Comments on: Scramjet Conference Conundrum

By: Clif Burns

Clif Burns — Thu, 13 Sep 2007 18:40:12 +0000

Robert, I suspected that this was the case notwithstanding the suggestions otherwise by the Aviation Week article.

By: Robert Fredrick

Robert Fredrick — Thu, 13 Sep 2007 17:33:21 +0000

Participants to this meeting gain no special access to the papers. The paper are all publically avaliable from AIAA. The papers are cleared throguh appropriate Goverment review for public release before the submission is accepted.

By: Mike Deal

Mike Deal — Sun, 09 Sep 2007 15:36:39 +0000

A professor of electronic engineering at the University of Tennessee, who also happens to be an honarary prof at a Chinese university, has been having problems since July of last year when ICE and OEE seized his laptop upon return from China and then executed a search warrant upon his office and home. It seems that the professor had also hired a Chinese graduate student to work on a contract for the Air Force; however, the professor was the inventor and patentee of the technology that the Air Force wanted to use, so its arguably his technology, not the Air Farce’s. No indictment has been issued yet, but its been an uncomfortable and expensive year.

By: Matthew J. Lancaster

Matthew J. Lancaster — Sat, 08 Sep 2007 04:20:45 +0000

I’ve been researching this issue since last discussed at ExportLawBlog quite extensively – stumbling upon several DoD Directives touching upon the issue.

The most concise argument I’ve been able to find collecting hard resources advocating a US Government position that release to the public domain of most ITAR-controlled technical data must be authorized prior to public release was assembled by the US Department of Agriculture at the following link:

http://www.usda.gov/da/pdsd/Security%20Guide/S2unclas/Techdata.htm

Quote: “The rationale for this restriction is that public release may constitute an export.”

Admittedly, gray area abounds in this arena, but sensible export control professionals will advise a conservative approach to public release of ITAR-controlled information. The liberal post-USSR exuberance prompting a textually insignificant change to the ITAR in the early eighties is likely to be quickly rendered moot by current protectionist tendencies brought about by the GWOT. It is only a matter of time before someone is hit with a substantial penalty, and my best guess is that it will likely come in the form of a debarment or substantial suspension of a medium College’s or University’s ability to participate in USG projects/contracting – thereby allowing DDTC to kill a few birds with a single stone.

By: Shawn Wheatfill

Shawn Wheatfill — Fri, 07 Sep 2007 13:30:13 +0000

This coincides with the problems that, potentially, many universities around the US face. One S.Cal university, attending an SIA meeting, described the situation at the school as being non-compliant. The school had been exporting technology to foreign nationals without first obtaining the proper BIS or DDTC export license(s). However, the school continues to err on the side of the foreign national’s rights to obtain the same degree and level of education as anyone else. So they continue to break the law. Just like Clif indicated, ” I might be a little nervous…” if I were the professor who transfered the technology.

Transferring technologies to foreign nationals without first knowing what can be transfered is much like Russian Roulette. You never know when enforcement authorities will come knocking on your door. And when you personally will face fines and jail time.

Good luck to Robert!