other military spares, they would be better served by reforming DRMS/DLA.</p>
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